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ABSTRACT 
 
In a series of discussions culminating in a conference organized by 
Villanova University, Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion argue the 
impossibility of negative theology.   
 
For Derrida, negative theology operates via “denegations” that lead to a 
hyper-theology affirming God as hyperousious.  “Mystical theology” 
embodies this hyper-movement and, so, is no longer apophatic.  For 
Marion, negative theology is not self-sufficient but ushers the hyperbolic 
and pragmatic mode of knowing God by unknowing or “denominating” 
God.  Mystical theology is a “theology of absence”, a higher apophasis 
that overcomes both affirmation and negation. 
 
However, Derrida understands mystical theology as a discourse of 
presence.  It promises union with God, a teleological fulfilment of 
presence that is more ontological than apophatic.  Marion disagrees, 
arguing for the possibility of a presence exceeding ontology:  The 
“Saturated phenomenon” (Revelation), where intuition of presence 
exceeds and disqualifies all concepts and intentions.  Presence exceeds 
knowledge; it precedes being.  As such, Marion’s phenomenology 
welcomes all phenomena.  Derrida finds this problematic.  As their 
discussion on “the Gift” shows, Marion’s phenomenology makes room 
for revelation as an appearing of the divine itself.  Derrida questions if 
this is still phenomenology that welcomes the other as tout autre, 
absence.   
 
Beginning with Heidegger’s destruktion of ontotheology (Introduction), 
this discussion subsequently analyzes the respective arguments of 
Derrida and Marion on the possibility of negative theology (sections 1 
and 2).  Their arguments reflect the points mentioned above.  These 
are evaluated in light of the conference round-table discussion, “On the 
Gift” (Conclusion).  The conclusion evaluates Derrida and Marion’s 
discussion as an ideal enactment of the tension between philosophy and 
theology – a tension that Heidegger identifies as inherent in 
ontotheology. 
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1. Introduction:  God, Ontotheology, and Negation  
 
This essay proceeds as follows:  First, it recalls Heidegger’s project of 
“overcoming metaphysics” as a prelude to Derrida’s and Marion’s efforts to overcome 
ontotheology (Introduction); second, it analyzes Derrida's Jerusalem lecture, ‘How to 
Avoid Speaking’, the basis of Marion's critique of Derrida's interpretation of negative 
theology (Section 1).  Subsequently, Marion's paper, ‘In the Name’, is analyzed to 
uncover the issues Marion has with Derrida and deconstruction (Section 2).  The issues 
identified in Derrida’s and Marion’s lectures, respectively, are explored in light of their 
discussion, ‘On the Gift’ (Section 3).  Finally, this essay will evaluate the discussion 
between Derrida and Marion as an “enactment” of the tension between philosophy and 
theology – a tension Hediegger identifies as inherent to ontotheology (Conclusion). 
 
1.1. The Event 
 
 Villanova University organized a conference, ‘Religion and Postmodernism’ 
(September 25–27, 1997), to discuss “the question of religion at the end of the 
millennium”. 1   An important objective was to facilitate a face-to-face dialogue 
between Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) and Jean-Luc Marion (1946–    ) on two 
issues:  Mystical theology and the Gift.
2
  According to John D. Caputo: 
 
The conference was an attempt to seize a particular moment in recent 
work in philosophy and theology, a moment in which the 'overcoming of 
metaphysics' characteristic of continental philosophy since Heidegger 
and questions of a profoundly religious character have become 
increasingly and surprisingly convergent. 
 
 Indeed, this was the first public meeting between Derrida and Marion.  
However, their discussion on negative theology began as early as 1968:
3
  In his essay, 
                                                 
1 Another four conferences on separate themes related to 'Religion and Postmodernism' have since 
been held at Villanova University:  'Questioning God' (October 14 & 15, 1999), 'Confessions' 
(September 27–29, 2001), 'Transcendence and Beyond' (September 18–20, 2003), and 'Athens and 
Jerusalem on the Polis' (October 26–28, 2006). 
2 John D. Caputo and M. J. Scanlon, eds., God, the Gift, and Postmodernism (Bloomington, Indiana: 
Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 1.  Dawne McCance, Derrida On Religion: Thinker of Difference 
(London & Oakville: Equinox Publishing, 2009), p. 93. 
3 For the philosophical and religious development of negative theology, see:  Raoul Mortley, From 
Word to Silence, 2 vols (Bonn: Hanstein, 1986); Deirdre Carabine, The Unknown God – Negative 
2 
 
‘Différance’ (1968), Derrida distinguished deconstruction from negative theology, the 
latter being an attempt at establishing a “superessentiality”;4 Marion critiques Derrida’s 
interpretation of negative theology in his, The Idol and Distance (1977), a critique 
Derrida picks up in, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ (1986),5 where he also refers to 
and critiques Marion's God Without Being (1982);
6
 Marion responds to Derrida with his 
conference paper, ‘In the Name: How to Avoid Speaking of ‘Negative Theology’’;7 
these culminate in the conference round-table discussion, ‘On the Gift’, moderated by 
Richard Kearney.
8
 
  
 With Derrida and Marion, two trajectories of thinking converge:  First, the 
“overcoming of metaphysics” effects a religious turn in philosophy of the 'apophatic' 
kind;
9
 second, “questions of a profoundly religious character” motivate efforts to 
                                                                                                                                               
Theology In the Platonic Tradition: From Plato to Eiugena, Louvain Theological & Pastoral 
Monographs 19 (Louvain: Peeters Press, 1995). 
4 ‘Différance’ was originally an address given at a meeting of the Société française de philosophie (27 
January 1968).  Simultaneously published in the Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie 
(July–September 1968).  Translated into English by Alan Bass and published in Jacques Derrida, 
Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 1–27. 
5 Originally delivered as a lecture in Jerusalem (June 1986) for the opening of the colloquium, 
‘Absence and Negativity’, organized by the Hebrew University and the Institute for Advanced 
Studies of Jerusalem.  Translated into English by Ken Frieden and Elizabeth Rottenberg and 
published in Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume II, ed. by Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth 
Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 143–195.  Referred to as HAS in the 
present essay. 
6 Both works originally published in French as L'Idole et la distance: cinq études (Paris: B. Grasset, 
1977) and Dieu sans l'etre (Paris: Fayard, 1982), respectively. 
7   There are two editions of Marion’s essay.  The original is found in Caputo and Scanlon , eds., God, 
the Gift and Postmodernism, pp. 20–53.  Marion later published an version in the collection, In 
Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena, trans. by R. Horner and V. Berraud (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2002), pp. 128–162.  The original will be our primary source, since it is closest to 
the paper he delivered during the Villanova conference.  Furthermore, Derrida's response is also 
contained in the original.  For citation purposes, the original essay published in Caputo and Scanlon 
is abbreviated, ‘IN’; the later edited version published in In Excess will be abbreviated as, ‘INE’. 
8   See ‘On the Gift: A Discussion Between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion’, in God, The Gift 
and Postmodernism, pp. 54–78. 
9 For the postmodern turn of continental philosophy to apophaticism, see William Franke, ‘Apophasis 
and the Turn of Philosophy to Religion: From Neoplatonic Negative Theology to Postmodern 
Negation of Theology’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 60.1–3 (December 2006), 
pp. 61–76.  Volume 60 of IPJR is reprinted as Self and Other: Essays in Continental Philosophy of 
Religion, ed. by Eugene T. Long (Dordrect, Netherlands: Springer, 2007).  Michael Sells poses the 
question, “Is apophasis dead?”, and suggests that it ressourcement lead to a critical re-evaluation of 
contemporary philosophy.  Sells, ‘Apophasis in Plotinus: A Critical Approach’, in The Harvard 
Theological Review 78.1/2 (January–April, 1985), pp. 47–65. 
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“reclaim the God of Abraham, of Isaac, of Jacob, of Jesus.”10  These modes of thinking 
produce a “philosophy of the religious” and a “philosophical theology”, respectively.  
As this essay demonstrates, although not immediately apparent, Derrida approaches the 
former, while Marion the latter.  What defines their respective approaches is a deep 
appropriation of thinking stemming from two sources:  Edmund Husserl’s 
phenomenology and Martin Heidegger’s critical philosophy.  Phenomenology will be 
discussed later.  Presently, Heidegger’s project of “overcoming metaphysics” needs 
explication.  Derrida’s and Marion’s efforts to overcome ontotheology and 
metaphysics owe much to Heidegger’s destruktion, which moves philosophy from 
metaphysics to thinking itself.
11
 
 
1.2. ‘Questioning Back’:  Overcoming Metaphysics and the via negativa12 
 
 Heidegger’s destruktion is a critique of the inadequacy of the metaphysical 
understanding of the ground of being.
13
  In What is Metaphysics? (1929), Heidegger 
recalls Descartes' metaphor:  Philosophy is a tree; metaphysics is its root; the trunk is 
physics; the branches are the sciences (including theology).
14
  Insofar as the ground 
(Being) is confused with metaphysics, thinking is unable to arrive at its source.  The 
only way is to go beyond the roots, to overcome or ‘step back’ from metaphysics.  
Radical thinking about being then truly begins.  Heidegger shifts his inquiry to the 
                                                 
10 Caputo and Scanlon, 'Introduction: Apology for the Impossible: Religion and Postmodernism', in 
God, the Gift and Postmodernism, p. 11. 
11 A good and concise account of these two developments in Western philosophy of religion is found in 
Eugene T. Long, Twentieth-Century Western Philosophy of Religion 1900-2000 (Netherlands, 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000; repr Dordrecth: Springer, 2000), pp. 424–452; on 
Derrida's and Marion's influences on deconstruction and hermeneutics, see pp. 441–446 and pp. 446–
452, respectively. 
12 An excellent work addressing the need to for theology to overcome metaphysics is Joseph O'Leary, 
Questioning Back: The Overcoming of Metaphysics in Christian Tradition (Minneapolis, Minnesota: 
Winston Press, 1985).  See also Merold Westphal, 'Overcoming Onto-Theology', in God, the Gift 
and Postmodernism, pp. 146–164. 
13 The discussion in this present section is indebted to John Macquarrie's, 'Being and Giving: Heidegger 
and the Concept of God', in God: The Contemporary Discussion, ed. by F. Sontag and M. Darrol 
Bryant (New York: The Rose Sharon Press, 1982), pp. 151–167.  See also Diogenes Allen and E. O. 
Springstead, Philosophy for Understanding Theology, 2
nd
 edn (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 2007), pp. 192-194.  
14 Descartes uses this metaphor in his essay, Principles of Philosophy, originally published in Latin in 
1644.  See The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 1, trans. by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. 
Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 186. 
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ground from which metaphysics (the root) itself arises. Although such thinking 
“overcomes” philosophy, it does not destroy philosophy with an ‘anti-metaphysical’ 
purpose.  ‘Overcoming’ connotes going beyond and toward Being, the grounding of 
philosophy itself, not its destruction. 
 
A thinking which thinks of the truth of Being can no longer be satisfied 
with metaphysics, though its thinking is not opposed to metaphysics.  
...[I]t does not tear up the roots of philosophy.  But it digs and ploughs 
the ground for philosophy.  Metaphysics remains the origin of 
philosophy, but it does not attain the origin of thinking.  Metaphysics is 
overcome in the thinking of the truth of Being.
15
 
 
 This ‘stepping back’ is, simultaneously, an overcoming of ontotheology.  
“Ontotheology” is the metaphysical inquiry into the highest or most excellent being as 
the source or ground of all other beings.  Theology calls this source, ‘God’.  When 
theology employs metaphysics to understand God, it inscribes God (causa sui, prime 
mover) within the horizon of beings.  For Heidegger, this dangerous conflation of 
philosophy and theology results in the forgetfulness of what he calls, “ontological 
difference”.  God is reduced to “the status of a superbeing pitched on the same plane as 
creation.”16 
 
 A such, Hiedegger's critique works on a negation, a denial:  Being is not God.  
This involves a double negation.  ‘Stepping back’ from metaphysics negates 
philosophical thinking about ‘God’ in terms of ontology; at the same time, it negates 
theological thought about God as the causa sui, the ‘first cause’, the ‘unmoved mover’ 
of metaphysics.  So “overcoming ontotheology” involves a two-fold negation.  Being 
– the ‘god’ of philosophy – is not the God of theology.  Therefore, Heidegger writes: 
 
…...[T]he cause as causa sui.  This is the right name for the god of 
philosophy.  Man can neither pray nor sacrifice to this god. Before the 
causa sui, man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music 
and dance before this god.  The god-less thinking which must abandon 
the god of philosophy, god as causa sui, is thus perhaps closer to the 
divine God.  Here this means only: god-less thinking is more open to 
                                                 
15 Cited in Macquarrie, 'Being and Giving', p. 161. 
16 Rupertt Shortt, God's Advocates: Christian Thinkers in Conversation (Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
William B. Eerdmans, 2005), p. xii.  Also, Macquarrie, 'Being and Giving', pp. 156–157. 
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Him than onto-theo-logic would like to admit.
17
 
 
Heidegger insists theology approach the divine with “god-less thinking” – that is, a 
thinking of God not represented by any concepts conceived by philosophy.  Philosophy 
can conceive of a principle of source of being, but this would not be the God of 
theology.  Being is not a ‘God’ one can pray to. 
 
 Philosophy is otherwise than theology.  In Introduction to Metaphysics (1953), 
Heidegger pushes this distinction further.  He remarks on Leibniz's question, “why are 
there essents rather than nothing?”18   ‘Nothing’ contrasts with essents or being.  
Whatever is, is being; ‘Nothing’ is other than being.  So just as the ground of the tree is 
other than the tree, so the source of thinking must be other than metaphysics, 
philosophy, and the sciences – all are preoccupied with being.  Therefore, Heidegger 
insists that thinking of the Nothing must lead to the source of thinking the ground of 
being.
19
  It is ‘beyond’ being, a nonbeing (non-thing).20  Here, Heidegger resembles 
Meister Eckhart (c. 1260–c.1328), for whom God “cannot be hypostasized and set over 
against the world as a transcendent being.”21  Likewise, Heidegger strives for a 'being-
less' thinking in philosophy, which may be not so different from the 'God-less' thinking 
that Heidegger prescribes for theology. 
 
 Nevertheless, in thinking Being, Heidegger acknowledges the intimate 
relationship between theology and philosophy.  Theology is an ontic science (like 
mathematics); it arises from the same source of thinking as philosophy.
22
  As such, 
theology and philosophy share the same roots.  So to arrive at the source of thinking 
itself would be to overcoming both philosophy and theology.  The same passion for the 
source of thinking flows through both, which implies that theology is traceable in 
                                                 
17 Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. by J. Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 
1969), p. 72. 
18 Italics mine.  Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans R. Manheim (New Haven, Connecticut: 
Yale University Press, 1969; repr Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1961), p. 2. 
19 “...[H]ere we have to do with a reality more real than any of the things that are...” Cited in 
Macquarrie, 'Being and Giving', p. 161. 
20 Allen, Philosophy for Understanding Theology, 193. 
21 Macquarrie, ‘Being and Giving’, p. 163. 
22 Heidegger, ‘Phenomenology and Theology’ in The Religious, ed. J. Caputo (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers Ltd, 2002), p.p. 49–66. 
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philosophical discourse, and vice versa.  Indeed, as Wolfhart Pannenberg suggests, the 
philosophical desire for God provided the impetus for Christianity's eventual success in 
the Gentile world:  
 
Such an appeal to the philosophical doctrine of God must not be 
interpreted only in an external sense as an accommodation to the spiritual 
climate of Hellenism. ... The appeal to the philosophers' teaching 
concerning the one God was the condition for the emergence of a Gentile 
church at all. ...[T]he connection between Christian faith and Hellenistic 
thought in general – and the connection between the God of the Bible 
and the God of the philosophers in particular – does not represent a 
foreign infiltration into the original Christian message, but rather belongs 
to its very foundations.
23
  
 
In other words, philosophy gave expression to theology.  However, philosophy 
also initiated a return inquiry [Rückfrage] against the God and gods of myth, religion 
and poetry.
24
  Philosophers demythologized religion, replacing it with the task of 
thinking God, and essentially distinguishing theology from philosophy – which 
Heidegger does so well.  In the absence of such a distinction, the question about 
whether or not philosophy can properly think or speak of God apart from theology gains 
no credence.
25
  Indeed, Heidegger not only works out this distinction but evaluates 
theology as being inferior to philosophy.  In Being and Time, he says: 
 
Theology is searching for a more original interpretation of human being's 
being toward God, prescribed by the meaning of faith and remaining 
within it.  Theology is slowly beginning to understand again Luther's 
insight that its system of dogma rests on a 'foundation' that does not stem 
from a questioning in which faith is primary and whose conceptual 
apparatus is not only insufficient for the range of problems in theology 
but rather covers them up and distorts them.
26
 
                                                 
23 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Metaphysics and the Idea of God, trans. by Phillip Clayton (Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: Wm B Eerdmans, 2001), pp. 11–12.  Likewise, John Macquarrie understands ontology to 
be a foundation or presupposition of theology, not external to theological inquiry.  Without 
metaphysics, theology would not have the expression it needs to objectivize God in concepts and 
language. John Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology: A Comparison of Heidegger and Bultmann 
(London: SCM Press, 1955; repr Middlesex: Pelican Books Ltd, 1973), pp. 6–9. 
24 Pannenberg, Metaphysics, p. 13. 
25 Ibid, p. 16.  For Pannenberg's own critique of Heidegger's stance on philosophy's right to speak 
about God, see pp. 8–7. 
26 Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by J. Stambaugh, rev. ed. (Albany: SUNY, 2010), p. 9; cited in 
Macquarrie, Existentialist Theology, pp. 7–8. 
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According to Heidegger, theology should confine itself to religion, the task of 
which is not thinking.  For its part, philosophy must not indulge in theology.
27
  There 
should be no confusion:  “A ‘Christian Philosophy’ is a round square and a 
misunderstanding.”28  Ontotheology is a misconception about theology and philosophy 
sharing the same path of inquiry.  Heidegger insists they are not and overcoming 
metaphysics and ontotheology means overcoming this misunderstanding, namely, 
philosophical theology as workable project.   
 
1.3. Athens and Jerusalem Again 
 
Derrida and Marion acknowledge themselves as philosophers, not theologians.
29
  
However, regarding Marion's works, criticisms have been raised about the religious 
influences on his philosophy.
30
  Certainly, Marion's criticism of Derrida shows 
phenomenological and theological inclinations, particularly in his use of theological 
sources that includes patristic sources.  As will be seen in later, his conception of 
phenomenology makes room for theology, for the possibility of God’s presence as 
phenomena.  
 
Derrida’s “deconstruction” is a return inquiry.31  It questions traditions and 
                                                 
27 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 6.  “For the original Christian faith, philosophy is 
foolishness.” 
28 Ibid, p. 6. 
29 This is more true of Derrida than Marion, whose work is regarded more as a ‘theological’ form of 
phenomenological-hermeneutics.  Cf. V. E. Taylor, 'A Conversation With Jean-Luc Marion', Journal 
for Cultural & Religious Theory 7:2 (Spring 2006), pp. 1–2.  Also, “God and the Gift: A Continental 
Perspective,” in God’s Advocates, p. 150.  And, Tamsin Jones, A Genealogy of Marion's Philosophy 
of Religion: Apparent Darkness (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2011), pp. 
15ff. 
30 See Being Given: Toward A Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. by J. L. Kosky (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2002), pp. 234–24, where Marion posits Jesus Christ as “the sole example 
and paradigm” of the possibility of Revelation.  Shane Mackinlay, Interpreting Excess: Jean-Luc 
Marion, Saturated Phenomenon, and Hermeneutics (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), p. 
178.  Against his critics (e.g. Dominique Janicaud), Marion insists he is merely arguing for the 
possibility of religious phenomena contra those who would a priori preclude it as a 
phenomenological possibility.  See Marion, Being Given, pp. 4–5, and p. 236. 
31 Derrida owes this aspect of his thought to Edmund Husserl's notion of rückfrage.  See Leonard 
Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl:The Basic Problem of Phenomenology (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 2002), pp. 107ff. 
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structures of thinking, writing and speech that claim absolute closure of meaning – that 
is, the ability to fully re-present the object of thought in its own particular discourse.
32
  
As such, deconstruction inquires into the difference between thought and what thought 
thinks, between speech and what speech refers to.  It suggests deference between them, 
that what is thought and spoken of is never present to the thinker or the speaker.  
Derrida calls this différance.  So, in theology, ‘God’ never coincides with discourse 
that takes place about God – not even in the most negative or mystical theological 
discourse.  As Derrida explains, all discourse is already “late”:  All speech and 
thought are conditioned by a more primal and originary presence, but a presence that 
never appears in the appearing of discourse.  Any return inquiry performed in order to 
re-present the originary source of any discourse is already late; it can only study its 
trace.
33
  Theological discourse is impossible.  However, for Derrida, it continues to 
name the object of its prayers and praises; negative and mystical theology are no 
exceptions.  They attempt to bring God into the horizon of being (presence) by naming 
God, to inscribe God in the horizon of experience.  For Derrida, as long as theology 
continues to be a way of speaking about God, is can never be free of ontotheology,  
 
Marion takes issue with Derrida's return inquiry of theology.  Theology – and, 
mystical theology, in particular, is never preoccupied with inscribing God in the horizon 
of experience.  Marion recognizes that this would be ontotheology.  But Marion 
acknowledges another threat to theology, namely, deconstruction.  Indeed, Marion is 
uncomfortable with theology falling under the scrutiny of deconstruction, which seems 
to dictate what theology should be in view of an impossible God – a God who is never 
presence.  For Marion, on the contrary, God is always a possible phenomenon, a 
                                                 
32 See Derrida, 'Letter to a Japanese Friend', in Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume II, ed. by Peggy 
Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 1–6.  Derrida 
explains that deconstruction is not a concept, method, or critical theory.  It is both “nothing” and 
“not everything”.  Deconstruction is “a discourse or rather a writing that can make up for the 
incapacity of the word to be equal to a 'thought.'”  'Letter', p. 5.  In other words, it is the thinking of 
the difference that underlies the identity of thought to writing.  Deconstructing theology would mean 
questioning the identity between thinking God and writing (or speaking) about God. 
33 Lawlor, Derrida and Husserl, pp. 107–8; also, Marian Hobson, Jacques Derrida: Opening Lines 
(London: Routledge, 1998), p. 180: “a return inquiry is asked on the basis of a first posting.”  And, 
especially, Derrida, Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, trans. by John P. Leavey, 
Jr.. (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), p. 50:  “Like Ruckfrage, return 
inquiry is asked on the basis of a first posting.  From a received and already readable document, the 
possibility is offered me of asking again, and in return, about the primordial and final intention of 
what has been given me by tradition.” 
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possible presence.  He makes this clear in his saturated phenomenon, which is 
discussed below.  Marion thinks that philosophy and deconstruction, in particular, has 
usurped the role of theology and religion in thinking about God.
34
  This is more than a 
polemical charge.  Marion is arguing for theology’s right to think about God and, 
moreover, that philosophy and deconstruction refrain from preventing theology doing 
so.  So, while Marion argues that deconstruction can assist theology is purifying 
thought and speech about God, it should not dictate what is possible or impossible for 
theology, which has complete autonomy when it speaks about God.  In his refusal to 
bow theology to philosophy, Marion hopes to liberate theology from ontotheology. 
 
 In this regard, although Derrida and Marion follow closely Heidegger's project 
of overcoming ontotheology, even if both express this overcoming very differently.  
Derrida stands further from Heidegger's distinction of philosophy and theology.  
Marion is much closer.  Yet, because both are greatly indebted to Heidegger, Marion's 
thinking remains close to Derrida.
35
  Derrida and Marion achieve this overcoming of 
metaphysics and presence in different ways.  Presently, it is necessary to provide a 
background to Derrida's method of deconstruction vis-vis Marion's phenomenological 
hermeneutics.  This is illustrated through a series of interviews between Richard 
Kearney, Derrida and Marion. 
 
1.4. Phenomenological Hermeneutics and Deconstruction 
 
 In 2001, Kearney published, The God Who May Be, which addresses 
philosophy's 'turn-to-religion'.
36
  Especially after 9/11, philosophers and theologians 
                                                 
34 On Marion's affinity with Heidegger's view that philosophy and theology do not mix, see his God 
Without Being, p. xxi.  See also Long, Twentieth-Century Western Philosophy of Religion, p. 448.  
Marion calls “God according to onto-theology” the “first idolatry” which, when deconstructed, 
unmasks a “second idolatry”, “God according to Being” – in reference to Heidegger's thinking of the 
ground of being as also susceptible to the charge of idolatry. 
35 Marion himself acknowledges his affinity with Derrida.  See Marion's preface to the English 
translation of God Without Being, p.xxi; Long, Twentieth-Century Western Philosophy of Religion, 
p.446. 
36 Richard Kearney and J. P. Manoussakis, 'Thinking at the Limits: Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc 
Marion in Dialogue with Richard Kearney', Philosophy Today 48.1 (Spring 2004), p. 3.  This 
interview followed the publication of Kearney's, The God Who May Be: A Hermeneutics of Religion 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001), which exemplifies philosophy's turn 
to religion via hermeneutics as an overcoming of ontotheology.  Another excellent analysis of this 
turn-to-religion in philosophy is Hent de Vries, Philosophy and the Turn to Religion ((Baltimore: The 
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experienced a deeper or more serious hermeneutical dimension in thinking about 
religion.  Subsequently, between 2001 and 2003, Kearney interviewed Derrida and 
Marion.  Kearney's interview with Derrida quickly establishes the tension between 
'hermeneutics' and 'deconstruction'; the interview with Marion reveals a difference 
between Kearney's hermeneutics and Marion's phenomenology.
37
   
 
 Hermeneutics involves interpretation about the purpose or meaning of human 
existence.
38
  It strives to identify or locate a ‘teleology’, a ground or foundation for 
life, a ‘purpose’ that resolves the indeterminateness and paradox that existence offers.  
Such telos is determinate, fixed and identifiable as the reason or principle that guides all 
events, relationships, and identities.  However, Derrida sees teleological thinking as 
conditional.  Any rigorous relation with the other takes place only in absence of any 
anticipation of purpose or goals, implying the absence of any interpretation of a 
transcendental telos.  Derrida acknowledges that, although he sympathizes with 
Kearney's hermeneutics, he cannot follow – in particular, Kearney’s hermeneutics of the 
resurrection, which is Kearney's way of overcoming ontotheology, as well as 
overcoming deconstruction's khōra.39  For Derrida, hermeneutics problematizes faith; 
faith is sacrificed for certainty and ‘determined’ hope.  Identifying the resurrection as 
the horizon of hope is to know.  It is no longer faith.  Faith is not hermeneutical, lest it 
becomes knowledge.  Therefore, Derrida acknowledges:  “That's why sometimes, you 
call me an atheist...”40   
                                                                                                                                               
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).       
37 Kearney and Manoussakis, 'Thinking At the Limits', p. 3; Kearney, 'Foreword', in Traversing the 
Imaginary, p. ix, where Derrida thinks Kearney is too 'hermeneutic'.  Kearney explains that his 
interview/dialogue (New York, 16 October 2001) with Derrida took place just weeks after 9/11.  It 
was their last meeting together before Derrida passed away in 2004.  Kearney, 'Foreword', in 
Traversing the Imaginary: Richard Kearney and the Postmodern Challenge, ed. by P. Gratton and J. 
P. Manoussakis (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2007), xii.  The interview, which 
Kearney sees as “a postscript to our twenty years of shared intellectual traversals,” is republished in 
Traversing the Imaginary, pp. 18–28. 
38 Flew, Antony, A Dictionary of Philosophy, 2
nd
 edn (New York: Gramercy Books, 1999), p. 146. 
39 'Thinking at the Limits', p. 10.  For Kearney's understanding of the possibility of “possibilizing 
God” – and his criticism of Derrdia's deconstruction as a preference for “ghosts to gods”, see The 
God Who May Be, pp. 80–100, especially pp. 93–99.  In the same way, Derrida is unable to 
reconcile with Marion's liturgical 'hermeneutics' of baptism in Marion's interpretation of negative 
(mystical) theology. 
40 Italics mine.  'Thinking at the Limits', p. 10.  Kearney corrects Derrida: “...Someone who rightly 
passes for an atheist...”  For Derrida's own account of the relationship between faith and knowledge, 
see his 'Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of 'Religion' at the Limits of Reason Alone', trans. by 
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1.4.1. Khōra41 
 
Kearney asks:  What, then, makes faith possible?  For Derrida, faith is 
indeterminate, uncertain and always filled with a kind of absence or ‘spacing’ that 
reminds one of the trace of something other than what is present.  He calls this khōra, 
which is borrowed from Plato's Timaeus.  It is the “pre-philosophical, pre-originary 
non-locatable non-space that existed without existing before the cosmos.”42  It is that 
which is nameless and absent but, nevertheless, conditions the possibility of everything 
– even the prayer.43  More interestingly, Derrida thinks that khōra conditions the 
possibility of ‘God’, Other, spacing, difference.  But khōra is not God, Other, or 
spacing; it is the “impossible” that conditions all things, including faith.44  What faith 
interprets as ‘God’, we pray to; and what in philosophy is conceived as the Other, we 
respond to.  However, khōra is not something we can pray or respond to; it is not an 
experience.
45
 In saying this, Derrida is going beyond metaphysics ‘God’ as causa sui.  
Khōra is not. 
 
1.4.2. Phenomenological Hermeneutics 
 
 Kearney's interview with Marion is more extensive.  Both share a similar 
approach: phenomenology.
46
  However, unlike Kearney, Marion is “slower” to apply 
hermeneutics to what phenomenology is able to describe.
47
  This is due to Marion's 
‘Saturated Phenomenon’, which prevents hastiness in interpretation.  The saturated 
phenomenon is a pure event that has no horizon or context and exceeds the judging gaze 
                                                                                                                                               
S. Weber, in Derrida, Acts of Religion, ed. by Gil Anidjar (New York and London: Routledge, 2002), 
pp. 42–101. 
41 See below, pp. 36ff. 
42 Lucy, A Derrida Dictionary, p. 68. 
43 'Thinking At the limits', p. 11. 
44 Ibid, p. 3.  The tension between Marion's notion of the possible and Derrida's notion of the 
impossible is discussed below. 
45 Ibid, p. 11. 
46 The interview with Marion comprised of three instalments – two with Kearney, one with 
Manoussakis. 
47 Ibid, p. 12. 
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of the knower or agent; it escapes or exceeds interpretation.  So, for Marion, 
phenomenology is prior to hermeneutics, which does not imply the absence of 
hermeneutics.
48
 
 
 Marion explains the Saturated Phenomenon in terms of a binary:  Intuition 
(surplus) over concept or intention (deficit).  Phenomenon exceeds what concepts or 
intentions can grasp.  Such excess calls for more concepts and, therefore, the need for 
hermeneutics.  Saturated Phenomenon necessitates hermeneutics, which is also 
necessarily an endless hermeneutics.  Following Paul Ricoeur, Marion believes endless 
hermeneutics implies there can never be a final interpretation.
49
  An endless 
hermeneutics is what the saturated phenomenon makes possible.   
 
Here, Kearney presses Marion with a question: “Can we have a hermeneutics of 
God qua saturated phenomenon?”  In other words, can God still be interpreted, known, 
even when revealed as a saturated phenomenon?  For Marion earlier remarked that, the 
saturated phenomenon is not directly related to Christian revelation; it is not a 
revelatory event in the theological sense.
50
  However, Kearney observes that Marion 
thinks otherwise when, for instance, Marion proposes a ‘theology of absence’; speaks of 
a “eucharistic hermeneutics”; and, states that the bishop is the only true theologian.51  
For Marion, these are hermeneutics of the Saturated Phenomenon, where the “delay to 
[of] interpretation” caused by the Saturated Phenomenon delegates the eucharist, bishop 
(theologian), and community, the task of performing a “eucharistic hermenutics” (that 
is, the liturgy).  Marion's Saturated Phenomenon translates into “theological” 
hermeneutics.
52
  This is most explicit when Marion acknowledge Revelation to be the 
                                                 
48 Ibid, p. 12.  Kearney states his disagreement with Marion at the outset: “There is no pure 
phenomenon as such [since what appears] always already involves an interpretation of some kind.” In 
light of these observations, Kearney poses this question to Marion: How do we interpret or judge the 
saturated phenomenon without betraying it?  As will be seen in the later part of the present essay, 
Derrida poses the same challenge to Marion. 
49 Ibid, p. 13. There is never “at any moment an adequate, final concept [or interpretation].” 
50 Ibid, p. 12. 
51 Ibid, p. 13:  “[T]hose that do not participate in the praxis of the eucharistic phenomenon seem to be 
excluded not only from its experience but also from its interpretation [hermeneutics].”  For Marion's 
association of the Saturated Phenomenon, absence of hermeneutics, eucharistic community, the 
bishops' status as theologian, see Marion, God Without Being, pp. 139–158, especially pp. 156–158. 
52 See also Long, Twentieth-Century Western Philosophy of Religion, p. 452:  For Marion, “[o]nly a 
Eucharistic hermeneutics allows the Gospel message to pass through to its referent, and for Marion, 
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saturated phenomenon par excellence.
53
   
 
What Marion highlights through his “eucharistic hermeneutics” is the possibility 
of a phenomenology of revelation not confined or reduced to ‘Christian revelation’.  
However, revelation remains beyond reason, philosophy, metaphysics.
54
  It is 
theological.  Reason is incapable of defining what revelation is, or what is “natural” 
and what is “revealed”.55  No one decides a priori if revelation is or is not a 
phenomenological possibility.  It is always open to phenomenology; it is always an 
endless hermeneutics.  Therefore, Marion explicates in God Without Being the 
gathering of the Eucharistic community in the presence of the bishop, the theologian par 
excellence.
56
  This sort of hermeneutics and, therefore, knowledge of revelation is 
possibility because of the saturated phenomenon. Moreover, this demonstrates 
Marion’s positive affirmation of Christian theology as hermeneutics grounded on 
authority.
57
  On this basis, Marion argues how theology was supposed to be, alluding 
to the long-standing issue between theology and metaphysics.
58
  Ontotheology has 
distracted theology from how it should be done, namely, as a communal event.
59
  
Marion has thereby stated what theological discourse should be. 
                                                                                                                                               
this means that ultimately only the Bishop can speak the Word. The postmodern beginning ends in 
appeal to the authority of the church.  Marion comes close it seems to giving us a kind of Roman 
Catholic version of Barthianism.”  (Italics mine.)  In God Without Being, Marion writes theological 
as “theological” as opposed to “theological” to emphasize the phenomenon of divine revelation over 
hermeneutics, which can lapse into ontotheology. 
53 'Thinking At the Limits', p. 14. 
54 Ibid, p. 15. 
55 Ibid, p. 15.  “[T]o assume that you must already know what revelation is or does is the same as 
saying that the hermeneutics of revelation is now over, that revelation has nothing to reveal any more, 
and thus, by definition, that there is no revelation. If we speak of revelation, then, we have to accept 
that hermeneutics is still going on, that revelation is open since history is still in the making. There is 
no contradiction in saying that everything was fully revealed and achieved but that, even today, we 
don't know, we can't know, how far it reaches.” 
56 Ibid, p. 16.  In his defence, Marion replies that his reference was not to present-day differences 
between, say, bishops and theologians. Rather, he was referring to a tradition where bishops (e.g. 
Gregory, Basil, and so on) were also great theologians who formed the hermeneutic tradition of the 
Church.  Kearney, however, is quick to remind Marion that such bishop theologians were also 
responsible for the burning of books deemed heretical or placed on the index (e.g. Meister Eckhart, 
John Scotus Eriugena, and even Aquinas). Many of these were not bishops. 
57 Marion's works exhibit a similar inclination via his extensive references to the Church Fathers and 
doctors, particularly Pseudo-Dionysius and Gregory of Nyssa.  See Jones, A Genealogy of Marion's 
Philosophy of Religion, pp. 13–43. 
58 'Thinking at the Limits, p. 15.  
59 Ibid, p. 16.  
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1.4.3. The Possible 
 
 Theological discourse should be about the possibility of God, God as the 
possible.  This stands out in John Manoussakis' interview with Marion in 2002, where 
Marion expresses emphatic agreement with the title of Kearney’s book, The God Who 
May Be.
60
 
 
 To illustrate his agreement, Marion translates the ‘name’ of God in Exodus 3.14:  
A God who may be, not a God who is – possibility over and against actuality.  God is a 
messianic “possibility”, one “who comes”, Christ, “the name of the God who may be.”61  
With Heidegger, Marion thinks that, “possibility stands higher than actuality.” 62  
Nevertheless, the God who may be (the possible) is a transcendent one.  This possible 
God is not part of objective reality.
63
  God as possibility stands beyond everything that 
is, everything actual.  And since experience is the experience of actuality, we “need to 
direct back to God [possibility] every experience [actuality, being] of the world.”  
Actuality of experience must now be understood in the horizon of possibility. In this 
way, Marion and Kearney hope to safeguard – to be “fair” – to God by preserving the 
name of God in some hermeneutical circle, by saying what the name must or should be, 
that is, possibility.   
 
For Derrida, however, since he denies the possibility of hermeneutics as a ground 
for faith, there is no safe way to be “fair” to God.  To insist on this, one must first 
know what the possibility of God consists of.  Yet, this is impossible for Derrida, since 
to know the tout autre or wholly other is to annul the other as other.  God as tout autre 
is impossible.  Derrida’s notion of “impossibility” will be brought out clearer in the 
                                                 
60 'Thinking at the Limits', p. 17.  Kearney's book is, for Marion, is a new way of thinking of God “that 
provokes us to think of the phenomenon of God in new ways.” 
61 Ibid, p. 17. 
62 Ibid, p. 17.   Kearney's 1984 thesis, La Poétique du Possible, was under Paul Ricoeur.  Marion 
reads The God Who May Be as a fuller realization of Kearney's first intuition on the significance of 
possibility.  For Heidegger's remark on possibility, see Being and Time, p. 36:  Phenomenology 
“does not consist in its actuality as a philosophical 'movement'.  Higher than actuality stands 
possibility.  We can understand phenomenology soley by seizing upon it as a possibility.” 
63 Ibid, p. 17.  That is, “[not] part of our language, [not] part of our experience of the world.” 
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discussion below. 
  
1.5. Mystical Theology and the Saturated Phenomenon:  Excess and Desire 
 
 Marion insists that the Saturated Phenomenon that leads to a eucharistic or 
liturgical hermeneutics is not engaged with knowing.  Rather, it responds to a desire in 
light of a phenomenon that exceeds knowledge – a desire for the other than knowledge, 
being.  “Mystical theology” builds on this desire for the other, which is to be 
distinguished from negative or apophatic theology.   
 
Negative theology can be traced from Pseudo-Dionysius and the Church Fathers, 
notably Gregory of Nyssa.
 64
  However, it is also discourse stemming from Plato 
through the Neoplatonists and Plotinus.
65
  However, in Pseudo-Dionysius and the 
Church Fathers, negative theology is succeeded by a higher form of discourse that 
exceeds affirmation and negation.  According to Marion, mystical theology is the 
culmination of a three-staged discourse:  the kataphatic (affirmation), the apophatic 
(negation), and the hyperbolic.
66
  While negative theology is negation, mystical 
theology engages with the saturated phenomenon, an excess that opens an “endless 
hermeneutic” repeatable for “other logia”.  This has no absolute or final hermeneutic.  
So, while mystical theology is a path to knowledge, it goes beyond knowledge and 
presence.  It is a hyper-movement beyond affirmation and negation 
 
 Since mystical theology moves beyond affirmation and negation, it transcends 
reason, philosophy and metaphysics.  The latter are unable to adequately respond to 
                                                 
64 See his Mystical theology, ch. 3.  All references to the works of Pseudo-Dionysius is taken from 
Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, trans. by Colm Luibheid (New York: Paulist Press, 1987). 
‘CH’ – The Celestial Hierarchy; ‘EH’ – The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy; ‘MT’ – The Mystical Theology; 
‘DN’ – Divine Names. Marion mentions his preference to leave the omit 'pseudo-' when referring to 
Dionysius for he is convinced that the author's choice of name validly refers to the historical author as 
representative of the authentic tradition established in the name of Dionysius the Areopagite.  Both 
are in effect interchangeable and, therefore, the prefix is irrelevant.  IN, p. 34n13 / INE, p. 134n12.  
Denys Turner also refers to the author as just 'Denys', omitting 'pseudo-', The Darkness of God: 
Negativity in Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995; repr 1999), p. 
12n1. 
65 For the development of apophatic and negative theology in Christianity, see Denys Turner, The 
Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism, pp. 19–49 and pp. 137–185. 
66 'Thinking at the Limits, p. 19.  Marion, 'The Unspoken: Apophasis and the Discourse of Love', trans. 
by A. Conty, Proceedings of the ACPA, 76 (2003), p. 42. 
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the saturated phenomenon.  They fail to clarify what Marion calls the ground or 
“backstage” of knowledge and metaphysics, namely, desire – not the desire of 
psychoanalysis, an unconscious drive, but “eschatological desire” as opposed to 
“ontological desire”.67  Ontological desire “strives for possession, fusion, atonement, 
and appropriation”, while eschatological desire arises from a “superabundance, excess, 
and surplus.”68  Eschatological desire responds to the saturated phenomenon.   
 
 Since Derrida identifies God (tout autre) with the “impossible”, he identifies 
with another type of desire, namely, the “prophetic”, messianic or “apocalyptic” desire.  
Apocalyptic desire desire is a desire for what is absent, lacking.  Caputo has identified 
this as “derriderian destinnerance”, a wandering and desert-like desire.69  On the other 
hand, Marion's eschatological desire is guided by a hermeneutic, logic, telos.
70
  If 
mystical theology is rooted in “eschatological” desire, as Marion claims, then it is 
guided by a logos and telos – in other words, it is already a discourse and experience 
inscribed in the horizon of presence, being.  It is a “theologic” in as much as it is a 
“theologic”.71 
 
Derrida and Marion desire to overcome ontotheology – Derrida through 
deconstruction, and Marion through the saturated phenomenon and mystical theology.  
This introduction indicates several areas where Derrida and Marion diverge:  First, on 
the right of deconstruction to determine theological discourse; second, whether theology 
                                                 
67 'Thinking at the Limits', p. 21.  Kearney also calls ontological desire, “onto-theological desire”:  
“[T]he destruction of onto-theological desire might be more properly conceived as a spur to transcend 
our captivation by all that is (ta onta) for another kind of desire – a desire for something that eye has 
never seen nor ear heard. That is to say, eschatological desire.”  Kearney, The God Who May Be, pp. 
61–62. 
68 'Thinking at the Limits', p. 21.   
69 See John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion Without Religion 
(Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), p. 96 and 351n31.  Caputo, Radical 
Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987), chs. 5 and 6 (pp. 120–186). 
70 Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p. 96.  A desire guided by a purpose “toward which each moment strains 
in a rational process of ongoing development; the logos of the eschaton, of the extreme end point...” 
71  In God Without Being, Marion distinguishes “theology” from “theology” – the former referring to 
discourse in light of Revelation, the Word; the latter referring to discourse about God in light of 
metaphysics.  See God Without Being, pp. 148ff.  Robyn Horner likewise applies the term, “theo-
logic(al)” throughout his Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-Logic Introduction (Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate, 
2005), to place emphasis on Marion's pragmatic understanding of theology in contrast to theo-logy or 
ontotheology. 
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is a discourse of presence; third, if the saturated phenomenon inscribes God in the 
horizon of being; fourth, if God should be phenomenally known as a possibility or 
impossibility; and, fifth, whether mystical theology is a hyper-discourse that overcomes 
ontotheology.  The following three sections will explore these five aspects by 
respectively analyzing three sources, namely, (i) Derrida’s ‘How to Avoid Speaking: 
Denials”, (ii) Marion’s ‘In the Name: How to Avoid Speaking of ‘Negative Theology’’, 
and (iii) their discussion on the Gift. 
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2. ‘How to Avoid Speaking’:  Hyper-Theology and Denegation:72 
 
This section analyzes Derrida’s lecture, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’.  
Derrida explains that negative and mystical theology are unable to truly escape 
ontotheology due to the hyper-affirmative discourse that mystical theology enforces.  
Through a complex discussion on Plato, Pseudo-Dionysius, and Heidegger, Derrida 
illustrates how theology as discourse always fluctuates between the desire to name God 
and to be silent about the name.  Derrida’s conclusion is that theology is a supplement 
to a pure desire for the other, who is always an absence or lack that discourse tries to fill 
to no avail.  This pure desire for the wholly other is faith. 
 
2.1. Hermeneutics of Suspicion73  
 
 A hermeneutics of suspicion surrounds negative theology.
74
  But Derrida is 
most interested in the critique that sees negative theology as a hyperbolic discourse.  
When God-talk pushes language beyond all affirmation and negation, it ultimately 
affirms a hyper-reality or divinity – an eminent or superabundant source of all things, 
including God-talk itself.
75
  Negative theology is hyper-theology.
76
  However, a 
hyper-theology no longer remains negative discourse becomes affirmative or 
kataphatic.
77
  No doubt it denies that God is commensurable with everything:  God is 
                                                 
72 A very good discussion on Derrida and Marion on negative theology is John D. Caputo, 'Apostles of 
the Impossible: God and the Gift in Derrida and Marion', in God, the Gift and Postmodernism, pp. 
185–222. 
73  This is a phrase borrowed from Marion.  See IN, p. 25 / INE, p. 136.  He insists that “[t]he 
hermeneutics of suspicion always runs the risk of arbitrariness and therefore should intervene only in 
the last instance, when no other interpretation appears possible any longer.” 
74 HAS, pp. 145–146. 
75 Ibid, p. 146.  Carabine notes that, “the prefix 'hyper', which is indicated in every negation, is 
ultimately a linguistic device which provides the key to the central dialectic in Dionysian thought: it 
indicates something positive, but it is an affirmation which can no longer be thought.”  Carabine, 
The Unknown God, p. 293; see also p. 312.  Derrida is only too aware of this paradox:  Even as a 
linguistic device, the affirmation that “can no longer be thought” is, nonetheless, still an affirmation 
(albeit performative) and, therefore, ontological.   
76 Ibid, p. 145.  In negative theology, “[e]very negative sentence would already be haunted by God or 
by the name of God... it would produce divinity...in order to say that divinity is not produced but 
productive” – that is, divinity “is the origin of this work of the negative [so that] God would be the 
truth of all negativity.”   
77 HAS, p. 145. 
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not creation.  However, this incommensurability leads to creation being understood as 
effects of God's productivity.  God is without existence but God is also present as 
cause.  God is “the without cause”.78  Inadvertently, negative theology results in an 
ontological argument for God’s existence.  This, Derrida says, is “the first mark of 
respect for a divine cause that does not even need to ‘be’”.79  God's existence is 
affirmed in His effects, proving that negative theology is hyper-theology.  As cause 
without a cause, God is posited as hyperessence.  Yet, as hyperessential cause, God is 
unknowable.  Hence, the aporia of a negation that is also an affirmation. 
 
2.1.1. Différance vs Hyperessence 
 
 This leads Derrida to recall a remark about his own work on “deconstruction”, 
which speaks of différance as that which conditions everything and, yet, is itself 
conditioned by nothing.  So, when Derrida's essay, ‘Différance’ (1986),80 was first 
presented, someone in the audience commented that différance is negative theology. 
Derrida responded, “It is and it is not... It is above all not...”81  While différance 
resembles negative theology, it “derives from no category of being, whether present or 
absent”.82  It is not a word or concept, nor is it a discourse of any sort, not even a 
theology.
83
  Unlike différance, negative theology establishes the “superessentiality” of 
God.  On the other hand, différance is not.   
 
                                                 
78 Ibid S, p. 146. 
79 Ibid, p. 146.  Hence, “one thus arrives at a kind of proof of God, not a proof of the existence of God, 
but a proof of God by his effects, or more precisely a proof of what one calls God, by the name of 
God, by effects without cause, by the without cause.”   
80 Originally delivered as a lecture to the Sociéte Française de Philosophie in 1968.  English translation 
published in Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. by Alan Bass (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 1–27. 
81 David Wood, and Robert Bernasconi, eds., Derrida and Différance (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1988), p. 84.  Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p. 2.  For the original discussion 
following Derrida's presentation of “Différance”, see Wood and Bernasconi, eds., Derrida and 
Différance, pp. 83–95. 
82 Derrida, Margins, p. 6. 
83 HAS, p. 305n2.  “...not even in the order of the most negative of negative theologies, which as one 
knows are always concerned with disengaging a superessentiality beyond the finite categories of 
essence and existence, that is, of presence, and always hastening to recall that God is refused the 
predicate of existence, only in order to acknowledge his superior, inconceivable, and ineffable mode 
of being.”  
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Marion objects to Derrida’s interpretation of negative theology, claiming that it 
never predicates anything of God in light of being.
84
  Apparently, Marion thinks 
negative theology is apophatic through and through.  However, Derrida observes that 
Marion, through his own critique of negative theology, tries to distance himself from it.  
In Marion's interpretation, “[it seems necessary] to distinguish the bottom (the thinking 
of the gift, of paternity, of distance, of praise, etc.) from this concern with 
superessentiality.”85  Marion's own “deconstruction” of negative theology in terms of 
the gift, distance, praise, and so on, reflects a desire to negate negative theology.  
Beyond negative theology, Marion posits mystical theology as the more apophatic 
discourse about God.  However, Derrida argues that mystical theology is a hyper-
theology as well.  It does not escape ontology either. 
 
 Différance is not negative theology; it is not anything.
86
  Since Of 
Grammatology (1967), Derrida’s ‘deconstruction’ of logocentric thinking questions the 
absolute unity and privilege given to the word, noun, or name.
87
  Différance – 
interchangeable with “deconstruction” 88  – questions closed systems of language, 
meaning, and naming.  It is not an analysis, a critique, method, event – not even a word 
or concept.  Rather, it “marks” the trace in language of the wholly other (tout autre) – 
other than being, presence, essence.  Différance is negative theology’s other.  It does 
not posit a hyperessential reality, unlike Pseudo-Dionysius’ “hyperousios” that 
designates “God as being beyond being or also God as without being.”89  The same 
language is also at work in Meister Eckhart (c.1260–c.1327), who does not deny being 
to God but moreover, elevates it in him.
90
  For mystical theology, God is hyperessence 
                                                 
84 “What is meant by 'one knows' here? ...[N]egative theology, at bottom, does not aim to reestablish 
a 'superessentiality', since it aims neither at predication nor at Being; how, a fortiori, could it be a 
question of existence and essence in Dionysius, when he still speaks a Greek original enough not to 
have either the idea or the use of them?”  Derrida's emphasis.  Idol and Distance, p. 230n41; cited 
in HAS, p. 305n2. 
85 HAS, p. 305n2. 
86 As with the term, “deconstruction”, to ask what is it? or what is it not? Betrays a misunderstanding of 
différance (and deconstruction).  'Letter to a Japanese Friend', in Psyche II, p. 4. 
87 HAS, p. 147.  Deconstruction puts into question structures of thinking that “privileges not only the 
indestructible unity of the word but also the authority of the noun or the name....” 
88 'Letter to a Japanese Friend', in Psyche II, pp. 5–6. 
89 HAS, p. 147.  See especially p. 306n3.   
90 Ibid, pp. 147–148.  “[W]hen I have said God is not a being and is above being, I have not thereby 
denied Him being: rather I have exalted it in Him.”  Meister Eckhart, Sermon Sixty-Seven, “Quasi 
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– without being, more than being. The ‘without’ establishes God's eminence above all 
being. 
  
 Différance goes beyond the ‘without’.  It “does not mean to say anything”, 
since it alludes to “‘something’ ‘before’ the concept, the name, the word” and, therefore, 
would not be present, ‘is’ nothing, and not an essence.91  If différance thinks God, it is 
as absence without the possibility of grasping any essence.  God, the wholly other in 
theology, is absolutely impossible.  That is another reason why Derrida confesses his 
“uneasiness” with mystical theology:  It is discourse that promises God’s presence as 
given to intuition or vision – a promise presence, affirmation, beyond all 
negation.
92
  Pseudo-Dionysius himself describes this vision as “an intuition in the 
‘brilliant darkness’ [hyperphoton]”, an “immediacy of presence”, which leads “to a 
union with God”.93  It is a “union” of ‘presence’, a grasping of essence beyond thought 
and words, symbols and figures, where intellect “will turn silent completely, since it will 
finally be at one with him who is indescribable.”94   So, unlike différance, this 
‘economy’ of the mystical suggests a telos, vision, experience of (with) the ineffable. 
 
 Nevertheless, différance – because it promises no consummated presence with 
the wholly other – obliges speech about the unspeakable.  Mystical theology promises 
a union with God that will result in silence, fulfilment and, therefore, the annulment of 
desire for the other any longer.  In différance, desire for the wholly other remains 
unfulfilled.  This is why speech becomes a “must”, since the other leaves its trace in 
language, in the very desire to speak of this other.  Even silence bears witness to this 
trace of the other.  The trace of the other in language obligates speech about the other.  
The ‘early’ Wittgenstein once said, “[t]he inexpressible, indeed, exists. It shows itself; it 
is the mystical.”95  Furthermore, “what we cannot speak of we must pass over in 
                                                                                                                                               
Stella Matutina”, in The Complete Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, trans. and ed. by M. O'C. 
Walshe, revised by B. McGinn (New York: Herder & Herder, 2009), p. 342. 
91 Ibid, p. 148. 
92 Ibid, pp. 148-149. 
93 Ibid, p. 149.  Pseudo-Dionysius, The Mystical Theology, ch. 1, 998B–1000A, in Pseudo-Dionysius: 
The Complete Works, p. 135. 
94 HAS, p. 149; cf. p. 153.  MT ch. 3, 1033B–C. 
95 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuiness, 
rev. edn (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974; repr London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 
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silence.” 96   Derrida is lured to the phrase, “we must [il faut]”. For Derrida, 
Wittgenstein's “injunction of silence” only makes sense in light of a desire – a promise – 
of having to speak.  Demanding silence signals a prior promise of speech.  Therefore, 
for Derrida, Wittgenstein’s denial of speech is an affirmation of the need to speak:  
“[I]t is necessary [il faut] – not to avoid speaking”.97  The promise and obligation to 
speak arises from the trace of the other, who is wholly other, who manifests itself in its 
absence.  This other is no longer a promise but a destination, a place, in mystical 
theology. 
 
2.1.2. Trace and Promise 
 
 Trace is important for Derrida, for deconstruction.  It marks “the absence of a 
presence, an always-already absent present”.98  It shows the active but hidden presence 
– a lack that makes all thought and speech possible. 99   Therefore, trace is 
interchangeable with différance, which is in turn synonymous with the tout autre that is 
wholly other than presence.  The trace of the other obliges or promises thought and 
speech about the other.  The trace is also the promise to discourse.  Put another way, 
discourse happens because the promise conditions its possibility.  When discourse 
happens, the promise had already preceded it.   
 
Therefore, as Derrida says, when he promised to speak on negative theology, he 
was already doing so.  Pragmatically speaking, a promise to do something is already 
the act of doing it.
100
  This prior condition that commits Derrida to speaking, to 
making promises, is what Derrida calls the promise as such.  Without it, no discourse 
can take place, including negative theology.  Negative theology itself is discourse 
preceded by “the open space of the promise”, the promise of the other.  It is this 
                                                                                                                                               
6.522, p. 89:  “There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words.  They make themselves 
manifest.  They are what is mystical.”  Cited in HAS, 150. 
96 Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 7; cited in HAS, 150. 
97 HAS, p. 150–151. 
98 Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by G. C. Spivak, rev. edn (Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. xvii.   
99 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. xvii. 
100 HAS, p. 151. 
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promise of the other that keeps discourse ongoing.  The other has not arrived; the 
promise is not fulfilled and, so, one must speak out of this desire for the other as 
promise.  Discourse takes place but within the promise, which is never present, never 
fulfilled.
101
  Should the promise as such present itself – that is, appear – it would be 
fulfilled and there would be no more need for discourse.   
 
The promise as such is impossible.  It is impossible because it can never be 
fulfilled.  Derrida himself can only make promises to speak of negative theology.  He 
will never actually succeed doing so, which would imply fulfilling the promise.
102
  But 
such fulfilment leads to abandonment of all discourse since there is no more promise to 
fuel a desire for thought and speech of the other.  Therefore, “it is necessary to be 
silent and to be silent about what one cannot speak of.”103  In other words, one cannot 
speak of a promise that has been fulfilled.  Discourse continues as long as the promise 
remains as such, namely, the promise.  It is already present in every discourse, 
including negative theology.  Since the promise itself is never present (fulfilled) in 
discourse, it “will have always escaped this demand for presence.”104   
 
2.2. Negative Theology as Discourse  
 
The promise of negative theology – negative theology as promise, is not the 
discourse called negative theology.  Derrida distinguishes negative theology as such 
from negative theology as a “tradition”.  However, because this distinction has been 
overlooked, the tradition of discourse known as negative theology has become a source 
unto itself.  On the contrary, Derrida argues, there are existing discourses called 
“negative theology” but no one discourse is negative theology as such – negative 
theology as promise
105
  The moment one speaks or writes a negative theology, a 
“pluralizing of discourse” on negative theology occurs.  But the promise of negative 
                                                 
101 Ibid, p. 152.  “It is not certain that I will keep my promise today, but nor is it certain that in further 
delaying its fulfilment, I have not, nevertheless, already kept it.”  Which is why Derrida says he 
“will speak of a promise but also within the promise.” (HAS, p. 153) 
102 Ibid, p. 153. 
103 Ibid, p. 153. 
104 Ibid, p. 153. 
105 HAS, p. 143.  Hence, Derrida's question: “Is there one negative theology, the (only) negative 
theology?” 
24 
 
theology – negative theology as such – never takes place, is never fulfilled, in any one 
discourse or tradition of negative theology. 
 
 This is true even of Pseudo-Dionysius’ theology.  Derrida agrees with Marion 
that Pseudo-Dionysius’ theology contains no negative theology as such.  Indeed, when 
Psuedo-Dionysius mentions the way of negation (apophasis, denial), it is always in the 
context of affirmation.
106
  In mystical theology, negative theology never stands alone 
but always in the company of positive or kataphatic discourse.  This is why negative 
theology as such is impossible in Pseudo-Dionysius.  Furthermore, Derrida does not 
deny that other discourses share a family resemblance with “negative” discourses.  Yet, 
in light of their rhetorical similarities they are mistaken to be negative theology itself.
107
  
One type of “discourse” may be an exception to this criticism, namely, prayer. 
 
2.2.1. Prayer and Praise108 
 
 Prayer is performative, always an addressing of the other, a discourse to the 
other.
109
  This “posture” of address precedes discourse itself, even apophatic 
utterances.
110
  Since negative theology is also discourse in the presence of a wholly 
other, it is rightly preceded by prayer, invocation.  For Derrida, prayer – like trace, 
                                                 
106Ibid, 304n.1.  See Marion, The Idol and Distance: Five Studies, trans. by T. A. Carlson (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2001), p. 145n.6.  Marion's reference is to Dionysius' Mystical Theology, 
II–III, 1025A-1033A, in Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete Works, trans. by C. Luibheid (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1987), p. 37.  The term “aphairesis” used by Pseudo-Dionysius means, “clearing 
aside”, which the translaters have rendered as “denial”. 
107 HAS, p. 144.  According to Derrida, some critics therefore charge that, “...for those who have 
nothing to say or who do not want to know anything, it is always easy to imitate the technique of 
negative theology.”  Derrida's own work has been subjected to the same criticism.  While repetition 
of techniques of negative discourse is possible, Derrida would insist that negative theology itself is 
not subject even to the perfection of rhetorical techniques. 
108 “To ask whether God exists...[i]f it is to mean anything at all, it is to wonder about praising and 
praying; it is to wonder whether there is anything in all that.  This is why philosophy cannot answer 
the question 'Does God exist?' with either an affirmative or a negative reply.... 'There is a God'...is an 
expression of faith.”  D. Z. Phillips, Religion Without Explanation (Oxford, 1976), p. 181; cited in 
Davies, Philosophy of Religion, 24.  Phillips' attitude to philosophical inquiry as conceptual 
clarification in religion is salutary.  It is what Derrida is doing here.  See also Phillips' The Concept 
of Prayer (New York: Seabury Press, 1965). 
109 “To use a performative expression is not to make a statement but to perform an action.”  Gertrude 
Ezorsky, 'Performative Theory of Truth', Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2
nd
 edn, ed. by Donald M. 
Borchert, vol. 7 (MI: Thomas Gale, 2006), pp. 195–196. 
110 HAS, p. 145. 
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promise, différance – conditions negative theology. 
 
 But prayer can be ritualized, inscribed in texts, and repeated mechanically, 
becoming discourse, becoming traditions.
111
  Derrida thinks that prayer as discourse 
does not precede or condition negative theology.  Rather, the discourse of prayer is 
often conditioned negative theology itself.  Negative theology can lead to a moment of 
(and respect for) prayer, as Derrida points out with Pseudo-Dionysius’ and Heidegger’s 
thinking.  However, prayer conditioned by negative discourse is still not that which 
conditions or “marks” the beginning of theology; prayer as discourse is not pure prayer, 
prayer itself.
112
   
 
As Derrida explains, pure prayer precedes discourse, speech, and writing.  It is 
a posturing or orientation toward the other, the addressee of all subsequent discourse.  
As such, all discourses are supplements to prayer, the address of the other.  The wholly 
other elicits a posturing of address, which is the beginning of prayer itself.  So, prayer 
itself is “not a preamble, an accessory mode of access [that is, not a mode of discourse]”  
but, rather, “[i]t constitutes an essential moment… by addressing itself to the other, to 
you, albeit the You that is higher than any other.”113  Negative theology, too, is 
discourse conditioned by prayer itself. 
 
 Pure prayer is pure addressing of the other as referent.  So it is performative 
and not predicative; it is not discourse.
114
  Despite this, prayer can translate into 
“praise” or “celebration (hymnein)” that “qualifies God, determines prayer, determines 
the other, the One to whom it addresses itself…invoking the other even as the source of 
prayer.”115   When prayer translates into praise, it is no longer performative but 
predicative as well.  So, for Derrida, pure prayer is not praise.  This distinction, he 
                                                 
111 Ibid, p. 145.  “...prayer, invocation, and apostrophe can also be imitated, and can even lend 
themselves, as if despite themselves, to repetitive technique.”  In other words, prayer can become 
types or kinds of discourses, and all discourse are affirmative and predicative by nature. 
112 Ibid, p. 145.  “This risk [of prayer being reduced to repetitive technique] is inscribed in the structure 
of the mark.”  The “mark” is another of Derrida's phrases that points to différance – here, the 
difference between the mark of writing and what precedes or conditions writing itself. 
113 HAS, p. 176. 
114Ibid, p. 176. 
115 Ibid, p. 177. 
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argues, has suffered confusion in the hands of theologians such as Pseudo-Dionysius, 
for whom praise (hymnein) is almost a saying (predicating) of God.
116
  Derrida 
observes that Marion, as well, “gives the impression all too quickly that the passage to 
praise is the passage to prayer itself”.117  Marion, for his part, argues that Aristotle 
states that, “prayer is a λόγός, but neither true nor false”.118  Following Aristotle, 
Marion says that prayer predicates but is not apophantic – that is, does not affirm or 
reveal anything.  However, Derrida points out that Aristotle himself does not say 
whether praise (hymnein) is apophantic or not.  The issue here is that Marion, with 
Pseudo-Dionysius, conflates prayer with hymnein (praise), which names and determines 
what is being praised.  While pure prayer is not apophantic, praise is: “The 
performative in itself does not always exclude predication.” 119   And Marion's 
references to Pseudo-Dionysius concern praise (hymnein) and not prayer per se.  As 
hymnein, Marion's prayer is predicative.  Moreover, it is predication of the ontological 
kind:
120
  According to Derrida: 
 
If prayer, at least according to Dionysius, tends toward union with God, 
praise is not prayer: it is at most its supplement: what is added to it, when 
the union [with God] remains inaccessible or is lacking, in order to play 
the role of substitute but also to determine the referent itself, which is 
also the cause (the Requisite, Marion would say) of the prayer. It can 
incite to prayer, it can also follow it, but it is not identical with it.
121
   
 
                                                 
116 Ibid, p. 177; see also p. 309n16.  Derrida cites Balthasar:  “When it is a question of God and the 
divine, the word hymnein nearly replaces the word 'to say'.”  Cited from Marion, Idol and Distance, 
184n68. 
117 HAS, 309–310n16.  In Idol and Distance, Marion writes:  “...Denys tends to substitute for the to 
say of predicative language another verb, ύμνείν, to prause.  What does this substitution signify?  It 
no doubt indicates the passage from discourse to prayer, for 'prayer is a λόγος but neither true nor 
false' (Aristotle).  But how, in its turn, can prayer constitute a rigorous language that nevertheless 
remains in distance?  What cannot be said must not be silenced.  For it is necessary to merit a 
silence that holds for that very thing about which one must be silent.  Denegation would here remain 
dishonest, through defect.  It is therefore necessary to pass beyond the categorical alternative, in 
order to reach another model of discourse.  Let us describe it as a discourse of praise.” (Italics 
mine.)  Idol and Distance, pp. 184–185.  Marion's interpretation of the direct “passage” from 
prayer to praise is Derrida's object of critique here. 
118 Aristotle, On Interpretation, VII, 17a, 4. 
119 Italics mine.  HAS, p. 310n16. 
120 See Idol and Distance, p. 184n60.  The relevant citations Marion makes from Dionysius' work are:  
DN, 593c–d; 596 a–c; 637b; 641d; 652a; 681d; 701c; 709b; 713c; 816b–c; 820c; 824a; 868a; 872a, c; 
909b; 969a, c; MT 1025a.  Marion makes special mention of DN 816b–c. 
121 Italics mine.  HAS, p. 310n16. 
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Dionysius uses praise as a “supplement” or “substitute” for pure prayer in light of a 
lack, namely, experience of the divine.  In the presence of this lack, Pseudo-Dionysius 
is obligated to employ predicative discourse, praise, in order to say and determine “the 
very thing that it cannot show and know, and to which it cannot unite itself even by 
prayer.”122  Praise is a device that allows the tout autre to appear, to be determined.  If 
prayer is praise, then it is a prayer that names.  But this means it is no longer prayer 
itself, but discourse. 
 
 So Marion, with Psuedo-Dionysius, still stands within the horizon of presence, 
albeit a hyper-presence or eminent being.  Marion, however, is convinced otherwise.  
Prayer is praise, to the extent that it “does not aim to bring to light...the superessential 
essence inasmuch as it is superessential…but much rather to praise the procession that 
makes essences and that comes to all beings from the [trinitarian] Thearchy, the 
principle of essences.”123  Prayer as praise already determines the principle of essences 
to be addressed.  Marion sees prayer as discourse, a way “to begin speaking in order to 
determine the addressee of the prayer…a trinitary beyond being, a thearchy as principle 
of essence.”124  Whereas for Derrida, “pure prayer asks only that the other hear the 
prayer, receive it, be present to it, be the other as such...”.125  It does not name the other 
to whom one prays, unlike the prayers of Pseudo-Dionysius and Marion that ‘name’ the 
other.   
 
Prayer (eukhē) is praise (hymnein) when it speaks or says or names God in its 
own way.
126
  While pure prayer “does not speak about but to”, praise determines 
who or what we are addressing.
127
  The conflation of these two structures occurs when 
no absence or lack separates God from us but urges a union between us and God.
128
  
                                                 
122 Ibid, p. 310n16. 
123 Italics mine.  DN 5:816B, cited in HAS, p. 310–311n16; Idol and Distance, p. 184n68. 
124 HAS, p. 311n16. 
125 Ibid, p. 176. 
126 Ibid, p. 177.  Derrida sees the same conflated structure in all religious prayers, not just the Christian.  
But in saying this, Derrida is also acknowledging that:  “To refuse this no doubt subtle distinction, 
inadmissible for Dionysius and perhaps for Christians in general, is to refuse the essential quality of 
prayer to every invocation that would not be Christian.” 
127 Ibid, p. 177. 
128 Ibid, pp. 177–178; Dionysius, DN 3:680B. 
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For Derrida, what ultimately conditions all kinds of prayer as hymnein is pure prayer 
itself, which does not name. 
 
2.2.2. The Secret and Negative Theology 
 
 Prayer itself is purely an address to the other, without naming this other.  The 
Other remains other, a pure secret never disclosed to the one who prays.
129
  For 
Derrida, prayer itself precedes prayer as discourse, never disclosing the secret itself, 
never naming the other to whom prayer as praise is addressed.  Prayer is the secret 
done in secret.  As Derrida observes, keeping promises and secrets is something 
humans do best.  They can promise not to speak – to keep a secret – while animals 
cannot.
130
  Humans can refrain from manifesting what they are capable of doing so.  
So the ability to keep a secret presupposes the capacity to reveal it, which makes 
possible ‘secret societies’.131  These are structured on the promise to keep a secret and 
also share it – a characteristic some critics have attributed to deconstruction and 
deconstructionists.  Derrida denies this.  For him, the secret is impossible; so are 
secret societies. 
 
 Secret societies keep secrets to share them.
132
  Sharing a secret indiscriminately 
would mean fully manifesting what is hidden.  However, Derrida notes a paradox in 
secret societies:  What “should be hidden” is already known by those who have the 
                                                 
129 HAS, pp. 155ff.  The animal or animality was the theme of his last seminar of lectures, “The Beast 
and the Sovereign” (2001–2003).  See The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. 1, trans. by G. Bennington 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), p. xii.  It was also the theme of of the ten-day Cisery 
conference, “The Autobiographical Animal”, for which Derrida wrote the introduction, L’animal que 
donc je suis (Paris: Éditions Galilée, 2006).  See The Animal That I Am, trans. David Wills, ed. by 
Marie-Luise Mallet (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), p. ix.  For Derrida, the animal or 
animality is a reference to the 'other' than human, a trace in the condition of being human and, 
therefore, that which conditions “unconditional hospitality”.  See Leonard Lawlor, 'Jacques Derrida', 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring, 2014), online 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/derrida/>, accessed March 22, 2014, § 4, 
'Elaboration of the Basic Argumentation: The Worst and Hospitality'.  Also, Leonard Lawlor, This is 
not Sufficient: An Essay on Animality and Human Nature in Derrida (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007). 
130 HAS, p. 155.  Animals can “neither choose to keep itself silent [setaire] – nor to keep a secret 
silent.” 
131 Ibid, p. 157. 
132 Ibid, pp. 156–157.  To share a secret is “a power-to-keep-silent [about] a reserved content, of a place 
of wealth that had to be withheld from just anyone.” 
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power to share the secret.  So there is no secret as such, no pure secret, since someone 
already knows it, shares it, and is capable of keeping silent about it – precisely because 
the secret is already revealed to them.  There is no secret.  Since deconstruction 
acknowledges the impossibility of the secret, there are no secret societies for 
deconstructionists to belong to.  If any esotericism is to be found, it is found in the 
mysticism of Pseudo-Dionysisus and Eckhart.
133
   
 
In his Mystical Theology, Pseudo-Dionysius explains the secrets of revelation 
and exhorts Timothy not to make this known to those who are still obsessed with 
knowledge, or the ignorant and profane.  A double-separation occurs:  First, 
separation “from the philosophers or the experts in ontology” and, second, separation 
“from those who would manipulate predicative language as naive idolaters.” 134  
Pseudo-Dionysius then shares the secret, “that the cause of all ...is itself situated beyond 
all position, whether negative or affirmative – beyond privation.” 135   Therefore, 
Derrida interprets Pseudo-Donysius' secret as follows: 
 
[Dionysius] defines a beyond that exceeds the opposition between 
affirmation and negation. ...it exceeds position (thesis) itself, and not 
merely curtailment, subtraction (aphairesis).  At the same time, it 
exceeds privation. ...[This is a without that] marks neither a privation nor 
a lack nor an absence.  As for the hyper of the superessential 
(hyperousios), it has the double and ambiguous value of what is above in 
a hierarchy, thus both beyond and more.  God (is) beyond being but as 
such is more (being) than being: no more being and being more than 
being: being more.
136
 
 
This is a discourse on presence, a situating of the hyperousios.  A hyper-
ontology conditions Pseudo-Dionysius's theology, which speaks of the ‘cause’ as 
                                                 
133 Ibid, p. 158. 
134 Ibid, p. 158.  For Derrida, this calling is “analogous” to those of Levinas and Marion, whose 
philosophies are “not far from insinuating [sous-entendre] that ontology itself is a subtle or perverse 
idolatry.”  For Derrida's critical engagement with Emmanuel Levinas, see Derrida's essay 'Violence 
and Metaphysics: An Essay on Emmanuel Levinas', in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 97–192.  Here, Derrida explicitly takes issue with the 
polemics applied by Levinas and Marion in their critique of metaphysics. 
135 Derrida's emphasis.  MT 1:1000a–b; cited in HAS, p. 159. 
136 HAS, p. 158. 
30 
 
“situated…beyond all position.”137  It situates itself in the community that is called to 
the secret.  Pseudo-Dionysius refers to communions as a special mode of “mediation” 
or communication known as “Hierarchy”, which itself is a dis-course taking place 
between the celestial and “ecclesiastical hierarchy”.138  However, as Derrida already 
observes, the hierarchy also serves as a mode of separation from the “multiplicity of 
what is profane”.139  The community – served by the ecclesiastical hierarchy – is to 
“[k]eep these holy truths [about God] a secret”.140  In other words, the secret is already 
situated, located, and presented within the very community enlightened by the revealing 
of the secret.  This implies that there is no secret as such. 
 
 However, Marion adopts the Dionysian “hierarchy” as the mode in which the 
Gift gives itself unconditionally and with immediacy.
141
  Marion insists that “[t]he 
political model of hierarchy” is no obstacle to the hierarchy that “opens to the 
communion of saints.”142  However, Derrida questions this, since Pseudo-Dionysius 
himself speaks of the ecclesiastical hierarchy as integral to the mediation process 
originating from the celestial hierarchy.  This notion of community and hierarchy find 
their source in the historical forms of hierarchical institutions and communities.  For 
this reason, even if mystical theology has a secret to keep, it is not a pure secret.  It is 
already inscribed in the horizon of presence, metaphysics, history, politics, and so on.   
 
For a dissociation to take place, a pure secret can only be kept in a silence that 
                                                 
137 Ibid, p. 159. 
138 Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, in The Complete Works, chs. 1–3, 120A–168B, pp. 145–
154.  For Peudo-Dionysius, the “celestial hierarchy” is mediated through the “ecclesiastical 
hierarchy” to the natural hierarchies present in creation, thereby making possibility an ascent or 
divinization – an 'uplifting' return of all things toward the cause of all.  It is a Neoplatonic 
framework Pseudo-Dionysus employs to explain the process of the “hierarchy”.  Pseudo-Dionysius, 
CH, p. 144n4; also, p. 145n7.  This is why Derrida will not be as keen as Marion in distinguishing 
Christian mystical theology from the Greek “paradigm” of negative theology.  See below. 
139 CH, ch. 2, 145C, p. 152. 
140 Ibid. 
141 HAS, p. 307n8; see Idol and Distance, pp. 163–164, and p. 170.  Marion will relate Dionysius' 
“hierarchy” with immediacy of the gift, arguing that “[o]nly mediation produces immediacy; 
abolished, it would give way to barbarianism... [Mediation] ensures an act that aims precisely to give 
in order to receive, to receive in order to give.  Immediacy... [is assured] by the always 
recommencing, memorially repeated mediation of the given and giving gift, which each person 
delivers to his neighbor only in delivering himself to it... Hierarchy allows an immediate mediation.”  
Idol, p. 170. 
142 Idol and Distance, p. 170. 
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knows nothing.   Derrida refers to Pseudo-Dionysius' interpretation of Moses’ ascent 
to Sinai.
143
  Moses closes his eyes – a symbol of absolute silence, blindness.144  So, 
although Moses entered God's divine place, the secret God is still inaccessible to him.  
God is not where he takes place, be it in a temple or in a community.  God remains 
pure secret – never known or revealed, never present.  One has to engage a denial in 
order the secret safe:  “There is no secret” – that is, the secret that is never known 
remains pure secret.  Likewise, with God:  “God is not” – that is, the God that never 
takes place, is never named, remains God.   
 
So God, like the secret, is impossible.  Derrida here speaks of a paradoxical 
“denial (dénégation)”.145  The moment one engages the secret in discourse, the secret 
is no longer secret.  For there to be a secret, the secret must not be.  This is why the 
mystical theologies of Pseudo-Dionysius and Marion are never radically apophatic.  
For Derrida, they do not accomplish what they claim to, namely, save the name of God, 
the secret name.  Mystical theology does goes beyond affirmation (kataphasis) and 
negation (apophasis) to glimpse the God who “does not take place [n'apas lieu]” – a 
God who “is and has/takes place [a lieu] but [is] without being and without place, 
without being his place.”146  Nevertheless, in Pseudo-Dionysius and Marion, this 
“without place” comes to be situated, above all, in the community.  As Pseudo-
Dionysius says, “the presence (parousia) of God” takes place at the “heights of those 
                                                 
143 HAS, pp. 159–160.  See MT 1:1000c–d. 
144 HAS, p. 159.   Derrida identifies three motifs from Dionysius account of Moses' ascent.  First, the 
order for the enlightened and inspired to be separated from the profane.  Second, the creation of 
political strategems of social division, or shibboleth – leading to a “double inscription” of the 
theologian's knowledge (whereby the theologian now needs to provide a mystagogy to the 
community and, at the same time, guard the faith against the profane).  Third, the location of God's 
presence in the secret knowledge circulated within communal discourse.  See HAS, pp. 160–164.   
145 My emphasis.  HAS, p. 162.  This is the mode of denegation that is implied in Derrida's essay title, 
'How to Avoid Speaking: Denials' – which has been translated from the original French, 
“dénégations”.  There is something of a concensus that the original French “dénégations” be left 
untranslated, since “denials” lacks the connotation of the double negation explicated in Derrida's 
essay.  See Caputo, Prayers and Tears, p. 33; Mark C. Taylor, 'Non-Negative Negative Atheology', 
Diacritics 20.4 (Winter 1990), pp. 2–3n4; H. Coward and T. Foshay, eds., Derrida and Negative 
Theology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. 7.  Nevertheless, By 'denials', 
Derrida refers to something more originary that a Freudian or psychoanalytical repression.  Yet, as 
Lawlor suggests, by “denial” Derrida is employing a psychoanalytic understanding of negation.  
When a patient denies or negates something affirmed of him or her, a self-denial or denegation is 
already taking place:  What has been affirmed, though denied or negated, turns out to be true.  
Lawlor, 'Jacques Derrida', § 3, “Basic Argumentation and its Implications: Time, Hearing-Oneself-
Speak, the Secret, and Sovereignty”. 
146 HAS, p. 163. 
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holy places”.147  God's presence takes place – is His place. 
 
2.2.3. Trace of the Other, the Cause of All Discourse 
 
 How to avoid speaking?  Derrida does not think it is possible.  Before the 
possibility of speaking or silence, the promise itself has obligated him to speak.  This 
event – or, non-event, is other than presence; it is absence, an absent presence – trace.  
It conditions all discourse, which always happens “too late”.  The wholly other (tout 
autre) precedes discourse.  So, for Derrida, discourse responds to an otherness that 
remains pure promise, the secret itself.
148
  Discourses – be they promises, prayers, 
praise, hymns, celebrations, or silence – are possible only in the absent-presence of the 
tout autre.  The other is the event of the trace in all speech.
149
   
 
 For Derrida, the trace of the other conditions God-talk, theology.  The non-
event of the other who is never brought to presence and, yet, precedes theology – this 
other is recalled when we attempt to speak well of God.  In this way, discourse about 
God “already proceeds from God.”150  To speak well of God we must let God be 
wholly other.  For Derrida, even if speaking properly of God means avoiding 
speech altogether, silence is also “a gift and an effect of God.”151   God is the absent 
cause of speech about God.  All discourse, including theology, responds to God –  
recalls the call of God who is, nonetheless, the wholly other: 
 
This is what God's name always names, before or beyond other names: 
the trace of the singular event that will have made speech possible even 
before speech turns back toward – in order to respond to it – this first or 
last reference. ...
152
   
 ….the moment that the question 'How to avoid speaking?' arises, 
it is already too late.  It was no longer a question of not speaking. 
Language has begun without us, in us, before us. This is what theology 
                                                 
147 Ibid, p. 164.  See MT 1:1001A, p. 136. 
148 HAS, p. 165.  The “call of the other, having always already preceded the speech to which it has 
therefore never been present a first time, announces itself in advance as a recall [rappel].” 
149 HAS, p. 165. 
150 Ibid, p. 165. 
151 Ibid, p. 165. 
152 Ibid, p. 165. 
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calls God, and it is necessary, it will have been necessary, to speak.”153 
 
‘God’ no longer names a referent, an intelligible place, or a hyperessence.  Like the 
promise, the secret, trace, différance, ‘God’ never takes place, is never present.  Yet, 
God conditions discourse about God.   
 
 For this reason, negative discourse must begin with a prayer that recognizes its 
destination:  “[T]he Other as Referent of a legein [Gk from lego 'to collect', 'to say' or 
'to speak'] that is none other than its Cause [i.e. the cause of speech, discourse, prayer 
itself].”154  Here, while Derrida uses “Cause” in reference to the trace of the other, he 
has a very different notion of cause in mind.  Marion describes it as aitia (requisite), or 
the cause that conditions and is conditional.  Derrida's cause is the trace, which is 
infinite and, yet, is “the very possibility of an experience of finitude.”155  In other 
words, this cause (trace of the other) conditions finite experiences.  As pure possibility, 
trace is infinite but makes possible the finitude of speech.  At the same time, “insofar 
as it is infinite”,156 the trace of the other never appears in finite discourse or experience. 
The trace “has no cause or origin” but is the cause of all.  As such, experience never 
arises in virtue of itself.  Discourse and thinking are always a response to the trace of 
the other that precedes it.  They no longer belong to the speaker or thinker but, rather, 
to that which precedes discourse but is never present in it.
157
 
 
2.3. Three Paradigms of Negative thought 
 
The secret, promise, khōra, trace – these are the aporias involved in all 
                                                 
153 Italics mine.  Ibid, p. 166.   
154 Ibid, p. 165. 
155 HAS, p. 166. 
156 Ibid, p. 166.   Elsewhere, “the infinite differance is finite.”  Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, and 
other essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs, trans. by David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1973), p. 102. 
157 In this regard, Derrida refers to a scriptural analogy:  Jeremiah's cursing of the day of his birth (Jer 
20.14–18).  Jeremiah can only deny what has, in fact, taken place.  An allusion to a seminar on 
Jeremiah at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Jerusalem, which took place shortly before the 
colloquium of Derrida's present lecture. On this note, see 'How to Avoid Speaking', pp. 167 and 
308n12; and especially, Derrida, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, trans. by Geoffrey 
Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1989; repr 1991), pp. 129–136n5, 
where he addresses how a questioning no longer belongs to the questioner, since the question as such 
precedes the questioners question. 
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discourse.  To illustrate how they condition negative and mystical discourse, Derrida 
traces “three stages” or paradigms of the via negativa:158  The Greek, the Christian, 
and the metaphysical.  It is common to interpret the three paradigms as a historical 
process of evolution of the tradition called “negative theology”.  However, as seen 
above, since discourse is never the same with what discourse tries to represent, Derrida 
is cautious of identifying traditions called negative theology with the negative theology 
itself.  To say that there is a historical progression of the via negative spanning the 
Greek, Christian and metaphysical, is to acknowledge a hidden teleology at work that 
eventuates (that is, brings to presence, being) negative theology itself.  If this event 
were possible, then negative discourse and all negative theology will cease.  As such, 
Derrida puts into question this telelogical development of the via negativa in Western 
thought.
159
 
 
2.3.1. First Paradigm: Greek (Plato and the Neoplatonism) 
 
 The Greek paradigm of negativity consists of the epekeina tēs ousias (beyond 
Being/beings) and the khōra.  Derrida sees them as “two movements or two tropics of 
negativity.”160 
 
 In the first movement, the tou agathou (the Good) is situated beyond being.
161
  
So it is kind of overcoming of ontology.  The Good is situated or takes the place of 
being.  The Good is “not-being” but it is also “not a nonbeing; it stands, so to speak, 
beyond presence or essence, epekeina tes ousias, beyond the beingness of Being 
[l'étantité de l'être].”162  Itself without being or becoming, the Good produces being or 
essence; itself invisible, it does not belong in being and neither in the order of 
                                                 
158 HAS, p. 167. 
159 At the same time, Derrida detects the trace or the “ghosts [specter] of a tradition of thought that is 
neither Greek nor Christian...what of Jewish and Arab thought in this regard?” (HAS, p. 167)  This 
remark is autobiographical.  In this lecture on negative theology, Derrida speaks about a tradition 
that not his own: “I have never yet been able – lacking the ability, the competence, or the self-
authorization – to speak of what my birth, as one says, should have brought closest to me: the Jew, 
the Arab.” (HAS, p. 309n13).  This lacuna (absence, lack) is a “void” or an “internal desert” that 
resonates in his lecture – a lack that motivates him to speak about negative theology. 
160 HAS, p. 168. 
161 Ibid, p. 168. 
162 Ibid, p. 168. 
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knowledge.
163
  There is, therefore, an aporia. 
 
2.3.1.1. Hyperbolization 
 
 The Good is designated a place beyond (hyper) being, which is a hyperbolism.
164
  
Being is negated in a hyper movement distinguishing the Good as a hyper-reality 
beyond what is, even though the Good produces being just as the sun gives out rays.
165
   
So this negativity is not negation but an affirming of ‘superessentialism’, which finds a 
place in Christian apophaticism as well.
166
  Whether it is a hyperbolism of Good or 
Being, the horizon of presence (being) is re-introduced.  Derrida is apparently in 
agreement with Thomas Aquinas, who criticizes Pseudo-Dionysius for elevating Bonum 
above Ens or Esse in the hierarchy of divine names:  If the Good is Good by virtue of 
being hyperousious, then ‘being’ should be above all divine names. 167   The 
hyperbolism of the Good in the Greek paradigm does not overcome ontology.  Rather, 
it affirms the “analogical continuity” between the Good and being.168 
                                                 
163 Ibid, p. 168.  In establishing the interrelatedness of the Good and Being, David Burrell similarly 
highlights the teleological feature of this concept of the Good:  “...speaking of good is not adding 
anything to discourse about being, but rather calling attention to the telos inherent in that act of 
existing which creatures derive from their creator. To speak of '’he good’, then, is to call attention to 
the eros of being.”  Burrell, ‘Reflections on ‘Negative Theology’ In the Light of a Recent Venture to 
Speak of ‘God Without Being’,’ in Postmodernism and Christian Philosophy, ed. by R. T. Ciapolo 
(Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1997), pp. 58–67, and p. 60. 
164 HAS, p. 168. 
165 HAS, p. 169.  Derrida here refers to Plato's analogy of the sun as an illustration of the relationship 
between the Good, being and knowedge.  See Plato's Republic 509b.  This “analogical continuity” 
demonstrates an affirmation of 'presence', being, insofar as the Good is concerned. 
166 Ibid, p. 169. 
167 Ibid, p. 169.  Thomas' critique of Dionysius is a point of controversy.  Because of Thomas' 
prioritizing of being over Good, Marion himself earlier charges Thomas with falling to ontotheology.  
In light of critiques by philosophers on Marion's critique of Thomas, Marion later revised his 
assessment of Thomas.  See Thomas Hibbs, Aquinas, Ethics, and Philosophy of Religion 
(Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2007), p. 118.  For Marion's critique of 
Thomas, see his preface to the English edition of God Without Being, xxiii.  For references to 
critiques of Marion's criticism of Thomas, see Hibbs, p. 209n4. 
168 HAS, p. 169.  “The negative discourse regarding what stands beyond Being, and apparently no 
longer tolerates ontological predicates, does not interrupt this analogical continuity. In truth, it 
presupposes it; it even lets itself be guided by it. Ontology remains possible and necessary.”  
O'Leary states the same observation in this regard. See O'Leary, Questioning Back, p. 60.  “In 
Gregory [of Nyssa] or Pseudo-Dionysius, the language of 'beyond being,' or not-being in a non-
privative sense, could be seen as a deepening of his insistence on the primacy of being, not an 
overcoming of it. Being still serves here as the supreme principle of a metaphysical ordering of 
reality, although we can only say of this supreme being that it is, not what it is.”  Moreover, for 
O’Leary, if negative theology could go beyond Pseudo-Dionysian negativity, it “could fulfil its 
counter-metaphysical vocation.” (p. 60)  For Derrida, this “counter-metaphysical vocation” is an 
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2.3.1.2. The 'Third' and Khōra169 
 
 On the other hand, the Greek paradigm harbours a “hypo” movement.170  It is 
traced to Plato’s reference of a “third kind” that is “not-being” but, yet, conditions the 
possibility of opposites to “mix” and “participate” mutually – such as when negation 
and affirmation are co-present in thought and speech.  Discourse is never purely 
affirmative or negative.
171
  Thought and speech always affirms; even in its negations, 
discourse affirms.  Following Plato, Derrida calls this khōra, which is other than the 
hyperbolizing discourse of the Good.
172
  It is a third kind, a triton genus.
173
  It is not a 
mode of mediation suggested by the “hierarchy” of Pseudo-Dionysius and Marion.  
Khōra is unintelligible, forms no sense impressions; it is inadaptable to any type of 
discourse, hermeneutic, or telos.
174
  Khōra even precedes Plato’s Demiurge and is, 
therefore, “outside” time.175  Khōra is the wholly other that escapes thought and 
language. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                               
impossibility, unless one is willing to give up discourse, writing, and thinking all at once. 
169 See above, p. 11. 
170 Caputo, ‘Apostles of the Impossible’, pp. 216–217. 
171 HAS, p. 170.  It “is indispensable to the interweaving (symplokē) or to the dialectical intercrossing 
of the forms or the ideas in a logos capable of taking in the other.”  See The Sophist, 243b–259b, for 
Plato’s description of the paradox of “not-being”, which Derrida says is a “dialectic [that] admits the 
thinking of nonbeing as other and not as absolute nothingness or the simple opposite of being.”  See 
especially, Sophist, 256b–259b; and, 262e–264b.  Plato, Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12, Cratylus, 
Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, trans. by Harold N. Fowler (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1921), online 
<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0172> (accessed 23 March, 
2014). 
172 HAS, p. 170.  Derrida mentions “forthcoming text”, which is “[a] long introduction to [a] work in 
progress” in honor of Jean-Pierre Vernant.  Derrida's long introduction to this work is entitled, 
Chora. See also Derrida's “Khōra”, trans. by Ian McLeod, in Derrida, On the Name, pp. 89–127. 
173 HAS, p. 171.  For Plato's allusion to a “Third Kind”, see Timaeus, 48e, 49a, and 52a.  All 
references to Timaeus are from, Plato, Plato in Twelve Volumes, vol. 9, ‘Hippias Major, Hippias 
Minor, Ion, Menexenus, Cleitophon, Timaeus, Critias, Minos, Epinomis,’ trans. by W. R. M. Lamb 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1925), online 
<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0180> (accessed 23 March, 
2014).  
174 HAS, p. 171. 
175 Ibid, p. 171.  Khōra is “the ‘there’ itself, outside time or in any case outside becoming, in an outside-
time without common measure with the eternity of ideas and the becoming of sensible things.” 
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 In this ‘other’ language – language of the wholly other – Plato leaves behind 
metaphors and figures to explain khōra.  It is no longer a “receptacle” for being, that 
is, it is not a linguistic or textual vehicle of naming or expressing being.
176
  Khōra does 
not present itself; it is not a given or a givenness – not the Event of the gift.   As such, 
khōra is also not the Ereignis that gives itself in giving being.177   “…[O]ne cannot 
even say that it gives place or that there is [il y a] the khōra. The es gibt, thus translated, 
still announces or recalls too much the dispensation of God, of man, or even that of 
Being of which certain of Heidegger's texts speak (es gibt Sein).”178  This is technically 
not a lack or privation, since the khōra is “above all not an experience.”179  It is “only a 
philosophical way of naming an X” that escapes all categories of thought and being.180  
It is not an experience. 
 
 So it seems impossible to speak of khōra.  Indeed, one can suggest writing 
khōra under erasure (      ).  But this would be merely to affirm the presence of 
khōra, to let it appear under erasure, a denial of khōra.181  The only “rule” for referring 
to khōra, says Derrida, is to “always to refer to it in the same way. Not to give it the 
same name...but to call it, to address oneself to it, in the same way… [by] appellation, a 
way of addressing oneself.”182  One can only address the khōra, which is less a proper 
name than a ‘title’ for the tout autre that calls us to address it – pure address without 
                                                 
176 Ibid, p. 173.  Khōra is “‘something’ that is or is not, that would be present or absent, intelligible, 
sensible, or both at once, active or passive, Good (epekeina tēs ousias) or Evil, God or man, living or 
nonliving.”  See Timaeus 50a–d, where Plato also describes the third kind as always to be referred to 
in the same way (as just khōra), since it conditions all experience without ever giving itself in any 
way, intellectual or sensible.  Since it never gives itself, it is not a “receptacle” for being. 
177
 See below, pp. 81ff. 
178 Italics mine.  HAS, p. 173.  Khōra is “not even the ça, the es of the giving [le donner] before all 
subjectivity.  It does not give rise [lieu] as one would give something, whatever it might be; it does 
not create or produce anything, not even an event insofar as the event takes place. It gives no order 
and makes no promise. It is radically a historical, because nothing happens through it and nothing 
happens to it 
179 Ibid, p. 174. 
180 Ibid, p. 175. 
181
 For Derrida’s critique of Heidegger’s and Marion’s attempts to write Being and God under erasure, 
see below, pp. 46ff. 
182 HAS, p. 173–174. “Proserō: I address myself…to someone, and sometimes: I adore the divinity; 
prosrēma is the speech addressed to someone; prosrēsis is the situation that calls.”  Timaeus 50c:  
“the same account [of the khōra] must be given. It must be called always by the same name; for from 
its own proper quality it never departs at all for while it is always receiving all things, nowhere and in 
no wise does it assume any shape similar to any of the things that enter into it.” (Italics mine.) 
khōra
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discourse.  It is akin to pure prayer.  Khōra is an “unheard-of trace”, the promise of 
the other that obliges all discourse and thought.
183
   
 
2.3.2. Second Paradigm: The Christian 
 
 Since the khōra is not discourse, it is therefore not a matter of negative 
theology.
184
  “[O]ne cannot invent it”, Derrida says.185  It is wholly other to whatever 
is conceived in terms of presence and absence.
186
  It is not a theological experience, for 
“it is not a prayer, a celebration, or praise. It does not speak to You [Thou].”187  Khōra 
is not negative theology. 
 
 In contrast, the negative theology thinks in terms of naming – a naming beyond 
pure addressing.
188
  Christian apophatic discourse is grounded in the moment of 
history, event, and influence; that is, in what has taken place.  In negative theology, 
‘God’ is an experience.  Therefore, Pseudo-Dionysius affirms and celebrates God as 
“the Good, the intelligible Light, even the Good ‘above all light’”.  For Derrida, this 
“nonbeing” is superabundant life, an excess of life, an experience of life in light of this 
excess.
189
  This ontological necessity is assured of when Pseudo-Dionysius speaks of 
erōs, an erotics that inspires being and leads it back to God.190   
 
 
 
                                                 
183 HAS, p. 174. 
184 HAS, p. 174. 
185 Ibid, p. 174. 
186 Ibid, pp. 174–175. 
187 Ibid, p. 175. 
188 Ibid, p. 175.  Christian negative theology “is a thinking of an essential 'having-taken-place', of a 
revelation, of an order and a promise, of an anthropo-theologization that – despite the extreme rigor 
of the negative hyperboyle – seems to take command once again, closer still to the agathon than to 
the khōra.” In other words, negative theology is closer to the hyper-theology of Pseudo-Dionysius 
than Plato. 
189 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN ch. 4, 697A; cited in HAS, p. 175.  The quotation from Pseudo-Dionysius 
continues, “one might even say that nonbeing itself longs for the Good which is above all being. 
Repelling being, it struggles to find rest in the Good which transcends all being, in the sense of a 
denial of all things.” 
190 HAS, pp. 175-176. 
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2.3.2.1. Mystical Tradition and the Promise 
 
 Therefore, Derrida refers to Christian apophatics as “the negativity without 
negativity”.191  It is a logic of the ‘without’ – for example, “God without being” – 
where the “without” that negates a predicate actually ‘reveals’ the predicate in a higher 
form – hence, “God without being is more than being”.192  The Christian paradigm is 
an affirmation through negation, a hyperbolism employing negation in order to establish 
a hyperessence.  Besides Pseudo-Dionysius, Eckhart’s mystical theology is another 
figure of the Christian paradigm of negative theology.  
 
 A multiplicity of ‘voices’ of negative theology are employed in Eckhart’s works.  
It is therefore sometimes unclear if Eckhart speaks with his voice or is citing others.
193
  
But Derrida observes closely that Eckhart quotes a “pagan master”, who establishes a 
rule or law of apophatic procedure, namely, that “one must go beyond the veil or the 
clothing” of language and names, and grasp God bare.194  In other words, one must go 
beyond the veil that to unveil God, which suggests for Derrida a hyper-movement from 
the veil of being to the unveiling of that which is beyond being.  It is a hyperbolic 
gesture that, moreover, Eckhart cites from a “pagan master”.  Eckhart neither 
contradicts nor agrees explicitly with this “pagan master” but, instead, reverts to 
speaking via “a negatively without negativity.”   
 
He reverts to the “saintly masters, who knew by a much higher light.”  In a 
                                                 
191 Ibid, p. 178. 
192 Ibid, p. 179.  “A predicate can always conceal another predicate”, hence producing not a negation 
but a “demultiplication of voices and discourses, of disappropriation and reappropriation of 
utterances...”  HAS, p. 178. 
193 HAS, p. 179–180.  From 1323, Eckhart was most likely a lecturer at the Studium Generale.  At the 
time, there were Franciscan-led campaigns against him, resulting in an inquisitional proceeding that 
began in 1326.  A syllabus of errors was attributed to him and Eckhart submitted a reply to the Papal 
Court in Avignon.  The papal bull In agro dominico, issued by Pope John XXII (March 27, 1329) 
condemned 17 articles from this syllabus as heretical, 11 more as suspect of heresy.  Eckhart did not 
live to hear the verdict of condemnation.  He died before April 30, 1328. Burkhard Mojsisch and 
Orrin F. Summerell, 'Meister Eckhart', The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 
Edition), ed. by Edward N. Zalta, online <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/meister-
eckhart/> (accessed online 24 March, 2014), § 1, 'Life of Meister Eckhart'. 
194 HAS, p. 180.  Meister Eckhart, 'Sermon Sixty-seven, “Quasi Stella Maututina”', in The Complete 
Mystical Works of Meister Eckhart, p. 344: “A pagan master says the soul that loves God takes hold 
of Him under the garment of Goodness.  Intellect draws this garment of goodness off God and takes 
Him bare, where He is stripped of goodness and being and of all names.” 
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sermon, Eckhart speaks of what it means to be “an ad-verb and work one with God”, 
praying that “we may be forever an ad-verb to this Word.”195  Eckhart's sermon is a 
discourse in the form of a prayer.  But Derrida questions if it is a prayer since It does 
not directly address itself to God.
196
  Rather, it is turned toward the reader.  This 
makes sense to Derrida:  God (the Word) does not require “[t]his supplement of 
adverbiality” but the reader does; it is for the sake of the reader that Eckhart speaks of 
negative theology.
197
  Eckhart’s sermons supplement “[our] inability to read the 
authentic ‘book’ that we are, as creatures, and the adverbiality we should be as a 
result.”198  For Derrida, if Eckhart was really praying – if he was purely addressing 
God, he would not have given a sermon nor even supplemented his sermon with a 
prayer.  Eckhart’s discourse would have been silenced.  On the contrary, Eckhart is 
obliged to speak of negative theology for a pedagogical and affirmative purpose.  
Eckhart’s sermon (his prayer) is not prayer itself, for its purpose is to remind his hearer 
and reader of the desire for God within ourselves; we are the by-word of the Word.  In 
his negation of what God is not, Eckhart ends up not only affirming what we are but, 
moreover, what God is – the Word (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit).  This is a negativity 
without negativity.  On the other hand, no other supplement (no discourse of prayers, 
sermons, or theology) would have been necessary if only our hearts were already turned 
to God in pure address.  Because negative theology moves beyond pure negation 
toward affirmation, supplement, negative theology is a hyper-theology. 
 
Likewise, Pseudo-Dionysius’ Mystical Theology begins in prayer that already 
determines God with a hyper-affirmation:  “Trinity!!  Higher than any being, any 
divinity, any goodness!”199  But after praying, he “presents his prayer” to Timothy.200  
There is an apostrophe, a turn, which Derrida observes is not a turning away from God.  
                                                 
195 HAS, p. 181.  “The truest thing that one can say of God is 'Word' and 'Truth.' God called Himself a 
Word. St. John said, " In the beginning was the Word" (John 1.1), meaning that beside the Word, man 
was a 'by-word.'  But the man who would come to that of which I have been speaking – and this is 
the whole burden of my discourse – he should be like the morning star: forever present to God and by 
Him, at an equal distance, and raised above all earthly things, a 'by-word' beside the Word.”  
Eckhart, ‘Sermon Sixty-Seven’, trans. McGinn, pp. 344–345. 
196 HAS, p. 181. 
197Ibid, p. 181. 
198 Ibid, p. 181. 
199 MT ch. 1, 998a.  
200 HAS, p. 182. 
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Rather, it supplements the prayer that Pseudo-Dionysius addresses to God in the 
beginning of Mystical Theology.
201
  In the same way, the prayer of Pseudo-Dionysius 
is a hyper-affirmation of more primal and originary source that conditions prayer itself – 
Pseudo-Dionysius’ pure address turned toward ‘God’ prior to all prayer as discourse, 
prior to all supplements.  But this pure prayer Pseudo-Dionysius performs is never 
present in the prayer he says before he presents his Mystical Theology.  For Derrida, in 
pure prayer as address, ‘God’ is the wholly other and, therefore, always pure promise.  
It is this ‘God’, the other who is promise, which conditions every discourse of prayer.  
In other words, every discourse – including mystical theology, is a supplement to the 
promise.
202
 
 
 However, like Eckhart, Pseudo-Dionysius reverts to “a negativity without 
negativity”.  In Christian apophatics the promise is not pure promise for Pseudo-
Dionysius bonds revelation – which for Derrida is like promise, impossible – to a place, 
Jerusalem.
203
  In The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, Pseudo-Dionysius ties the promise to a 
place (Jerusalem) and, therefore, an experience (baptism).
204
  This ‘situation’ of the 
promise is an event, an experience of fulfilment – that is, history.205  Mystical theology 
affirms the fulfilment of the promise in the “experience” of revelation.  The promise is 
no longer the promise as such for there is already a prescription of what is “the good 
and right apophasis”, “at once a revelation and a teaching of the Holy Scripture.”206  
The promise takes the form of a determinate experience of revelation whereby God, 
though incommunicable, “can manifest itself” even though “separated by its 
                                                 
201 Ibid, p. 182. 
202 HAS, p. 182.  “[T]he prayer, the quotation of the prayer, and the apostrophe, from one you to the 
other, are all weaving the same text”, and ultimately reaches to us, the reader – “[n]ot to us such as 
we are, at present, but such as we should be, in our souls, if we read this text as it should be read, 
rightly, in the proper direction, correctly: according to its prayer and its promise.”  Also, HAS, pp. 
311–312n17. 
203 Ibid, p. 183.  It is “[u]nlike what seemed to happen in the 'experience' of the place called khōra since 
the apophasis puts itself in motion, it initiates itself, in the sense of initiative and initiation, from the 
event of a revelation that is also a promise...[this apophasis in Dionysius' negative theology] belongs 
to a history; or rather, it opens a history and an anthropo-theological dimension... This place is itself 
assigned by the event of the promise and the revelation of scripture.” 
204 Ibid p. 183; EH, trans. by McGinn, 512C.  “Do not depart from Jerusalem but wait for the promise 
of the Father which you heard from me...you shall be baptized with the Holy Spirit.” 
205 HAS, p. 183.  It is a “place of waiting...for the fulfilment of the promise. Then it will take place 
fully. It will be fully a place.” 
206 Ibid, p. 183. 
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superessentiality.”207  This “secret manifestation” is, as Derrida would say, neither a 
secret nor the promise.   
 
 Eckhart apparently is aware of this.  “God is nameless” and, therefore, the best 
way to speak of God is to be silent, “[o]therwise you lie and sin.”208  Silence and 
prayer (pure address) for Eckhart becomes a “duty of love”. 209   As Eckhart 
demonstrates, even the Christian paradigm of apophasis exhorts speech about God “so 
as to order one not to speak, to say what God is not and that he is a non-God.”210  
Eckhart demonstrates that, although mystical theology is not absolutely apophatic, 
nevertheless, the trace of negativity is inscribed there.  The Christian paradigm does 
not cease being Greek.
211
 
 
2.3.3. Third Paradigm: The Metaphysical (Neither Greek nor Christian) 
 
 Derrida says the metaphysical paradigm is “neither Greek nor Christian.”212  
Yet, he adds:  “...Heidegger's thought might resemble the most questioning legacy, 
both the boldest and most liberated repetition of the traditions I have just evoked.”213  
The metaphysical paradigm, represented by Heidegger's project to liberate thinking 
from ontotheology, is at the same time a “repetition” of the Greek and Christian 
traditions.  In explicating Heidegger’s thinking, Derrida shows that even the 
metaphysical paradigm struggles to free itself from ontotheology. 
                                                 
207 Ibid, p. 183. 
208 HAS, p. 185; MEP 3:441–442; 207.  See Eckhart, 'Sermon Ninety-Six': “So be silent and do not 
chatter about God, because by chattering about Him you are lying and so committing a sin.”  Trans. 
Wlash and McGinn, p. 463. 
209 HAS, pp. 185-186; MEP 3:448; 208.  Eckhart, 'Sermon Ninety-Six':  “Therefore your soul should 
be de-spirited of all spirit, she should be spiritless, for if you love God as He is God, as He is spirit, as 
He is person and as He is image - all that must go! …... You should love Him as He is: a non-God, a 
non-spirit, a non-person, a non-image; rather, as He is a sheer pure limpid One, detached from all 
duality. And in that One may we eternally sink from nothingness to nothingness. So help us God. 
Amen.”  Trans. Walsh and McGinn, p. 465. 
210 HAS, p. 186.  MEP 3:448; 208.  One prays in silence, “implores the aid of God in a prayer: 'You 
should love him as he is a non-God, a nonspirit, a nonperson, a nonimage, but as he is a pure, 
unmixed, bright 'One,' separated from all duality; and in that One we should eternally sink down, out 
of 'something' into 'nothing.' May God help us to that.  Amen.” 
211 HAS, p. 186. 
212 Ibid, p. 186. 
213 Italics mine.  Ibid, p. 186–187. 
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 For Derrida, Heidegger's What is Metaphysics? (1968), is a work on the 
“experience of the nothing”.214  So it is not a negation or denial of Being but “reveals” 
the wholly other who, nevertheless, transcends the structures of being.
215
  Heidegger 
travels the path of the Platonic epekeina tēs ousias, from which he tries to distance 
himself.  This distancing begins in, What Is Metaphysics?  There, Heidegger 
charges Plato with “falling short” of thinking the “place” of the wholly other, the tout 
autre.
216
  Instead, Plato reverts to thinking Being in terms of the horizon (place) of 
being.  But in an earlier work, What Is Called Thinking (1961), Heidegger observes 
that Plato's khōra does approach the wholly other place of Being, as against the place of 
beings.
217
  So Heidegger is also undecided as to whether Plato escapes ontotheology.  
From Derrida’s explanation of khōra, however, Plato has already indicated the 
impossibility of such a prospect. 
 
For Derrida, what causes Heidegger to misinterpret Plato is his haste to 
overcome ontotheology simply by distinguishing the thinking of philosophy and 
theology – or ontotheology (or, theiology) and theology:  The former speaks of the 
source of ground as being par excellence or causa sui; the latter is a “science of faith” 
                                                 
214 HAS, p. 187.  It is “a treatise on negativity.  It grounds negative discourse and negation in the 
experience of the nothing that itself nihilates (das Nichts selbstnichtet).”  Heidegger, 'What is 
Metaphysics?', in Basic Writings, trans. by D. F. Krell, rev edn (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 
1993), pp. 193–110. 
215 HAS, p. 187. 
216 Ibid, p. 187.  See Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans R. Manheim (New Have, 
Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1969; repr Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1961):  
Commenting on Plato's Timaeus 50e, Heidegger writes, “The Greeks had no word for 'space.'  This 
is no accident: for they experienced the spatial on the basis not of extension but of place (topos); they 
experienced it as chōra, which signifies neither place nor space but that which is occupied by what 
stands there” (p. 54); furthermore, “[t]he reference to the passage in Timaeus is intended not only to 
clarify the link between the paremphainon and the on, between also appearing and being as 
permanence, but at the same time to suggest that the transformation of the barely apprehended 
essence of place (topos) and of chōra into a 'space' defined by extension was initiated by the Platonic 
philosophy, i.e. in the interpretation of being as idea.”  (p. 55)   See also Jeff Malpas, Heidegger's 
Topology: Being, Place, World (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), p. 71. 
217 HAS, p. 187.  Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, trans. by F. D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 227:  “An interpretation [of 'Being'] decisive for Western thought is 
that given by Plato.  He says that between beings and Being there prevails the χωρισμός; ή χόρα is 
the locus, the site, the place.  Plato means to say: beings and Being are in different places. ...[W]hen 
Plato gives thought to the different location of beings and Being, he is asking for the totally different 
place of Being, as against the place of beings.” 
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that draws on the experience of revelation (Offenbarung).
218
  Ontotheology is the 
conflation of Being as causa sui with the God of revelation.
219
  
 
 From this arises Heidegger’s distinction between the “manifestation or the 
possibility of Being's revealing itself (Offenbarkeit) and revelation (Offenbarung) of the 
God of theology.”220  Philosophy presumably addresses the possibility of manifestion, 
while theology addresses revelation itself.  But here, Derrida finds Heidegger's 
distinction problematic, for the relation between offenbarkeit and offenbarung is not as 
clear-cut as it seems.  Indeed, Heidegger underscores the manifestation (of Being) and 
revelation (of God) with the term, Ereignis, or event.
221
  Being is an event that gives, is 
given, hence, is gift.  However, the question arises as to whether Being is given 
(revelation) because Being’s character is to give itself (reveal-ability); or, if it is 
givenness (reveal-ability) that is conditioned by Being's being given (revelation).
222
  
This is the kind of “undecidability” that Derrida speaks of as an aporia that Heidegger’s 
destruktion itself is unable to overcome.
223
 For Derrida, as soon as one speaks of the 
event of Being as opposed to the horizon of beings, revelation and reveal-ability are not 
so easily distinguished. 
 
                                                 
218 HAS, p. 188.  See Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics, trans Manheim, 6; 7. Derrida explains 
that Heidegger treats this distinction with a clearer terminological equivalence in Heidegger's Hegel's 
Concept of Experience; see trans. by Emad and Maly, Harper, 1970, 135. Furthermore, in Being and 
Time, Heidegger defines theology as a more 'primordial interpretation' of man's Being in his relation 
to God, beginning with the 'meaning of faith'. See Being and Time. 
219
 See above, pp. 4ff. 
220 HAS, p. 188. 
221 On this link between Heidegger, God and Ereignis, see Jean Greisch's 'The Poverty of Heidegger's 
'Last God' ', in French Interpretations of Heidegger: An Exceptional Reception, ed. by D. Pettigrew 
and F. Raffoul (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 2008), pp. 245–264. 
222 See HAS, pp. 189 and 313n24.  Derrida mentions a seminar at Yale in 1970 in which he treats of the 
question of thinking of the gift – 'Donner le temps', in relation to Heidegger's thinking of Being – the 
es gibt Sein (Zeit), in Heidegger's On Time and Being, trans. J. Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row 
Publishers, 1972).  There, Heiedgger says, “We do not say: Being is, time is, but rather: there is 
Being and there is time.  For the moment we have only changed the idiom with this expression. 
Instead of saying 'it is,' we say 'there is,' 'It gives.'  In order to get beyond the idiom and back to the 
matter, we must show how this 'there is' can be experienced and seen. The appropriate way to get 
there is to explain what is given in the 'It gives,' what 'Being' means, which-It gives; what 'time' 
means, which -It gives. Accordingly, we try to look ahead to the It which-gives Being and time. Thus 
looking ahead, we become foresighted in still another sense. We try to bring the It and its giving into 
view, and capitalize the 'It'.”  (pp. 4–5)  See Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. by 
Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 20–21.  
223
 See below, p. 83f. 
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 So, for Derrida, it is not a question of which is prior – the Being that gives 
(offenbarung) or the givenness of Being (offenbarkeit).
224
  However, for Heidegger, 
Being and the givenness of Being are not reconcilable.  When speaking of Being, we 
are at the same time speaking of the “concealment” of Being as being:  “Being is not” 
and, yet, it gives, is present.
225
  Being is not revealed but gives itself to what it reveals.  
This is why Heidegger avoids (negates) the term ‘Being’ and “writes the word Being 
under erasure.”226  He wants to write Being without allowing the word to occur.  
However, Derrida questions the possibility of not letting Being occur.
227
   
 
 For Derrida, Heidegger's avoidance resembles the apophatic thelogy.  In 
engaging a negativity – an avoidance of Being, Heidegger distances himself from 
negative theology, including that of Pseudo-Dionysisus and Eckhart, where God 
‘appears’ as hyperousious.228  Yet, Heidegger continues to cite Pseudo-Dionysius and 
Eckhart, demonstrating that Heidegger's negativity always maintains a point of contact 
with theology.  So, for instance, Heidegger cites Eckhart on the thinking of the thing 
(dinc), where Heidegger agrees with Eckhart on the nonbeing of God.
229
  This and 
other examples demonstrate that thought about Being occurs precisely where thought 
                                                 
224 Italics mine.  HAS, p. 313n24.   
225 “Being, by which all beings as such are marked, Being means presencing. Thought with regard to 
what presences, presencing shows itself as letting-presence. But now we must try to think this letting-
presence explicitly insofar as presencing is admitted. Letting shows its character in bringing into 
unconcealment. To let presence means: to unconceal, to bring to openness. In unconcealing prevails a 
giving, the giving that gives presencing, that is, Being, in letting- presence.”  On Time and Being, p. 
5.  Furthermore, “As a gift, Being is not expelled from giving. Being, presencing is transmuted. As 
allowing-to-presence, it belongs to unconcealing; as the gift of unconcealing it is retained in the 
giving. Being is not. There is, It gives Being as the unconcealing; as the gift of unconcealing it is 
retained in the giving. Being is not. There is, It gives Being as the unconcealing of presencing.”  (p. 
6) 
226 HAS, 313n25.  See what Heidegger says in comparing Eckhart and Kant:  “...love is of such a 
nature that it changes man into the things he loves... Kant talks about things in the same way as 
Mesiter Eckhart and means by this term something that is.  But for Kant, that which is becomes the 
object of representing that which runs its course in the self-consciousness of the human ego.”  
“The Thing”, in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper 
Colophon, 1975; repr New York: Harper Perennial, 2001), p. 174. 
227 See Derrida, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, trans. by G. Bennington and R. Bowlby 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). 
228 HAS, p. 313n25. 
229 See Heidegger, 'The Thing', in Poetry Language and Thought, trans by Hofstadter (New York: Harper 
Colophon, 1975; repr New York: Harper Perennial, 2001), p. 174.  Referring to Eckhart, Heidegger 
says:  “In what its language [i.e., that of things] does not say, there – says Eckhart, old master of 
reading and life – God is truly God.”  'The Pathway', trans O'Meara and Sheehan, in Heidegger: the 
Man and the Thinker, p. 70.  Both cited in HAS, p. 313n25. 
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about ‘God’ appears.  Heidegger's desire to write Being “under erasure” resembles 
mystical theology’s desire to speak about God without naming God – that is, to also 
write God under erasure.
230
  For Derrida, the metaphysical paradigm of negation is not 
so far removed from Christian apophatics and, therefore, the Greek paradigm. 
 
 Indeed, what Heiddeger avoids is not the speaking of Being but the using or 
mention of the word, “Being”.231  Yet, Derrida asks if this is possible at all, for by mere 
mention of the word “Being”, Being takes place, is situated; the reader that reads the 
word begins to think Being into presence.  This is true even if one writes being under 
erasure, in the form of a crossing-out (        ).
232
  Heidegger wants to avoid the 
word ‘Being’.  However, it still remains legible enough for the word to be read, 
deciphered, although it should not be “uttered”.233 So, for Heidegger, while Being 
should not be understood (or heard or thought) as in any sense a being, it nevertheless 
cannot be avoided.  But this is especially true when Heidegger diverts attention from 
Being to what Being brings together, or gathers – what takes place as the fourfold 
(Geviert), “the four regions (Gegenden): earth and sky, mortals and divinities.”234  In 
exposing this gathering, Being (under erasure) is no longer a negation but an event that 
takes place:  ‘Being’ shows the fourfold – “it gathers” in a “place (Ort)”, namely, the 
very crossing out (crossing through) of the Durchkreuzung.
235
  Heidegger's avoidance 
of Being translates into an affirmation of Being as taking place, the event and 
experience of the fourfold. 
                                                 
230 See also Derrida's discussion of Heidegger's interpretation of Gemüt (roughly translated as “soul”) in 
Derrida's Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, trans. by G. Bennington and R. Bowlby (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 78ff. 
231 HAS, p. 189. 
232 Ibid, p. 189.  In The Question of Being (Zur Seins frage, 1952), Heidegger writes ‘Being’ under 
erasure, “in the form of a crossing out (kreuz weise Durch streichung).”  This work by Heidegger 
was one in a series of replies to his friend, Ernst Jünger (1895–1998), who corresponded with 
Heidegger on the question of nihilism.. 
233 HAS, pp. 189–190.  “...Heidegger also warns us against the simply negative use of this 
Durchstreichung. The essential function of this erasure is not to avoid. No doubt, Being is no being, 
and it can be reduced to its turns, turnings, historical tropes (Zuwendungen); one must therefore avoid 
representing it (vorzustellen) as something, an object that stands face-to-face (gegenüber) with man 
and then comes toward him. To avoid this objectifying representation (vorzustellen), the word 'Being' 
will thus be written under erasure. The word henceforth cannot be heard, but it can be read in a 
certain way.” 
234 Ibid, p. 190.  For Marion's discussion of the relation between the fourfold, giving and the gift, see 
God Without Being, pp. 102–104. 
235 HAS, p. 190. 
Being 
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 Derrida observes an analogous gesture in Marion's crossing out the name, ‘God’, 
“crossing     with the cross that reveals him only in the disappearance of his death 
and resurrection.”236  Like Heidegger, Marion writes God under erasure, to remove 
God from the horizon of Being.
237
  Nevertheless, just as with Heidegger's writing 
Being under erasure, Marion unsuccessfully removes God from the horizon of thought, 
presence.  There is still a ‘topos’ of Being that, in the case of Marion, is the topos of 
the cross of the crucified Christ.  Therefore, Marion writes God under erasure only to 
emphasize a higher form of revelation, presence on the cross: 
 
These interrogations could be gathered into a topical question, modest in 
appearance: does the name of the     who is crossed because he is 
crucified, belong to the domain of Being?  We are not at all speaking of 
'God' in general, or thought on the basis of the divine, hence also of the 
Fourfold.  We are speaking of the     who is crossed by a cross 
because he reveals himself by placement on a cross, the     revealed 
by, in, and as the Christ; in other words, the     of rigorously Christian 
theology.
238
 
 
In writing ‘God’ under erasure, in avoiding ‘God’, Marion already thinks of 
‘Being’.  This is especially true since ‘God’ takes place, is inscribed in experience and 
presence, on (and behind) the cross.  There is a “gathering” in Marion’s writing God 
under erasure.  Similarly, Heidegger himself acknowledges a gathering that takes place 
in this Ort, where the crossing out, erasure, takes place.  Nevertheless, what Heidegger 
intends to say is still valid:  One could read ‘Being’ (and ‘God’) under erasure but 
thinking will have to think the place of the nothing.
239
  “What is the locale of the 
nothing?” asks Heidegger; he replies: “the nothing should also be written, and that 
means thought.  Like Being, it would also have to be written and read under 
erasure.”240  In other words, one cannot avoid speaking and thinking about Being or 
                                                 
236 HAS, pp. 313–314n26.  See Marion, God Without Being, pp. 105–107.  For Derrida, “[t]his is 
another thinking of the gift and of the trace, a 'theology' that wants to be 'rigorously Christian' by 
opposing itself at times to the most kindred thinking, that of Heidegger in particular.”  HAS, pp. 
314n26. 
237 Ibid, pp. 314n26.  “[T]o remove the thinking of the gift, or rather of the trace of the gift – since it is 
also and still a matter of thinking of the trace – from the Heideggerian fourfold.” 
238 Ibid, p. 314n26.  God Without Being, pp.71 –72.  Marion  
239 HAS, p. 190. 
240 Italics mine.  HAS, p. 190.  See 'On the Question of Being,” in Pathmarks, ed. by W. McNeill 
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God 
God
God
God
48 
 
about God.  Once again, the metaphysical paradigm of negativity, like the Greek and 
Christian, turns out to be an affirmation of the horizon of being. 
 
2.4. Faith, Ontotheology, and Prayer 
 
In Identity and Difference, Heidegger writes that metaphysics is not theology.
241
  
But as shown above, Derrida observes that Heidegger does say we should remain silent 
as far as Being is concerned:  “…the point is, rather, not to allow the word Being to 
occur, on the subject of God.”242  And, above all, it should not occur as 'God'.  
Heidegger would always avoid thinking God's essence on the basis of Being:
243
   
 
Being and God are not identical and I would never attempt to think the 
essence of God by means of Being… If I were yet to write a theology 
[then] the word Being would not occur in it.  Faith does not need the 
thought of Being.  When faith has recourse to this thought, it is no 
longer faith.  …One could not be more reserved than I before every 
attempt to employ Being to think theologically in what way God is God. 
…Being can never be thought as the ground and essence of God 
….[N]evertheless the experience of God and of his manifestedness, to 
the extent that the latter can indeed meet me, flashes in the dimension of 
Being, which in no way signifies that Being might be regarded as a 
possible predicate for God.
244
 
 
 For Derrida, the denial or avoidance of theology in Heidegger's response is 
                                                                                                                                               
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 310. 
241 HAS, p. 314n29.  See Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. by J. Stambaugh (New York: Harper 
& Row Publishers, 1969), pp. 54–55.  “Someone who has experienced theology in his own roots, 
both the theology of the Christian faith and that of philosophy, would today rather remain silent about 
God when he is speaking in the realm of thinking.  For the onto-theological character of 
metaphysics has become questionable for thinking, not because of any kind of atheism, but from the 
experience of a thinking which has discerned in onto-theology the still unthought unity of the 
essential nature of metaphysics.” 
242 HAS, p. 191.  ‘Being’ “should not take place, happen, arrive (vorkommen) in his text.”  HAS, p. 
190. 
243 Ibid, p. 191.  This is affirmed by Heidegger in a seminar at the University of Zurich, in answer to 
students of the university. The transcript was apparently initially privately circulated, and was later 
translated into French by F. Fédier and D. Saatdjian as Séminarire de Zuirch, in Poésie, 13 (Paris, 
1980).  It is the same passage referred to and translated in Marion's God Without Being, pp. 61–62; 
see also p. 211n16, where the passage is cited by Marion in German as originally transcribed from the 
lecture. 
244 Cited in God Without Being, pp. 61–62. 
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indication that what Heidegger says is already being written as a theology.
245
  What 
Heidegger allows to happen in his lecture – which he says should not occur – is the 
appearing of Being and God in the same place.  Heidegger's “theology of Being” has 
already taken place.  And this is not surprising.  Heidegger himself conceives of 
revelation (Offenbarung) as the experience of Being:  The possibility of revelation, 
manifestedness (Offenbarkeit) “flashes” in the very dimension of Being.  As Derrida 
explains, “the dimension of Being gives access to the advent, the experience, the 
encounter with this God who nevertheless is not.”246 
 
 “Dimension” connotes an event, a happening, a place.  Earlier on, Heidegger 
says Plato's khōra falls short of thinking the place of the wholly other.  Heidegger, too, 
falls short in his thinking of Being.  Indeed, if Being is for Heidegger the dimension of 
opening thought to the source of all thinking, then it is also the “antechamber” that 
opens thought to God – which recalls Eckhart’s dictum that we can only think about 
God via the thinking of being.
247
  So, for Derrida, it is not clear if Heidegger think the 
ground of being without, ultimately, thinking about God.   Speaking about God – even 
if to say how we must (should) avoid God-talk – already necessarily engages thought 
about being and, hence, metaphysics.  So Heidegger could no more write a theology 
without Being, then write a philosophy without God.  The moment theology speaks as 
if God is without ‘Being’, one engages in metaphysics; the moment philosophy speaks 
of Being as if it were without 'God', one does theology.  For Derrida, the separation of 
theology and philosophy is a “fiction or fable”.  Onto-theology is still not overcome. 
 
 Still, Heidegger writes in denial of theology, which does not mean Heidegger 
never prays.  Interestingly, Derrida compares Heidegger’s lecture remarks on 
metaphysics and theology to Pseudo-Dionysius’ presentation of his Mystical Theology 
to Timothy:  Both were texts of “pedagogical or psychagogical virtue...on an agogic 
                                                 
245 HAS, p. 191.  So “he [Heidegger] knows that what he says is already being written [as a theology].” 
246 Ibid, p. 191. 
247 Ibid, p. 192.  “This dimension of opening, this place that gives place without being either essence or 
ground – is this step or passage, this entryway that gives access to God, not the 'antechamber' 
[forecourt of being] that Meister Eckhart speaks of?”  Eckhart, 'Sermon Sixty-Seven', trans. 
McGinn, p. 343:   “When we receive God in being, we receive Him in His forecourt, for being is 
the forecourt of His dwelling.” 
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path”, inciting thought about Being, about God. 248   Of course, unlike Pseudo-
Dionysius’ text, Heidegger's contains no prayer.249  After all, Heidegger is not writing 
theology.  There is no reference to an other (a Thou), either God or the students or 
reader.
250
   All this is consistent with Heidegger's distinction between philosophy and 
theology:  “Faith does not need the thought of being.  When faith has recourse to this 
thought, it is no longer faith.”251   
 
Yet, Derrida thinks there is in Heidegger “a sign of respect for prayer.”252  
Pseudo-Dionysius quotes a prayer and addresses it to Timothy – all by way of 
predicative discourse.  But as explained earlier, it is a discourse the supplement 
Pseudo-Dionysius’ pure address to God.  Derrida notes something similar in 
Heidegger:  His use of predicative and propositional language is actually a form of 
apostrophe that supplements prayer, that is, Heidegger’s posture of reverence for Being.  
As Derrida’s deconstruction of the metaphysical paradigm shows, God is never far from 
Heidegger’s thinking of Being.   As such, Heidegger’s reverence for Being is never 
absolutely distinguished from God, from theology.  Heidegger’s writings and lectures 
are supplements to his pure prayer addressed to Being.  Because of this, prayer itself – 
the posture of addressing Being or God, makes ontotheology (theiology) and theology 
possible.
253
  Conversely, ontotheology and theology are discourses that “mark” the 
trace of pure prayer to the wholly other (Being, God).  As Derrida’s says at the end of 
his Jerusalem lecture, without the supplement of discourse, “there would be no prayer, 
no pure possibility of prayer”.254  Prayer itself is the trace – the source and origin of 
discourse itself. 
                                                 
248 HAS, p. 193. 
249 Ibid, p. 193.  “The absence of prayer, or of apstrophe in general, also confirms the predominance of 
the theoretical, 'constative,' even propositional form...”  Ibid, p. 194. 
250 Ibid, p. 194. 
251 Cited in God Without Being, p. 61.  Heidegger, of course, does not say one does not continue to 
think in theology.  Rather, theology thinks but not in the way philosophy is tasked to do so.  
“Within thought, nothing could be accomplished that could prepare for or contribute to determining 
what happens in faith and grace.  If faith summoned me in this way, I would close down shop. – of 
course, within the dimension of faith, one still continues to think; but thinking as such no longer has a 
task.”  Jean Greisch, Heidegger et al question de Dieu, p. 335, cited in HAS, p. 194. 
252 HAS, p. 194. 
253 Ibid, p. 195. 
254 HAS, pp. 194–195.   
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3. How to Avoid Speaking (of Negative Theology): 
Saturated Phenomenon and Denomination 
 
There are two editions of Marion's essay.  The first is found among the 
collection of essays from the Villanova conference, God, the Gift and 
Postmodernism.
255
  It was later edited by Marion and republished in a collection of his 
writings, In Excess (2002), with a slightly different title:  ‘In the Name: How to Avoid 
Speaking of It’.256  In the edited version, “Negative Theology” is omitted from the 
original subtitle, implying the essay is less about negative theology and more about how 
not to speak about the name of God.  It also omits Derrida’s response to Marion’s 
essay.  Furthermore, the changes and additions give Marion's essay a more apophatic 
emphasis; at the same time, they accentuate Marion’s disagreement with Derrida’s 
criticism of negative theology.
257
  Finally, Marion also omits ‘Him’ when referring to 
God, avoiding a masculine predicate for the divine. 
 
3.1. Metaphysics of Presence and Negative theology 
 
Derrida thinks negative theology is a hyper-theology of presence.  So Marion’s 
issue here is whether negative theology should be understood the way Derrida 
“deconstructs” it.258   
 
He begins by tracing Derrida's critique of negative theology to two of Derrida’s 
earlier lectures:  First, the Jerusalem lecture of 1987, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: 
Denegations’, and the Paris lecture in 1968, ‘Différance’.259  In both lectures, Derrida 
argues that negative theology is affirms God as hyperessence.  However, it is the 
                                                 
255 Ed. by Caputo and Scanlon (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), pp. 20–
53. 
256 In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena, pp. 128–162.  The bulk of the edited essay remained 
Jeffrey L. Kosky's translation.  Robyn Horner and Vincent Berraud translated the additions and 
changes that Marion made to the original essay. Changes are found both in the main body as well as 
the footnotes. 
257 See translator's note at the end of INE, p. 162. Also, see the translator's introduction to In Excess, pp. 
xix–xx.  
258 IN, pp. 20–21.  “Is 'metaphysics' always identified as and by presence, or can it also include 
absence?” 
259 IN, pp. 21–22 / INE, pp. 130–132.  See above, p. 2n4 and pp. 19ff. 
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lecture on différance that interests Marion, where Derrida denies différance is negative 
theology.
260
  Marion thinks Derrida’s denial and critique has nothing to do with 
negative theology at all but “[with] deconstruction itself, its originality and its final 
preeminence.”261  It is conclusion Marion arrive at early in his essay, which shifts the 
discussion from Heidegger's critique of ontotheology – the point at which Derrida’s 
Jerusalem lecture ends – to deconstruction itself.262  For Marion, Heidegger never 
speaks of the “metaphysics of presence”.  According to Marion, this phrase first occurs 
in Derrida’s Speech and Phenomena, where Husserl's phenomenology is referred to as 
“a metaphysics of presence in the form of ideality.” 263   The link between 
‘metaphysics’, ‘presence’, and ‘phenomenology’, is traced even further back to 
Derrida’s dissertation (1953/4).264  Derrida situates phenomenology within ontology.265   
 
However, Derrida’s intention is not as simple as Marion puts it:  In The 
Problem of Genesis, just as in Speech and Phenomena, rather than reduce 
phenomenology to ontology, Derrida demonstrates that phenomenology identified a 
paradox of difference between “presence” (a “dialectics” of experience) and “absence” 
(a nondialectic “primitivity”); however, phenomenology failed to worked on this 
paradox.
266
  So Derrida’s “deconstruction” picks up where phenomenology refuses to 
                                                 
260 See above, pp. 19ff. 
261 IN, p. 22 / INE, p. 132. 
262 IN, p.  21 / INE, p. 129. 
263 Italics mine.  Speech and Phenomena, and other essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs, trans. by D. 
Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 10.  However, Derrida refers to the 
‘metaphysics of presence’ as part of his discussion of “language as the proper medium of play 
between presence and absence,” the empirical and the transcendental.  For Derrida, Husserl's 
“metaphysics of presence”, phenomenology, determines a margin or horizon that also immediately 
invokes the other that lies beyond presence, namely, absence.  In speaking of phenomenology – of 
what presents itself to intuition, Husserl is also necessarily alluding to absence.  It is this 
difference between presence and absence that gives rise to Husserl's phenomenology as a “philosophy 
of life.”  Derrida’s project of deconstruction explores this area of difference (différance), not just 
presence. 
264 Published later as, The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Phenomenology The Problem of Genesis in 
Husserl's Phenomenology, trans. by M. Hobson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).  This 
was originally written as a dissertation for his diplôme d'études supérieures in 1953 and 1954. 
265 Problem of Genesis, p. 60:  “Phenomenology would no longer be quite mistress in her own house. 
Ontology would be already inside the fortress.”  Cited in Marion, 'In the Name', p. 48n2 (IN) / p. 
128n1 (INE).  Marion, himself a phenomenologist, conceives phenomenology differently. In the 
round-table discussion to the Villlanova conference, 'On the Gift', Marion states it is still 
phenomenologically possible to describe or grasp objects even if they do not appear within the 
horizon of experience, that is, when such objects are absent as such. 
266 See Derrida’s own introduction to the 1953/4 dissertation, Problem of Genesis, p. xxii, where he says 
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go.  Phenomenology is more than a house of presence for Derrida; it is a house that 
bears traces of absence as well. 
 
 Marion’s misinterpretations notwithstanding, he proceeds to ask:  First, can 
‘metaphysics’ be exclusively understood as ‘presence’, or as absence too?267  Second, 
is ‘negative theology’ a metaphysical discourse constituted by presence as well?  For 
Marion, it is clear Derrida answers yes to both questions.  Marion disagrees:  He 
argues that ‘negative theology’ is a modern invention since the Fathers and Doctors of 
the Church never mention it.  So Marion refers to the Alexandrian and Cappadocian 
Fathers, Irenaeus, Augustine, Bernard, Bonaventure, and Thomas; as well as Dionysius, 
who mentions ‘negative theology’ only once.268  Given the absence of the formula in 
classical theological thought, Marion thinks it must be a modern invention – that is, an 
invention of metaphysical thought.  It is this metaphysical formula – negative theology 
as “metaphysics of presence” – that Marion posits in Derrida’s works, especially in his 
lecture on ‘Différance’.269  There, Derrida critiques negative theology as a metaphysics 
of presence, of hyperousiology.
270
 
 
 According to Marion, Derrida denies negative theology as an authentic mode of 
                                                                                                                                               
that, “the motivation and the final sense of the phenomenological enterprise” as it develops in 
Husserl’s philosophy is understanding how the “dialectic of the nondialectic [primitive absence] with 
dialectic [presence]” conditions the genesis of the transcendental ego and, thus, experience itself. 
267 IN, pp. 20–21 / INE, p. 128. 
268 See MT ch. 3.  ‘Negative theology’ is mentioned in the same breath as affirmative theologies.  
Even so, Marion thinks it likely to have come from a redactor.  IN, p. 21 / INE, p. 129. Curiously, 
while Marion is satisfied to retain the name Dionysius without the prefix, “Pseudo-”, he refuses to 
accept the concept of ‘negative theology’ upon the authority of the redactor – who also presumably 
works within the tradition ascribed to Dionysius – that negative theology is a valid formula 
describing the apophatic project of theology.  It is not clear, then, if negative theology is an 
absolutely modern formula. 
269 Speech and Phenomena, p. 134. 'Differance' was originally delivered before the Societe Francaise de 
Philosophie. It is reprinted in Margins, as well as Speech and Phenomena. On this denial by Derrida, 
see also 'Letter to a Japanese Friend'. Indeed, this preoccupation with metaphysics and negative 
theology was already present in Derrida's essay on Levinas, 'Violence and Metaphysics', in Writing 
and Difference, esp p.144:  "At arms with the problems which were equally the problems of 
negative theology and of Bergsonism, [Levinas] does not give himself the right to speak, as they did, 
in a language resigned to its own failure. Negative theology was spoken in a speech that knew itself 
failed and finite, inferior to logos as God's understanding.” 
270 IN, pp.  21-22 / INE, p. 130.  “[Negative theology] is always occupied with letting a superessential 
reality go beyond finite categories of essence and existence, that is, of presence, and always hastens 
to remind us that, if we deny the predicate of existence to God, it is in order to recognize him as a 
superior, inconceivable, and ineffable mode of Being.” 
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deconstruction.
271
  More than that, Marion detects in Derrida the desire to distance 
deconstruction from the quasi-deconstruction of negative theology.
272
  Negative 
theology is for Derrida the only possible “serious rival” and, so, Derrida's critique of 
negative theology shields deconstruction against negative theology.  Moreover, while 
most critics interpret negative theology as a form of atheism, Derrida’s intention is more 
serious:
273
  It is “to stigmatize 'negative theology's' persistence in making affirmations 
about God...and thereby to point out its failure to think God outside of presence and to 
free itself from the metaphysics of presence.”274 
 
 Therefore, for Derrida, theology remains ontotheological.  In disagreement, 
Marion asks:  
 
[C]an Christian theology as a theology evoked by a Revelation remove 
itself in principle, if not in actual accomplishment, from the metaphysics 
of presence – or is it, in the final analysis, reducible to this metaphysics? 
Which amounts to asking: Is Christian theology subject to 
deconstruction, or not?
275
 
 
Here, Marion’s question recalls another:  What has Athens have to do with 
Jerusalem?
276
  As Marion frames his critique against Derrida, is become clear that 
                                                 
271 IN, p. 22 / INE, pp. 131–132.  The first moment Marion detects in Derrida is “an explicit 
denegation” wherein negative theology denies it says anything positive about God; the second is “an 
implicit denegation” wherein negative theology, in not speaking about God, in fact speaks about God 
and thus posits God into the horizon of presence again. On these two moments, Marion is quite right. 
However, it is with this third moment that Marion identifies in Derrida where a problem emerges with 
his interpretation of Derrida and his thinking on negative theology. 
272 IN, p. 22 / INE, pp. 131–132.  “For Derrida, it is not, as it is in his other readings of decisive 
moments in the history of metaphysics, a matter of deconstructing figures of presence that confess or 
lay claim to being as such; rather, it is a matter of deconstructing a project which is already an 
explicit denegation of presence, thus of deconstructing a quasi-deconstruction.” 
273 IN, pp.  22–23 / INE, p. 132.  However, see Sauf le nom, in On the Name, ed. by Thomas Dutoit 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995) p. 36, where Derrida implies that, if apophatic or negative 
theology inclines toward atheism, it is because it testifies to an intense desire of God, a desire that is 
never fulfilled.  In this sense, apophaticism testifies to a most radical notion of faith. 
274 IN, pp. 23 and 33 / INE, pp. 132 and 148.  In INE (p. 148), Marion's language is not as strong: 
“stigmatizing” is replaced with “marking”. 
275 Italics mine.  IN, p.  23 / INE, p. 134. 
276 For a proper understanding of the context of Tertullian's original question, see Allen and Springstead, 
Philosophy for Understanding Theology, p. x and p. 253n1.  Allen and Springstead suggest that the 
early Fathers had a positive outlook on what is known as philosophical theology today but Tertullian, 
and the Fathers with him, “rejected [the standards of philosophy and the philosophers] as the only 
standards and indeed as the proper standards to assess Christianity.”  Allen and Springstead base 
their interpretation on Robert Ayers' own study of the attitudes of the Fathers to philosophy. See 
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Marion aims to liberate Revelation and, therefore, theology from deconstruction.   
 
3.2. De-nomination 
 
 Derrida speaks of negative theology in terms of ‘denials’ or ‘denegation’.  
Marion employs ‘de-nomination’:  
 
It is no longer a question of naming, nor by contrast of not naming, but 
of de-nominating God...but with something close to a negation, and 
consequently also to undo from all nomination, to release and deliver 
God from it, thwarting it. In its ambiguity, de-nomination bears the two-
fold function of saying (affirming negatively) and undoing this saying of 
the name. It concerns a form of speech that no longer says something 
about something (or a name of someone) but which denies all relevance 
to predication, rejects the nominative function of names, and suspends 
the rule of truth's two values.
277
 
 
 This is the 'Third Way', similar to that laid out by Pseudo-Dionysius in his The 
Divine Names and The Mystical Theology.  In the words of Pseudo-Dionysius:  
 
[W]e know him from the arrangement of everything, because everything 
is, in sense, projected out from him, and this order possesses certain 
images and semblances of his divine paradigms [affirmation - Marion]. 
We therefore approach that which is beyond all [beings - Marion] as far 
as our capacities allow us and we pass by way of the denial and the 
transcendence of all things [negation - Marion] and by way of the cause 
of all things [third way - Marion].
278
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Robert Ayers, Logic, Language and Reason In the Church Fathers: A Study of Tertullian, Augustine 
and Aquinas (Hildesheim: Georg Olm Verlag, 1979), esp pp. 24-34, for Tertullian's attitude to 
philosophy.  In this regard, Pelikan makes another acute observation.  The tension with Greek 
philosophy coincides with theology adopting Latin as its medium of communication.  See Jaroslav 
Pelikan, What Has Athens To Do With Jerusalem? Timaeus and Genesis in Counterpoint (Ann 
Arbour: The University of Michigan Press, 1997), p. 2.  See also Pelikan's observation that 
Lucretius' via negativa was one of the first “counterpoints” between Greco-Roman philosophy and 
traditional Roman religion (pp. 3–8). 
277 Italics mine.  INE, p. 139. The same passage in IN, pp. 26–27, contains “or of denominating Him”, 
instead of “but of denominating God.”  It also omits “to release and deliver God from it, thwarting 
it” – which better alludes to what Marion is trying to say about de-nomination as a way of 'liberating' 
God from human categories – as if God needed liberation.  As for Marion’s mention of “the rule of 
truth’s two values”, it is a reference to Aristotle’s theory of apophantic speech.  See the above 
discussion on Derrida’s interpretation of prayer and praise. 
278 Pseudo-Dionysius, Divine Names, 7.3, 869D–872a. Marion himself is translating the original Greek 
in his essay.  See IN, p. 24 / INE, p. 135. 
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 Furthermore, in The Mystical Theology, Pseudo-Dionysius has this to say:
279
   
 
What has actually to be said about the Cause of everything is this. Since 
it is the Cause of all beings, we should posit and ascribe to it all the 
affirmations we make in regard to beings, and, more appropriately, we 
should negate all these affirmations, since it surpasses all being. Now we 
should not conclude that the negations are simply the opposites of the 
affirmations, but rather that the cause of all is considerably prior to this, 
beyond privations, beyond every denial, beyond every assertion.
280
  
 
 Marion recruits other authorities, namely, Thomas
281
 and Nicholas of Cusa.  
The latter speaks of affirmation and negation as paths to “learned ignorance”, a 
“darkness” of incomprehensibility by which we “approach the maximum, triune God of 
infinite goodness…who is forever blessed above all things.”282  Marion explains this as 
follows: 
 
This infinity does not revert to affirmation after passing through 
negation, but lays bare and circumscribes the divine truth as the 
experience of incomprehension [so that] '...in the shadows of our 
ignorance [negation] shines incomprehensibly the truth defined more 
precisely [eminence].’283   
 
So, Pseudo-Dionysius, Thomas, and Nicholas, speak of God as a knowing beyond 
affirmation and negation – the way of incomprehension.  This is the way of eminence, 
which Marion calls “denomination.”  And, as is clear from the above quotation, 
Marion’s critique of Derrida will consist of a theological defence of negative theology 
as a proper, if not more proper, discourse about God than deconstruction.  
                                                 
279 MT 1.2, 1000b. See also MT 5, 1048b. 
280 See IN, p. 24 / INE, p. 135. Luibheid and Rorem in a footnote to this passage acknowledge 
Dionysius' terminology here as a direct contradiction to Aristotle's own (On Interpretation 17a 31-
33), which states negations to be opposites of affirmations. Complete Works, p. 136n6. Marion 
concurs. See IN, p. 26 / INE, pp. 137 – 138. 
281 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1a.13.2 & 3, which discusses whether (i) language about God 
is apophantic and, (ii) language about God is metaphorical. 
282 Nicholas of Cusa, De Docta Ignorantia, trans. by John Hopkins, 2
nd
 edn  (Minneapolis: The Arthur 
J. Banning Press, 1985; repr 1990), 1.26.   
283 IN, p. 25 / INE, p. 136.  Derrida's critique can be applied here, namely, that apophaticism as 
practiced in theology tends to (i) emphasize incomprehension as a form of 'experience' and is, 
therefore, unable to escape immanence, and (ii) apophatic theology inclines to a hyper-affirmation of 
the divine, “eminence”. 
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Deconstruction denies the “third way”: 284   It interprets negative theology as 
unsuccessfully ‘overcoming’ affirmation and, instead, establishes a hyper-affirmation of 
an eminent being, hence, constituting a hyper-theology.  But Marion argues that, in 
theology, the “third way” overcomes both affirmation and negation – which implies an 
overcoming of knowledge, both its positive and negative forms.  Because of this, 
denomination is an unknowing of what was previously known by affirmation and 
negation.  The third way “means to overcome their [affirmation / negation] duel, just 
as it means to overcome that between the two truth values wherein metaphysics plays 
itself out.”285   
 
 However, denomination is grounded in God as the ‘cause’ (αἰτία) of all things. 
Marion translates ‘cause’ into the French, réquisit, which Marion further translates as 
demand (αἰτιατά), to demand (αίτέω).286  The ‘cause’ spoken of here is not the cause in 
the metaphysical sense.  It is “what all those who demand demand when they aim 
at Him [the One]
287
 from whom they come and to whom they return.” 288  
Denomination reveals an intimate relationship with the ‘cause’ toward which and from 
which all things owe their existence.  However, denomination does not give the name 
‘cause’ to God.289  Rather, “[w]ith αἰτία, speech does not say anymore than it denies – 
it acts by transporting itself in the direction of Him whom it denominates.”  
Denomination conditions pure address, what Derrida has called prayer. 
 
3.2.1. Hyper-theology: What It is (Not) 
 
                                                 
284 IN, p. 25 / INE, p. 136.  According to Marion, Derrida, “[i]n sticking with a straight 
forward opposition between affirmation and negation”, denies the third way.  “The hermeneutics of 
suspicion always runs the risk of arbitrariness and therefore should intervene only in the last instance, 
when no other interpretation appears possible any longer.” 
285 IN, p. 26 / INE, p. 138. 
286 INE, p. 135.  Also, Idol and Distance, §14, ‘The Request of the Requisite’, pp. 151–162.  See 
Jones, Genealogy of Marion’s Philosophy of Religion, pp. 21–24, who argues that Marion performs a 
somewhat “quixotic translation” of a Dionysian concept borrowed from Neoplatonism. 
287 INE, p. 139. 
288 Italics mine.  IN, p.  27 / INE, p. 139. 
289 IN, p. 27 / INE, p. 139.  See Pseudo-Dionysius, Divine Names, 5.8, 824b.  “He is all things since 
he is the Cause of all things. The sources and the goals of all things are in him and are anticipated in 
him. But he is also superior to them all because he precedes them and is transcendentally above them. 
Therefore every attribute may be predicated of him and yet he is not any one thing.”  (Italics mine.) 
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 The prefix hyper- (ὑπέρ ) is a point of contention between Derrida and Marion. 
For Derrida, negative theology engages a hyperessentiality and operates within the 
horizon of metaphysics.
290
  Marion adamantly disagrees:  When negative theology 
speaks of God as ὑπέροὐσίος, “this is to deny that God is a being of any kind, even the 
highest or original being.”291  This ‘beyond’ is the same employed by St. Paul, echoed 
in Pseudo-Dionysius, which refers to the ‘beyond’ of ‘logos’, being, existence, 
understanding and knowledge.
292
  It is not a matter of knowing the “superessential 
essence” but praising it.293 Likewise, John Scotus Eriugena states hyperessentiality 
functions to go beyond the language of essences.
294
  Denomination does not say what 
God is but what God is not, “for he declares he is not essence, but more than 
essence.”295 Yet, if God is “more than essence,” then God is affirmed as hyperousious.  
Derrida detects this hyper-affirmation of that which is not just essence but more than.  
God is the most eminent being, beyond and more than being.  For Derrida, the 
language of essences is not negated, even if denied. 
  
 Marion is adamant that Eriugena is right:  To affirm God as beyond being is to 
negate essence; it is also to negate the denial of essence.  For to affirm that God is 
beyond all affirmation (‘yes’) and negation (‘no’ or ‘not’); God is “void” of essence.296  
This echoes Heidegger’s notion in, Phenomenology of Religious Life, of “the beyond of 
                                                 
290 Cf. John N. Jones, 'Sculpting God: The Logic of Dionysian Negative Theology', The Harvard 
Theological Review 89:4 (October, 1996), pp. 369 and 369n60.  For Jones, “negations proper [in 
Dionysius' negative theology] are so stripped of conceptuality that they do not risk delimiting God.” 
291 Travor Hart, Trespass of the Sign (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), p. 202.  Also cited 
in IN, p. 27 / INE, p. 140. 
292 Cf. Eph 3.18–19.  DN, 1.1, 558B; MT 2, 1025B. 
293 Italics mine.  See DN 5.1, 816B.  Also, see above, pp. 27ff.  In DN 5, 816A, Dionysius says:  
“We must go on now to the name of being which is rightly applied by theology to him who truly is.” 
(Italics mine.)  When Marion goes on to discuss prayer and praise, he omits this very crucial remark 
found at the start of DN 5. 
294 IN, p. 28:  “For one who asserts [God] to be superessential clearly denies he is essential.” In INE, p. 
141, this passage is preceded by:  “For when one declares [God] is superessential, one allows 
nothing else to be understood than a negation of essence.”   See Eiugena, De Divisionae Naturae, 
1.14; cited in Medieval Philosophy From St. Augustine to Nicholas of Cusa, ed. by John Wippel and 
Allan Wolter (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 130–131. 
295 IN, p. 28 / INE, p. 141. 
296 IN, pp. 50–51n29 / INE, p. 141n28.  Here, Marion cites Francis Bertin, who explains that the 
“super” (suoer) in superessentiality and “more than” “in no way imply a way of eminence which 
surreptitiously re-introuduces affirmations at the heart of the negations... one does not suggest that 
God is an Essence situated at the apex of the hierarchy of essences, but rather that God is essentially 
void.” 
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the Yes and No born of the thought of negative theology.”297  Heidegger’s calls the 
‘beyond’ the “enactmental not” (not-enactment).  It never takes place, always escaping 
determination in history and experience.
298
  It is impossible to objectify, name, or 
“enact” in any way.  For Heidegger, it “is not a refusal of enactment, not a setting-
oneself-outside of the enactment” in history.  Yet, it is known only through what has 
been enacted in history, in experience.
299
  The Heideggerian ‘beyond’ – transcendence 
– negates presence but, yet, it is affirmed through experience.   
 
Heidegger identifies this problem of “beyond” as that of negative theology as 
well.  However, he adds:  “The problem of [the ‘beyond’ in] negative theology 
appears, in a pale form, in medieval mysticism.”300   Mystical theology, as it has 
developed in medieval history, dimly reflects the Heideggerian ‘beyond’.  The former 
remains intent on ‘referring’ or naming the beyond; the latter sees it as “void”, a non-
identifiable reference.  Indeed, it is impossible to ‘refer’ to the beyond, unless one 
names it.  For Marion, the “hyper-” is also “void”.  However, he also says that 
denomination is now a matter of “referring to Him who is no longer touched by 
nomination” 301   One can pray to the God of mystical theology – the God of 
denomination, but not to the Heideggerian “void”.  Mystical theology is grounded on 
prayer and praise as a reference, a naming of the Referent. 
 
                                                 
297 “The thoughts of negative theology grew from similar motifs of the 'beyond yes and no.' ”  See 
Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, trans. by M. Fritsch and J. A. Gosetti-Ferencei 
(Bllomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004; repr 2010), p. 77.  Marion cites and 
does his own translation from the original German text.  See INE, p. 141n28. 
298  “Enactment” is a Heideggerian innovation in phenomenology:  “[T]he enactment-sense is the mode 
of comportment by which a relational-sense and a content-sense are seized within a historical and 
concrete horizon of sense – thereby unfolding the phenomenon itself as a lived unity of sense always 
susceptible of a transformation or re-appropriation. This enactment-sense, i.e., the intrinsic possibility 
for any phenomenon to undergo a transformation of its content-sense and relational-sense, constitutes 
the greatest Heideggerian innovation in terms of phenomenological description.”  Sophie-Jan 
Arrien, 'Faith's Knowledge: Heidegger's Reading of St. Paul', in Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle 
Annual 3 (2013), p. 32.  
299 For Derrida, this will be a dialectic between the “non-dialectic” (beyond) and “dialectic” (the 
enacted). 
300 Phenomenology of Religious Life, p. 78. Here, 'negative theology' and the 'beyond' appear in the 
context of Paul's Second Letter to the Thessalonians, where Heidegger interprets the 'not' in terms of 
an existential mode of living that is neither a question of privation or negation but letting-be. 
301 Italics mine.  IN, p. 28.  Hence, it is “a matter no longer of saying the referent, but of pragmatically 
referring the speaker to the inaccessible Referent.”  (Italics mine.)  INE, p. 142. 
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3.2.2. Prayer and Praise 
 
 Derrida differentiates between pure prayer and prayer as praise.
302
 Praise 
affirms a referent, a presence, and identifies and names what is prayed to.  Again, 
Marion disagrees.  “Proper” names can name the essence of things but never the 
individual itself, which is referred to only indirectly by naming its “accidents”.303  
Metaphysically, names define “essences”, such definitions being only ‘accidental’ to the 
individual itself.
304
  So things themselves can be referred to by name but they are never 
their name.  In other words, the presence of the individual exceeds the names given to 
the individual’s essence.305  Unlike essences, which are definable, “presence” exceeds 
the logos of definitions and names.   Prayer and praise refer to the Presence void of 
essence, definition, and name.  For the more a presence is named, the more anonymous 
it appears.  The individual is not its essence.
306
  And this is most true of God. 
 
 Mystical theology praises and names not God’s essence but presence.  Yet, 
names have an important function:  A prayer without names and naming is “[a]n 
anonymous prayer [that] would make no more sense than does the claim to attain the 
proper by an (im)proper name.”307  But prayer names in order to redirect our attention 
to a presence.
308
  Such “elevation” through prayer, which does not name, aims at union 
with God who is Unity.
309
  Yet, as seen above, this union is an obstacle for Derrida.
310
  
                                                 
302 See above, p.  29. 
303 IN, p. 29 / INE, p. 143. 
304Aristotle states that “there is an essence of just those things whose logos is a definition”.  Cited in S. 
Marc Cohen, 'Aristotle's Metaphysics', § 7, ‘Substance and Essence’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), ed. by E. N. Zalta, online 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/ (accessed, 27 March, 2014). 
305 Italics mine.  IN, p. 29 / INE, p. 143:  Therefore, “the individual [itself] does not coincide with its 
essence or its presence exceeds its essence...[and] an individual's presence remains anonymous in 
direct proportion to the degree to which its name becomes more present.” 
306 This is where Marion departs from Aristotle, for whom the primary essence or substance (that which 
is spoken in respect of itself, the individual itself) coincides with the essence.  This is definable, 
nameable.  See Cohen, 'Aristotle's Metaphysics', § 7, ‘Substance and Essence’. 
307 But has not Marion argued that all proper names are, technically, 'improper'? 
308 IN, p. 30 / INE, p. 144.  And, so, prayer is an “elevating ourselves toward him by sustained 
attention.”  Similarly, for Pseudo-Dionysius, “it is fitting to raise ourselves toward it [the Trinity] 
first by our prayer to it as the principle of goodness.”  DN 3.1, 680B. 
309 “Consequently theology [Scripture] praises the thearchy, as αἰτία of all things, with the name unity.”  
Italics mine.  DN 13.3, 980b; cited in IN, p. 51n31 / INE, p. 144n31. 
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This elevation of being with God inscribes God within being and, thereby, brings God to 
presence.  Such union anticipates what Marion alludes to in Heidegger, namely, “the 
interpretive comprehension of what is aimed at on the basis of and to the measure of the 
intonation of the one who intends”.311  Mystical union inscribes God within presence, 
comprehension, and discourse, since “the intonation of the one who intends” brings God 
into the act of “interpretive comprehension”.  This is the heart of Derrida’s critique of 
mystical theology. 
 
3.2.3. The Good Without Being , Otherwise Than Being 
 
It is self-evident to Marion that Pseudo-Dionysius employs being to God and 
creatures equivocally.  Moreover, God is, first and foremost, not a metaphysical cause 
of creation – not Being – but the Good (ἀγάθων).312   All being and non-being 
participate in the Good that surpasses (ύπέρ) both beings and non-beings.313  It is 
above being and non-being, presence and absence.  So even if “the Good” is the most 
revered of names, it is “without essential impact.”314  It is not only without being; it is 
otherwise than being.  In this way, Marion argues that the Good is the tout autre, the 
wholly other, other than being. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
310 See above, p. 21. 
311 Italics mine.  IN, p. 30 / INE, p. 144.  Marion is here commenting on Heidegger's explication of the 
phenomenological, “as” – a pragmatic structure of understanding based on interpretations of what 
things can possibly mean for the subject.  See Being and Time, §32.  This is a crucial reference on 
Marion's part for, with this, he establishes the way of denomination as an “interpretive” act of 
“comprehension” that is dependent on how the subject understands existence, hence, effectively 
putting into question Marion’s notion of phenomenon that exceeds the subject.  Cf. also Being and 
Time, §34, where Heidegger discusses 'being-there', discourse and language, as the disclosure of 
existence. 
312 IN, p. 31 / INE, p. 145.  Cf. DN 4.3, 697A; 4.7, 704B; 4.10, 705D. 
313 DN 5.1, 816B. 
314 IN, p. 32 / INE, p. 147.  Marion's language is ambiguous (see IN, p. 32):  “Goodness transcends 
Being on principle, but it itself does not attain the essence and hovers, so to speak, between the 
derived names and the un-namable. Thinking God without Being and only without Being does not, 
however, end up thinking goodness otherwise than Being – goodness remains undetermined and, in 
any case, without essential impact.” (Italics mine.) Does he mean that the Good is inscribed in the 
horizon of Being, after all – even if not absolutely?  This passage is slightly revised in INE (p. 147): 
'Being' is changed to 'being', which raises another question, namely, is the Good (and God) now 
thinkable in terms of Being, but not being?  DN 13.1, 977B:  “...let us proceed now to the most 
enduring [name] of them all”; “...the name that is most revered” (DN 13.3, 981A).  But, see also DN 
13.3, 981A.  “...we cannot even call [the unity of the Godhead] by the name of goodness.”  
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 Marion suggests this is makes mystical theology a pragmatic discourse where 
the presence of the tout autre forms the response of the one who prays.
315
  The Good, 
the wholly other, does not appear in the horizon of being.  Yet, the Good (tout autre) 
elicits my response to it, first and foremost, as a response by “hearing” what is for me an 
“intended” non-object, that is, absent to my intentions.  It is no longer ‘learning’ about 
the Good (the Other) but, rather, ‘hearing’ and ‘listening’ to it – obeying it.316  As 
wholly other, the Good is unknown and, therefore, absent.  This much Derrida will 
agree. 
 
3.3. Privilege of Unknowing (Marion's apophatic theology)317 
 
Marion’s apophaticism is a “theology of absence”.318  He does not have a 
problem with the metaphysics of presence per se but, rather, what it tends toward, 
namely, conceptual idolatry.
319
   Idolatry violates the God who is unknown and remains 
the unknowable:  No thought can think (‘gaze’) the essence of God and live.320   For 
Marion, the “metaphysics of presence” – and deconstruction -- constitutes idolatry in 
bringing God under its gaze.  The only way that remains to know God is through 
unknowing.  Mystical theology assumes the responsibility of vanquishing idolatry of 
any sort.  Pseudo-Dionysius himself teaches, “God is known by knowledge and also by 
unknowing.... [I]t is the most divine knowledge of God that one knows through 
                                                 
315 “It is a matter of being exposed in one's intending a non-object, exposed to the point of receiving 
from this non-object determinations that are so radical and new that they speak to me and shape me 
far more than they teach and inform me.”  Italics mine.  IN, p. 32 / INE, p. 148.  Here, several 
questions: What does an “intention” toward a non-object phenomenologically appear as, if it appears 
at all? And, since non-objects are non-determined – do not appear as such, what sort of 
determinations can one receive from non-objects? 
316 See also below, p. 66.  
317 For Derrida’s notion of “unknowing”, see the above discussion on the Secret, p. 34.  Caputo, 
Prayers and Tears, §8, “The Secret”, pp. 101–112. 
318 IN, p. 33 / INE, p. 149.  Theology has nothing to gain “by being integrated in presence in its most 
clearly metaphysical sense” since it has “the means, the intention, and also every reason not to yield 
[banally]
318
 to the metaphysics of presence.” 
319 This is “the same [idolatry] as that of the gaze: imagining oneself to have attained God and to be 
capable of maintaining him under our gaze like a thing of the world.  And the Revelation of God 
consists first of all in cleaning the slate of this illusion and its blasphemy.”  Italics mine. IN, p. 34 / 
INE, p. 150.  For a fuller account of Marion's notion of the ‘gaze’, see God Without Being, pp. 7–24.  
Marion distinguishes two types of ‘gaze’, the first being ‘idolic’, the second, ‘iconic’.  In the first, 
the subject gazes at the object in order to represent it to itself.  In the second, the subject who gazes 
at the object is gazed at in return and, consequently, the object forms the subjectivity of the knower. 
320 Cf. John 1.18:  “No one has seen God...”.  Also, Ex 33.23:  “nobody can see my face.” 
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unknowing.”321  So, it is necessary that theology speaks of God by affirmation, which 
must then be negated.
322
  Again, Marion cites support from the Church Fathers and 
Doctors:
323
  They affirm that “theology does not consist in naming God properly, but 
in knowing him precisely as what cannot be known properly – what must not be known, 
if one wants to know it as such.”324  For Marion, God is the “known unknowability” as 
such, which “disqualifies” all attempts at presence.325  One may ask, as Derrida does, if 
this disqualification is ever absolute. 
 
Marion cites a historical incident that illustrates the theology of absence and 
denomination:  The heresy called “Arianism”.326   The Church Fathers know God 
through unknowing; the Arians understand God through the “primacy of presence.”327  
As Marion explains, the Arian position is two-fold:  First, the essence of Christ (the 
Son) is defined as being “begotten”, while God is essentially “unbegotten”; second, as 
Eunomius argued, that the substance or essence of God is “signified by his name”, that 
is, “the unbegotten”.328  For the Arians, the name of God and Christ coincide with their 
respective persons.  They “include God within presence” by giving Him a name.  To 
Gregory of Nyssa, this amounted to knowing God “as God knows himself”. 329  
Contrary to the Arians, the Fathers employed denomination to counter conceptual 
idolatry.  In the end, denomination won the day and shaped orthodoxy, which for 
Marion is born out of the passion “liberate” God from metaphysics and presence.   
 
 Therefore, to know God is to know without comprehension.
330
  As Marion 
                                                 
321 DN 7.3, 872a (trans. Kosky, in IN, p. 34 / INE, pp. 150–151.)  Here, Derrida will not take issue with 
the doctrine of knowing through unknowing, but rather with a subsequent teaching about another 
mode of reaching God, namely, a "union [that takes place] far beyond the mind." 
322 IN, p. 34 / INE, p. 150. 
323 Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, the Alexandrians, Origen, Philo, Athanasius, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, 
John Chrysostom, John of Damascus, Augustine, Bernard, Thomas. 
324 IN, p. 35 / INE, p. 152. 
325 Italics mine.  INE, p. 152. 
326 The fourth century Christological heresy, which denied the full divinity of Christ.  Named after 
Arius of Alexandria (d. 336). 
327 See IN, pp. 35–36 / INE, pp. 152–154. 
328 Eunomius (d. 393) was the Arian bishop of Cyzicus, Mysia. 
329 Gregory, On the Incomprehensible Nature of God, 2.1g; cited in IN, p. 36 / INE, pp. 153–154. 
330 IN, pp. 36–37 / INE, pp. 154–155.  
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explains, ‘knowing by not knowing’ is not equivalent to “ignorance” – the absence of 
any knowledge whatsoever, nor is it the inability to know.  These constitute the “failure 
of knowing”.  But neither is it “knowing with the intention of knowing more”.  Rather, 
it is a knowledge accessed by a “radical apophasis”, reminiscent of Anselm's ontological 
argument:  ‘Knowing without knowing’ means the intuition of a presence that exceeds 
comprehension, that is, conceiving “an other still greater than the one we comprehend”, 
namely, the “Incomprehensible”. 331  In this “known unknowability”, Marion states 
that “Incomprehensibility therefore belongs to the formal definition of God...”  In sayin 
this, however, is Marion’s “formal definition of God” as “Incomprehensibility” contrary 
to the telos of mystical theology, denomination? 
 
 Marion does not think so.  He further explains knowing by unknowing in two 
movements:  First, affirmation – inscribing God as an object of knowledge within the 
horizon of metaphysics and being, which is the pre-requisite for the second movement, 
namely, negation – a denial of affirmation that will “clear the way for the higher 
possibility of an infinite conception, beyond the comprehensible”.332  As support, 
Marion cites Descartes’ response to the objections raised against Descartes’ ‘Fifth 
Meditation’:  We know of God’s “necessary existence” both by intuition as well as 
inference from our knowledge of created things.
333
  The existence of God is self-
evident for Descartes, who acknowledges that his position differs from Thomas 
Aquinas.  For Thomas, knowledge of created things does not make God’s existence 
self-evident to us since, as Descartes explains of Thomas, “we do not know whether his 
essence is immutable and true, or merely invented by us”.334  For Thomas, God’s 
existence is self-evident to God Himself since “God is His own existence”, but it is not 
self-evident to us.
335
    
                                                 
331 Italics mine.  IN, p. 36 / INE, p. 154.  See also Marion, 'Is the Ontological Argument Ontological? 
The Argument According to Anselm and Its Metaphysical Interpretation According to Kant', Journal 
of the History of Philosophy, 30:2 (April, 1992) pp. 201–218. 
332 Italics mine.  IN, p. 36 / INE, p. 154. 
333 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, ed. by J. Cottingham, rev. edn (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996; repr 1999) pp. 99–102.  Also, L. Nolan’s introduction to his 
article, “Descartes' Ontological Argument”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 
Edition), ed. by E. N. Zalta, online http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/descartes-
ontological/ (accessed, 29 March 2014). 
334 Meditations, 'Objections and Replies', p. 100. 
335 ST, Ia.2.ad:  “I say that this proposition, “God exists,” of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the 
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 Marion apparently agrees with Descartes that the existence of God is self-
evident.  After all, for Marion, God is by “formal definition” that than which nothing 
greater can be conceived, the “Incomprehensible”.336  He even dictates the way to 
infinite conception: “knowledge [of God] holds only if comprehension ceases.”337  The 
“privilege of unknowing” for Marion is a certitude, namely, that knowledge of God 
consists of self-evident knowledge of the One, of which nothing greater can be 
conceived.  We know this eminent by leaving comprehension and turning to the 
incomprehensible.  So there is knowledge of God.  God is the “Incomprehensible”.338 
 
3.3.1. A Theology of Absence 
 
 Knowledge as comprehension reduces God to “presence”, while a theology of 
“absence” knows God as “Incomprehensible”, beyond comprehension.  So God (tout 
autre) remains inconceivable, unknown, absent.  For Marion, this is not a nihilistic 
absence but is analogous to the Heideggerian Nothing – as opposed to existents that are 
knowable, comprehensible.  Therefore, Marion's “theology of absence” refers God 
beyond presence.  In this theology of absence, “the name is given as having no name, 
as not giving the essence, and having nothing but this absence to make manifest”.339  
“Absence” becomes a characteristic of the manifestation of God, vis-à-vis Revelation. 
 
A theology of absence responds to revelation by obedience derived from 
hearing.  This is an implicit point in Marion’s essay.  He cites St. Paul – “not only in 
                                                                                                                                               
same as the subject; because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (Q. 3, A. 4).  Now 
because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be, 
demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature – namely, by 
effects.” 
336 IN, p. 37 / INE, p. 154. 
337 Italics mine.  IN, p. 37 / INE, p. 155.  For a critique of Marion's ‘dogmatic’ train of thinking, see 
Mark Manolopoulos, 'When Marion's Theology Seeks Certainty', in Journal of Cultural and 
Religious Theory 4.1 (2002).  Online, 
<http://www.jcrt.org/archives/04.1/markmanolopoulos.shtml>, accessed, 29 May, 2013.  
338 IN, p. 37 / INE, p. 155:  “[K]nowledge cannot rise up to itself except by transgressing itself until it 
becomes an unknowing, or rather until it becomes a knowledge that is capable of acknowledging the 
incomprehensible, and thereby respects the operative, pragmatic, and endlessly repeatable de-
nomination of God as that than which nothing greater [better] can be thought”. 
339 Italics mine.  IN, p. 37 / INE, p. 155.  
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my presence but also in my absence” (Phil 2.12) – to illustrate how “absence” is the 
modus operandi of theology.  Yet, from the context that this quote is extracted, Paul is 
acknowledging the “obedience” of the Christians at Phillipi to what they have heard 
from Paul.  They “hear” and obey, rather than hear and “think”, before obeying.  
Marion leaves out this crucial element: “Therefore, my beloved, just as you have always 
obeyed me...work out your own salvation with fear and trembling.”340  In light of this, 
Marion’s “theology of absence” is oriented to a telos that does not consist in thinking 
the nature of God but, rather, hearing and obeying for the “working out” – the 
Heideggerian “enactment” – of one’s salvation.  The theology of absence consists of an 
existentialist turn described by Marion as a "pragmatic" theology of absence.
341
   
 
 This means that ontotheology, “the Greek horizon” of theology, is 
overcome.
342
  Marion is sure that essence and presence are “missing” from such a 
theology of absence.  However, is that-which-is-absent (and has no name) not 
traceable in what is “heard” and “obeyed” – which are modes of experience, of 
being?  Essence and presence are not entirely missing, considering that one must “work 
out” one’s salvation through obedience.  So, granted that a theology of absence begins 
with hearing what has no name and is incomprehensible, this ‘beyond’ is still 
experienced in light of an “enactment” within the horizon of presence.  This existential 
“enactmental sense”, as Heidegger calls it, precludes the possibility of escaping 
ontotheology – even for a pragmatic theology of absence.343 
 
 It is easy to slip back into presence.  This may be why Marion sees the need “to 
shield God from presence”.344  This leads to another aspect of Marion’s theology of 
absence:  God, the Incomprehensible name, is also defined by “weakness...as well as 
strength.”345  In kataphatic theology, God is affirmed as perfection – omnipotent, 
omnipresent, and omniscient.  But with the theology of absence, Marion alludes to 
                                                 
340 Phil 2.12. 
341 INE, p. 155. 
342 IN, p. 37 / INE, p. 155. 
343 For a discussion on Heidegger’s notion of “enactment”, see above, p. 71. 
344 IN, p. 37 / INE, p. 156. 
345 Ibid. 
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“kenotic” theology, which refers to an event in the economy of salvation that manifests 
the weakness of God, or kenōsis:  Christ, who “emptied himself, taking the form of a 
slave, being born in human likeness. And being found in human form, he humbled 
himself and became obedient to the point of death – even death on a cross.”346  Marion 
implies a negation here, where Christ – “who though was in the form of God” (Phil 2.6) 
– emptied himself of his divinity, assuming humanity.  But Marion does not make the 
slightest mention of kenosis.  He simply remarks in passing that the theology of 
absence saves God from presence.  God’s “weakness” is implicit to Marion's theology 
of absence.
347
 
 
 God’s weakness is demonstrated in the Name that does not name.  With 
Gregory of Nyssa, Marion shows how absence is also the modus operandi of 
baptism.
348
  Gregory refers to Matthew 28.19, which speaks of the significance of the 
unnameable name in the context of baptism.
349
  For Gregory, since no name can signify 
God, the Name of God is beyond comprehension.  It “designates what is not named 
and says what is not named”.350  In baptism, the baptized does not learn to name God 
but, rather, receives a name from the unnameable name.
351
  This leads to 
Marion's understanding of the significance of the liturgy, where it is a matter of 
speaking to God and not about God.
352
  It is to do what Marion calls, “theo-logy”.   
                                                 
346 Phil 2.7-8.  This precedes the passage about hearing the message of salvation (Phil 2.12). 
347 On this note, see John Caputo, The Weakness of God: The Theology of the Event (Bloomington & 
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2006).  One reason Marion may have refrained from elucidating 
this aspect was to avoid a lengthy discussion on Christology.  Yet, this is improbable since two of 
Marion's key scriptural citations come from the same portion of Paul's Letter to the Philippians (2.9–
12).  He left out the kenotic attribute of God, merely referring to it as “weakness”. 
348 “[T]he Word [Jesus Christ], in saying this name, did not add to the tradition of faith what it is (how 
could he have found a name for a thing above all names?). But he gave our understanding the power 
to set about piously to find, according to its capacity, a name which indicates the supereminent nature 
and which is equally fitting to the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. . . . And this, it seems to me, is 
what the Word decreed by this form-ula [sc., say “the name” without saying which one] —in order to 
convince us that the name of the divine essence is unsayable and incomprehensible.” Basil, Against 
Eunomius, 2, §§14-15; cited in IN, pp. 37–38 / INE, p. 156. 
349 “Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the 
Son and of the Holy Spirit.” 
350 IN, p. 38 / INE, p. 157. 
351 IN, p. 38 / INE, p. 157.  For a discussion on Marion's debt to Gregory of Nyssa's theory of language, 
see Jones, Genealogy of Marion's Philosophy of Religion, pp. 14–43. 
352 INE, p. 157.  In the liturgy “it is never a matter of speaking of God, but always of speaking to God 
in the words of the Word.” 
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Mystical theology (the Third Way) “has as its goal...to make us receive our own [name] 
from the unsayable Name.”  Denomination saves God’s Name and, in doing so, 
determines a pragmatic relationship between God and us.  We do not name God but 
God names us; we are inscribed in God, whose presence shapes us.  Instead of theo-
logy (theology with an emphasis on logos, thinking), Marion insists on theo-logy, 
“speaking to God in the words of the Word.”353  This pragmatic relationship is realized 
in the “liturgical function of all theo-logical discourse.”354  
 
Thus, Marion connects denomination, mystical theology, pragmatics, and 
liturgy.  While the theologian’s task is to “silence the Name and...let it give us one... the 
metaphysican is obsessed with reducing the Name to presence, and so defeating the 
Name.”355  Theology is not metaphysics; neither is it Derrida’s deconstruction. 
 
3.3.2. The Saturated Phenomenon356   
 
 One can be forgiven for thinking that Marion is doing theology here.  The 
contrary is true:  Marion claims he is addressing the “formal possibility” of a theology 
of absence, that is, how the Name and absence to can be objects of phenomenology, and 
how it is phenomenally possible for us to enter into the Name.
357
  Marion is doing 
phenomenology.  As a phenomenologist, Marion inquires into the possibility of a 
phenomenology of absence, not its actuality.
358
  True to the phenomenological method, 
                                                 
353 INE, p. 157. 
354 IN, p. 38 / INE, p. 157. 
355 IN, p. 39 / INE, p. 158. 
356 IN, p. 39–41 / INE, pp. 158–162.  See also above, pp. 11ff.; and below, pp. 72ff.  In the revised 
essay [INE], this section is titled, "The Saturated Phenomenon Par Excellence" – an allusion to 
Marion's fifth type of “saturated phenomenon”, namely, Revelation.  Of the five types ('event', 
'painting', 'flesh', 'the face', and 'revelation'), Revelation is the “paradox [i.e. saturated phenomenon] 
par excellence”, since it is saturated in the same way as each of the other four possible types of 
sautrated phenomena as well.  See Shane Mackinlay, Interpreting Excess: Jean-Luc Marion, 
Saturated Phenomenon, and Hermeneutics (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), p. 11. 
357
 On the importance of the Possible for Marion, see above, pp. 14ff. 
358 “Phenomenology is to make decisions only about the type of phenomenality which would render this 
phenomenon [of absence] thinkable.”  IN, p. 39 / INE, p.158.  See also his 'Metaphysics and 
Phenomenology: A Relief for Theology,' trans. by T. A. Carlson, Critical Inquiry 20.4 (Summer, 
1994), p. 590.  “Of itself, phenomenology can identify the saturated phenomenon of the being-given 
par excellence only as a possibility – not only a possibility as opposed to actuality but above all a 
possibility of donation itself.”  Also, Being Given (p. 234) where he speaks of Revelation as a 
“possible figure of phenomenology as such” (Italics mine). 
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Marion is non-dogmatic in his consideration of a phenomenology of absence, the 
possibility of which appears where God speaks to us, giving us a name, where we are 
inscribed in the horizon of God.   This is the possibility of “Revelation” itself, and 
Marion wants to know “how should the phenomenon [Revelation] be described, such 
that we do justice to its possibility?”359 
  
 Husserl explained that all phenomenon is defined in terms of what appears 
(fulfilment, intuition, noema), and the appearing (significance, intention, 
noesis).  Marion considers three possible scenarios that arise in the interaction of these 
pairs:
360
 (i) Intuition and intention are adequate to each other, where the appearing 
intention is fulfilled (partially or fully) by the receiving intuition and gives rise to 
objective and adequate knowledge (“kataphasis”); (ii) intention exceeds intuition, which 
is unable to fulfil or realize intention and, hence, no objective knowledge arises since 
there is a lack of what appears (“apophasis”);361 (iii) intuition exceeds intention, which 
can never be adequate to the giving intuition since intention is unable to capture 
adequately what is given by intuition (“mystical theology”).  In (iii), one can have an 
intuition of an object without intending it, conceptualizing it.  Because intention is 
inadequate or falls short of what appears in intuition, this possibility gives rise to 
incomprehension.  This excess intuition over intention is the ‘Saturated Phenomenon’.  
For Marion, it conditions the possibility of revelation as a phenomenon.
362
   
 
 Marion’s saturated phenomenon moves beyond Husserl’s phenomenology, 
positing a different relation between what appears (noema) and the appearing 
(noesis).  For Marion, the ‘content’ of phenomena (intention) falls short of the ‘object’ 
intuited; so one can intuit an object without comprehending it.  But this contradicts 
                                                 
359 IN, p. 39 / INE, p. 158.  On criticisms facing Marion’s attempt of include all phenomena in 
phenomenology, including revelation, see Jones, Genealogy of Marion’s Philosophy of Religion, pp. 
4–5 and, especially, pp. 90–91.  Also, 'On the Gift', p. 70.  Marion expresses his frustration with 
criticisms against his phenomenology as being tainted with theological intentions.  He insists that 
his project attempts to arrive at phenomena that lie beyond theological concepts and, indeed, any 
intellectual comprehension whatsoever.  He says, “I think the difficulty for phenomenology now is 
to become more fair to some phenomena [including the divine] which cannot be described either as 
object or as being.” 
360 Husserl and Kant only take notice of the first two possibilities. 
361 Marion relegates 'atheism' and deconstruction to this second possibility.  IN, p. 40 / INE, p. 159. 
362 See also Being Given, pp. 189–199.  For Marion's elucidation of the possibility of Revelation as the 
gift par excellence, see Being Given, §§21–22, pp. 199–221. 
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Kant and Husserl, both of whom claim that an object can be intuited only by knowing 
and intending the object.  What appears in the appearing is determined by the knower.  
However, Marion suggests that it is possible that certain phenomena exceed the 
knowing intention.
363
  These appear as “surplus” intuition that intention is unable to 
organize.  “What is given disqualifies every concept.”364  Marion calls this the 
“undoing of the concept and intentionality”, which is also the aim of denomination.  
No concept of God can adequately name God, who exceeds thought and 
language.  Nevertheless, “God remains incomprehensible, not imperceptible” – in other 
words, God can still be intuited without being understood.
365
  Indeed, one can ask if 
God can be “given intuitively”, for this means that there is the possibility of an 
immediate perception of God without any accompanying concepts
366
 Marion 
acknowledges the possibility of phenomena that escape experience altogether, God 
being one of these.
367
  Again, he insists he is considering the possibility of such a 
phenomenon, not its actuality.  However, in order to entertain any possibility well, 
perhaps possibilities must be “hypostasized” as actual possible experiences.368  Indeed, 
Marion does this when he proposes that: 
 
Access to the divine phenomenality is not forbidden to man; in contrast, 
it is precisely when he becomes entirely open to it that man finds himself 
forbidden from it – frozen, submerged, he is by himself forbidden from 
advancing and likewise from resting. ... [I]t could also be that the excess 
of intuition is marked – strangely enough – by our obsession with 
evoking, discussing, and even denying that of which we all admit that we 
have no concept.  For how could the question of God dwell within us so 
deeply – as much in our endeavoring to close it as in our daring to open it 
– if, having no concept that could help us reach it, an intuition did not 
                                                 
363
 Being Given, pp. 196–199. 
364 Italics mine.  IN, p. 40 / INE, p. 159.  See also Mackinlay, Interpreting Excess, pp. 1–2. 
365 IN, p. 40 / INE, p. 160. 
366 IN, pp. 40–41 / INE, pp. 161–162. 
367 “It is by no means self-evident that every phenomenon must be submitted to the conditions for the 
possibility of experiencing objects and cannot sometimes contradict them. It could even be the case 
that this is a requirement proper to the phenomenality of God — supposing one admits its formal 
possibility, and what right does one have to exclude it?”  (Italics mine.)  Marion considers this 
objection (i.e. can God be intuitively give?) to be undeserving of a response “since it [the objection] 
no longer concerns the formal possibility of a phenomenon corresponding to the third way but is 
already concerned with its actuality.”  IN, p. 41 / INE, p. 161. 
368 Here one recalls Eckhart, for whom God “cannot be hypostasized [as an experience] and set over 
against the world as a transcendent being.”  See above, p. 5. 
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fascinate us?
369
 
 
 Marion’s saturated phenomenon suggests the possibility that God ‘appears’ as an 
intuition, not intention.  God can be thought but not known.  Beyond intention and 
concept, God is presence that precedes knowledge.  Nevertheless, Marion also speaks 
of God as an experience as well – a situation:  All concepts of God must be negated 
“so that we might…dwell in it.”370  The intuition of God already inscribes God in 
experience, albeit the experience of God as intuition.  Otherwise, how would such a 
God “fascinate us”?  So the saturated phenomenon continues to be, as Derrida would 
say, a discourse about God in the horizon of being.  It does not escape ontology.   
 
Therefore, despite Marion’s insistence – that his phenomenology makes it 
possible for God to appear to intuition without actually appearing as a concept, Marion 
denies the God of metaphysics only to affirm the God of phenomenology.  Indeed, one 
wonders if Marion is doing phenomenology as a service to theology.  In his essay, he 
closes with Basil of Caesarea, who exclaims against the Arians (the “metaphysicians of 
presence”) that it is a “dreadful thing” to give a name to him whom God has named 
above all names.
371
  As far as Marion is concerned, theology has the final say.
372
  
Nevertheless, as Heidegger might say, the experience of “‘dread’ precedes, and prepares 
for, the genuine meditation on ‘Being’.”373 
 
 
 
                                                 
369 IN, p. 41 / INE, p. 161.  This echoes John Calvin's sensus divinitatis, of which he says in his 
Institutes of the Christian Religion is present even in the minds of idolators, the impious, as well as 
the religious.  Faith and Reason, ed. by Paul Helm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 
143–145. 
370 Italics mine.  IN, p. 42 / INE, p. 162.  
371 See Basil, Contra Eunomius, 2.8; cited in IN, p. 42 / INE, p. 162.  Also, Against Eunomius, trans. by 
Mark Delcogliano and Andrew Radde- Gallwitz (Washington D. C.: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 2011), p. 140. 
372 Following Basil, who says: “whoever keeps before his eyes the tribunal of Christ and sees how 
dangerous it is to subtract from or add anything to what the Spirit handed down should not endeavor 
to innovate on his own, but acquiesce to what the saints announced beforehand.”  Against Eunomius, 
2.8, p. 140. 
373 See Werner Brock Dr. Phil’s ‘Introduction’ to Heidegger, Existence and Being (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Co., 1949), p. 226. 
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4. Conclusion:  Phenomenology, the Gift, and Revelation 
 
Having considered the respective positions of Derrida (section 1) and Marion 
(section 2), the present discussion concludes with an analysis of the round-table 
discussion on the question of the Gift.  This is an essential component of the discussion 
between Derrida and Marion, for it reveals the crux of their discussion on negative 
theology, namely, the possibility of a phenomenology of Revelation.  In their 
discussion, Derrida and Marion enact the inherent tension that Heidegger identifies in 
the project to overcome ontotheology, namely, the tension between philosophy and 
theology. 
 
4.1. Phenomenology of ‘Lack’ or ‘Excess’? 
 
Marion’s mystical theology is a culmination of a three-step process:  
Kataphasis, apophasis, and hyperbolism, which is beyond the kataphatic and the 
apophatic.
374
  Mystical theology – the “Third Way”, coincides with the hyperbolical, 
which is also the saturated phenomenon.  Two unique elements appear in Marion's 
saturated phenomenon:  First, it gives rise to presence as well as absence; second, it 
does this as a phenomenon of excess or surplus, where what appears (noema) exceeds 
the appearing (noesis).  Mystical theology and the saturated phenomenon intuit the 
presence of God as beyond what appears conceptually. 
 
 Immediately, two problems arise regarding Marion’s theology of absence in light 
of the Saturated Phenomenon.  First, whether a surplus phenomenon can appear at all 
given that it exceeds the intention that allows it to appear distinctively (as such).  
Second, granting the possibility of the non-appearing of an excess phenomenon, is this 
“excess” a hyper-phenomenon that ideally (that is, possibly but not actually) anticipates 
the presence of what remains unknown?  Is this, as Derrida would say, a hyperessence 
beyond phenomenal appearing?  So far, Marion’s arguments have implied that, 
although the saturated phenomenon is a problem for phenomenology (philosophy), it is 
the condition that makes mystical theology radically apophatic.  The challenge facing 
                                                 
374 'Thinking at the Limits', p. 19. 
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Marion is, therefore, philosophical.  How is the saturated phenomenon an object of 
phenomenological study if its appearance is non-apparent?  Is this a phenomenon of 
‘lack’ or ‘excess’? 
 
4.2. The Gift375 
 
 For Derrida and Marion, the Gift must be thought, even if it cannot be explained 
or known.  A gift that is known or understood is no longer a gift.
376
  A Gift – to 
remain a Gift itself – exceeds knowing and, therefore, presence and appearance; it is 
non-apparent.  Nevertheless, it can still be thought about.  Despite these agreements, 
however, Derrida and Marion differ on whether the Gift can be described 
phenomenologically.  Derrida insists this is impossible, unless one stops doing 
phenomenology.  However, Marion argues otherwise:  The Gift appears – is a 
phenomenon (presence), even if it is never an appearing (concept). 
 
 For Derrida, the Gift that exceeds comprehension is indescribable since it is 
unknown.  It falls outside phenomenology as a descriptive science.  Even the gift 
given through revelation is given within an “economy” of being.  Therefore, the Gift 
itself – pure Gift, is impossible.  The very act of acknowledging a gift – as given by 
someone, to someone, for some reason – constitutes the appearing of the gift as such.  
It is given; it is received; it is acknowledged; and, therefore, it is circumscribed in the 
economy of exchange.  The Gift itself, however, is always other than the economy of 
exchange.  Nevertheless, the impossibility of the Gift does not annul its existence.  
Rather, it demonstrates that the Gift never coincides with the givenness that enters into 
the economy of exchange.  The Gift exists but it can only be experienced, thought of, 
“through the experience of the impossibility [of the gift].” 377   For Derrida, the 
                                                 
375 This round-table discussion was moderated by Richard Kearney.  It was the final session of the 
conference.  Caputo and Scanlon, eds., God, the Gift, and Postmodernism, p. 19n21.  For the 
discussion itself, see ‘On the Gift’, in God, the Gift and Postmodernism, pp. 54–78.  Referred to as 
‘OTG’ here.  Importantly, see Marion, ‘Sketch of the Phenomenological Concept of the Gift’, trans. 
J. Conley and Danielle Poe, in The Visible and the Revealed, trans. by C. M. Gschwandtner, et al. 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), pp. 80 – 100. 
376
 Caputo, ‘Apostles of the Impossible: On God and the Gift in Derrida and Marion’, in God, the Gift 
and Postmodernism, pp. 200–210. 
377 Caputo, OTG, 60. 
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experience of this impossibility conditions the desire for the gift, a desire enacted in the 
repetition of giving.  The Gift never is given.  If it were, there would be no need for 
gifts.  Likewise, the Name of God is impossible, never given.  It is the experience of 
this Impossible Name that arouses a desire to know the name of God, making possible 
the repetition and supplements of prayer, praise, and theology.  Yet, the Name – like 
the Gift, never appears so as to be an appearing as such. 
 
Likewise, for Marion, the Gift ceases to be itself when it is reduced to the “lived 
experience” of the giver (donor), the experience of the recipient, or the content given 
(object).
378
  Phenomenology can perform this three-fold reduction of the Gift by 
inquiring about them.  However, this constitutes the gift within an economy, an 
experience of the gift appearing as such with an intention of giving.
379
  But Marion 
introduces a fourth possibility:  The Gift being given by an anonymous donor.  Here, 
the recipient receives the gift without knowing the giver or the intention for giving; 
what is received is pure gift, gratuity of the gift without intention.
380
  As such, “the gift 
intrinsically gives itself from its self-giving.”381  Even if content of the gift is known, it 
remains as being given without intention.  The Gift itself coincides with givenness and, 
therefore, appears but lacks the significance to be an appearing of any sort (as such).  
So it is not necessary for that which appears to always be an appearing in some form or 
other.
382  
The Gift is present without being present as such.  It is not confined to being.  
So, as Derrida himself observes, “[Marion] wants to free the gift and givenness from 
being, in a way.”383  However, Derrida is also adamant that Marion’s description of the 
phenomenology of the Gift is, in fact, its destruction.
384
  For the Gift that appears at all 
is already inscribed in experience, being, by virtue of its givennes. 
 
 In reply, Marion makes two qualifications.  First, the Gift that appears to me is 
                                                 
378
 Caputo, ‘Apostles of the Impossible’, p. 201–202. 
379 See OTG, p. 64. 
380
 Caputo, ‘Apostles of the Impossible’, p. 202. 
381
 Marion, ‘Sketch of the Phenomenological Concept of the Gift’, p. 100. 
382 OTG,, p. 57. 
383 Ibid,, p. 59. 
384 Ibid, p. 66: Derrida: “...what you [Marion] are describing under the authority of the 
phenomenological as such, is precisely the process of the destruction of the gift.” 
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not the same as the appearing of the gift as such – that is, a specific mode or intention of 
giving.  Second, the phenomenological concept of the Gift is possible so long as it is a 
description of the Gift itself that appears to me (my intuition) and not the gift as such 
that is an appearing as a specific intention or significance.
385
  The phenomenology of 
the Gift Marion describes is not a phenomenology of the gift as such.  Derrida objects 
to this as being “the first heresy in phenomenology”, for phenomenology is a descriptive 
science of whatever is appearing as such.  Phenomenology inquires into the ‘horizon’ 
of experience wherein what is given is not just what appears but, rather, what is given as 
such.  To do otherwise is to acknowledge the possibility of description of what lies 
with-out the horizon of determinate experience, of the as such.  For Derrida, this is 
what Marion suggests, namely, giving up the concept of horizon in phenomenology, 
which for Derrida is tantamount to being no longer a phenomenologist.
386
  For Derrida, 
Marion is not being faithful to phenomenology. 
 
 If Derrida is right, then Marion’s saturated phenomenon is disqualified as a 
proper study for phenomenological description.  After all, it exceeds the scope of 
phenomenology, which attempts description of determinate experiences within the 
horizon of the subject.  A phenomenon that appears to me but does not attain a specific 
intention for me is not a phenomenon I can describe.  Indeed, it can still be thought but 
it is not a study for phenomenology. 
 
4.3. The Event, Khōra387 
 
In light of these problems, Derrida finds it insufficient and self-contradictory to 
think of God in terms of the Gift.
388
  He prefers the Heideggerian Event, Ereignis.
389
  
                                                 
385 OTG, p. 66. Marion: “I do not recognize the as such as mine.  What I have said, precisely in that 
horizon, is that the question of the claim to the as such has no right to be made.” 
386 Ibid, p. 66. Marion: “I said to Levinas some years ago that in fact the last step for a real 
phenomenology would be to give up the concept of horizon. Levinas answered me immediately: 
Without horizon there is no phenomenology. And I boldly assume he was wrong.” Derrida 
subsequently acknowledges that he himself advocates the suspension of horizons and, therefore, 
unlike Marion, does not consider himself a phenomenologist any longer, although he adds, “I am very 
true to phenomenology.” 
387
 See above, pp. 12ff. and pp. 42ff. 
388 OTG, p. 67.  “[A]t some point I am ready to give up the word”. 
389
 Derrida does, however, has stated that khōra is not the Heideggerian Event.  See above, p. 44. 
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As Heidegger himself describes it, the Event does not take place but conditions 
(“grounds”) the possibility of events, what takes place.  Since it conditions the 
appearing of beings, the Event itself is other than being, other than appearing.
 390
  
Being other, the Event “exceeds” being, thus implying a ‘surplus’ to existence that 
recalls the above discussion on Marion’s saturated phenomenon.391  Yet, unlike the 
saturated phenomenon, the Event is not an excess of what appears; it does not take place 
and, therefore, is not.  Still, it conditions all appearing, grounding the impossible in the 
horizon of experience and making possible the occurrence of ‘revelation’ in history.392  
The Event precedes and conditions revelation.
393
  At the same time it gives itself in 
revelation, the Event withdraws, is self-concealed.  It does not appear though it makes 
possible all appearing.  For Derrida, the Heideggerian Event most resembles Plato's 
khōra.  
 
Like “deconstruction” and différance, khōra and Eriegnis designate something 
that is never present, never appears.  Yet, it is what conditions the possibility of 
appearing and presence.  If there is an “excess” here, it is not the excess or surplus of 
Marion’s saturated phenomenon.394  Indeed, Marion interprets the Heideggerian Event 
as an indeterminate appearance that has no specific mode of appearing as such.  It is 
for Marion a “phenomenon”.  Hence, the Event is an “excess” that appears but has not 
obtained an appearing as such-and-such an object or thing.  This is the saturated 
phenomenon.  But this is not how Heidegger himself and Derrida understand it.  The 
Event is not a phenomenon; it does not appear.  If it appears, it is always an appearing 
of such-and-such an object or thing that annuls the Event; the object or thing that 
                                                 
390
 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), trans. by R. Rojcewicz and D. Vallega-Neu 
(Bloomington and Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2012), p. 197.  “Beyng essentially occurs as 
the event of grounding the ‘there’ or, in short, as the event.” 
391
 “This event is itself a sort of excess, an excess unlike the existence of beings. Ereignis is not itself an 
entity, but it is not being as meaning either. It is the meaning-less or self-concealing giving of being 
as meaning.”  R. Polt, ‘Meaning, Excess, Event’, Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual, 1 
(2011), p. 27. 
392OTG, p. 67. Derrida: “That is why religion is interesting to me. I do not say anything against it, but I 
try to go back to a place or a taking place where the event as a process of reappropriation of an 
impossible gift becomes possible.” Derrida refers to this originary taking-place or event as khōra – 
not as described or interpreted by Plato but as understood by Derrida against Plato.  OTG, p. 73. 
393
 Heidegger, Contributions, p. 23.  “The event is the ‘between’ in regard to both the passing by of the 
god and the history of mankind.” 
394
 Marion performs a “hermeneutics” of saturated phenomenon in light of Ereignis.  See “The Event or 
the Happening Appearance”, in In Excess, pp. 30–53. 
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appears is an appearing that conceals the Event.  The Event withdraws at the very 
moment of the appearing of being.  Therefore, “excess” here is not a surplus 
phenomenon.  It is the void or Nothing that is absence, a lack, in the horizon of being.  
Heidegger and Derrida would never call it a phenomenon in the way it figures in 
Marion’s saturated phenomenon.  For Derrida, the Event always designates a lack or 
absence of what appears, while for Marion it designates a presence, namely, the self of 
what appears as itself, which exceeds the appearing as such.
395
  Most importantly, 
Derrida’s khōra is indescribable and unknowable, while Marion’s saturated 
phenomenon attests to what appears as a proper study for phenomenology.  Khōra 
never is and, therefore, escapes any possibility of phenomenological description.
396
   
 
 This is why Derrida and Marion achieve very different insights in their critique 
of negative theology.
397
  In speaking of ereignis, différance, the Gift, and khōra, 
Derrida is not doing phenomenology any longer but is moving toward the limit of 
phenomenology, from what is possible for phenomenology to what is impossible.  
However, the “impossible” cannot be defined, identified, or conceptualized, since like 
khōra it is not present or experienced.  It is not given nor givenness; it is never a Gift 
as such.   Derrida refers to the “impossible” as a “desire” for the pure gift, pure 
hospitality, pure justice, and “God”, the wholly other of what is possible for experience.  
The impossible can never be reduced to the economy or horizon of the possible, of 
                                                 
395 Marion, “The Event”, p. 31. 
396 “Among Derrida’s points is that Plato was being most serious of all, he was doing the hardest 
philosophy, when he was thinking the khōra: in his not knowing how to name or identify what is 
proper to the khōra, Plato had to confront the structural necessity of this ‘not knowing’ in the ‘being’ 
of every ‘identity’.”  Niall Lucy, A Derrida Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. 
68–69. 
397 “In negative theology the difficulty is not that we lack intuitions concerning God (we are 
overwhelmed by them), but that we lack concepts fitting God. What we share in common, Derrida 
and myself, is that the concepts have to be criticized even in theology, as they are deconstructed in 
deconstruction. But it is for opposite reasons. In theology...we receive an amount of experiences 
through prayer, liturgy, life in the community, fraternity, etc. The difficulty lies in that we have an 
utmost experience without the words, the significations, and the concepts able to utter it, to explain it, 
and to articulate it. ..... there was an excess of intuition over the concept or the signification.  So, we 
have deconstruction in that sense, that the most fundamental concepts of theology before Christ – Son 
of God, Messiah, Isaiah, Elijah, the prophet, and so on – all these concepts which nevertheless remain 
meaningful for us in theology now, were rejected as meaningless, not because they were criticized as 
such, but because they were devaluated by the excess of intuition. ....I do not want to claim that 
deconstruction is opposed to all this, but I assume that deconstruction cannot say it deconstructs 
because of an excess of the gift.”  (Italics mine.)  OTG,, pp.68–70. 
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phenomenology.  It remains pure desire, promise.
398
 
 
 What Derrida says about phenomenology, the Gift, and the impossible, has 
repercussions for his understanding of revelation.  Just as the Gift, the Event, and 
khōra, are ‘impossible’ to locate in the structure of experience, so is revelation:  It is an 
undecidable for Derrida, since he hesitates between two hypotheses about the possibility 
of revelation.  One can say the khōra or event precedes revelation.  But doing so 
implies that khōra somehow causally determines revelation, which is ontotheology.  
Alternatively, one ‘thinks’ retrospectively of the khōra or event as revealed through 
revelation – the experiential structure of religion.  However, doing so implies that 
revelation can somehow make khōra appear.399  This also amounts to ontotheology.  
Therefore, Derrida is undecided either way.  The best he can say is that revelation is an 
impossibility. 
 
4.4. Revelation 
 
 For Derrida, there is no event one can refer to as ‘revelation’, unless the source 
of its possibility is known.  Nevertheless, the possibility of the event called 
“revelation” is always already inscribed in thinking about an appearing, that is, what is 
called a “revealing”.  These phenomenal objects that are describable as revealed 
constitute “revelation”.  But Derrida is also aware that, to think about what makes 
revelation possible (the Event or khōra or the God), reason first accepts the appearing of 
something as ‘revelation’.  This is already to conceive or comprehend revelation as 
such, as something that takes place, which is not its possibility (the Event or khōra or 
the God).  This possibility – Heidegger’s offenbarkeit (revealability) – does not take 
place.  Like khōra and Ereignis, it does not appear with revelation as such, even 
                                                 
398 “Desire is not perhaps the best word. I mean this quest in which we want to give, even when we 
realize, when we agree, if we agree, that the gift, that giving, is impossible, that it is a process of 
reappropriation and self-destruction.  Nevertheless, we do not give up the dream of the pure gift, in 
the same way that we do not give up the idea of pure hospitality. Even if we know it is impossible and 
that it can be perverse... If we try to draw a politics of hospitality from the dream of unconditional 
hospitality, not only will that be impossible but it will have perverse consequences. So despite this 
perversion, despite this impossibility, we go on dreaming or thinking of pure hospitality, of pure gift, 
having given up the idea of the subject, of a subject-giver and a subject-receiver, and of thing given, 
object given. We continue to desire, to dream, through the impossible.”  OTG, p. 72. 
399 OTG, p. 73.  For a description of ‘undecidability’ as used by Derrida, see Lucy, A Derrida 
Dictionary, pp. 147–151. 
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though it conditions the experience of it.  So Derrida is alluding to the impossibility of 
locating revelation itself (offenbarkeit) in the structure of experience and, therefore, 
phenomenology.  What is revealed as such (Heidegger’s offenbarung) – the appearing 
of a determinable thing or object – is not that which allows the possibility of revelation 
to occur.  So, there is revelation (offenbarung) but, at the same time, revelation 
(offenbarkeit) is impossible.
400
  What is revealed as such takes place in experience and, 
therefore, annuls pure revelation of the other as other.   
 
 On the other hand, Marion is certain that the revealability is known through 
revelation, what is revealed.  His analysis of Heidegger’s distinction between 
revelation and revealability recalls the Transcendental subject of Kant and Fitchte.  For 
them, the subject is the agent or horizon of what is known (the Possible, or the horizon 
or limits of possibility).
401
  The subject decides which experiences are possible for 
knowledge.  As a consequence, whatever has been labelled as “revelation” tends to be 
dismissed by the modern mind as “impossible” – at the least, only partial – phenomena, 
which puts into question the very possibility of revelation itself.  For Marion, all this 
implies that something else:  The subject already comprehends a priori whether 
revelation is a possible phenomenon, which presupposes that reason already knows 
which phenomena should be considered revealed, and which are not.  The possibility 
of revelation occurs within the limits of reason.   
 
However, Marion thinks that, with Heidegger's distinction between revelation 
and revealability, a reversal of thinking occurs: The possibility of revelation 
(offenbarkeit) becomes the horizon within which what is known to be revealed as such 
(offenbarung) takes place.  This demonstrates an “excess” of revealability – a saturated 
phenomenon – not controlled by the knowing subject.  Instead, what the subject thinks 
is impossible is now contextualized within what Heidegger conceives as possible, 
namely, the revealed (offenbarkeit, khōra, ereignis, God) that takes place in the 
                                                 
400OTG, p. 73. Derrida: “Heidegger said, this is his position, that there would be no revelation or 
Offenbarung without the prior structure of Offenbarkeit, without the possibility of revelation and the 
possibility of manifestation. That is Heidegger's position. I am not sure. Perhaps it is through 
Offenbarung that Offenbarkeit becomes thinkable, historically. That is why I am constantly really 
hesitating. That is part of – what can I call this here? – let us say, my cross.” 
401 Ibid,, p. 74. 
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revealing as such to the subject.
402
 
 
 In other words, for Marion, revelation as saturated phenomenon figures in the 
experience of the subject and is, therefore, phenomenologically viable.  Revelation is 
possible – even if the subject fails to recognize that what is appearing is a revelation as 
such, and even if it is impossible for the subject concerned.  The possibility of 
revelation (offenbarkeit) exceeds the subject’s experience of what is or is not revelation 
(offenbarung).  As Marion insists, after Heidegger, “the impossible now is no longer 
what cannot be thought, but whose fact has to be thought.  So the question is, how is it 
possible to remain rational and to have a discourse dealing with the impossible?”403  In 
other words, Marion thinks revelation is possible.  More than this, its possibility 
consists in “discoursing” about the impossible, namely, that which is revealed in the 
revealing – khōra, ereignis, God.  Therefore, like the mystical theology of Pseudo-
Dionysius, God’s taking place (revealability) in discourse coincides with revelation.  
The task now is no longer to decide if revelation is possible.  Rather, it is to ask how 
one should discourse about the God that is revealed in revelation.   
 
 Hence the problem Derrida has with Marion's phenomenology of the saturated 
phenomenon multiplies.  While Marion is convinced that our thinking about God 
though revelation is possible, Derrida thinks it is not.  We can think God but we cannot 
know the impossible in light of the possible.  A discourse with the revealed in 
revelation – that is, knowledge of offenbarkeit through offenbarung, is impossible.  
Since we cannot know the impossible, we cannot speak of it, let alone speak to it.  One 
can only do this, says Derrida, if one is not doing phenomenology.  So, the question 
arises:  Is Marion doing phenomenology or – in light of his phenomenology of the 
saturated phenomenon – is Marion doing what Dominique Janicaud has accused him of 
doing, namely, ushering theology into phenomenology through the back door?
404
   It 
                                                 
402 OTG, pp. 74–75.  Despite this compliment, Marion insists that Heidegger’s “idolatry” consists in the 
latter inscribing revelation within the horizon of Being.  See T. Carlson, 'Marion, Jean-Luc', in 
Encyclopedia of Postmodernism, p. 238. 
403 Ibid, p. 74. 
404 Caputo refers to this as what Dominique Janicaud regards as Marion's theological hijacking of 
phenomenology, a move beyond the limits of phenomenology…”  See Caputo, ‘Introduction: 
Apology for the Impossible’, p. 7.  It is “what Janicaud regards as an illicit importation of the 
transcendent into phenomenology, a smuggling of the invisible into the visible.”  Caputo, ‘Apostles 
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may be neither.  Rather, Marion would insist that he is proposing a “counter-
experience” of what revelation is.  It is not, as modern phenomenology would suggest, 
the subject determining phenomena on the basis on knowing.  Rather, it would be 
acknowledging events we ‘see’ (intuit) but cannot understand or name.  Marion calls 
such phenomena events of “weak intelligibility”. 405   Accordingly, such counter-
experience is a different mode of ‘knowing’.  It will be a knowing without knowing, or 
an unknowing knowing, such as the Augustinian mode of 'incomprehensibly 
comprehending the incomprehensible' (incomprehensibiliter comprehendere 
incomprehensibile).  Comprehension of the incomprehensible escapes all 
objectification.  Nevertheless, as Marion’s explication of mystical theology makes 
clear, the incomprehensible itself is a presence that is knowable by experience, namely, 
in the experience of union.   
 
Therefore, an irony concerns the notion of absence that Marion espouses in his 
“theology of absence”.  The saturated phenomenon invokes a God who is intuitively 
present even though absent to intention.  Marion employs a phenomenology of the 
invisible to introduce a God that is intuited but unknown, the God of mystical theology.  
Derrida, however, insists on a divine that is impossible for thought and speech.  
Indeed, the desire for the presence of the divine makes possible thinking and speaking 
about God; it conditions the possibility of speaking in terms of revelation as well.
406
  
But the divine never appears in the appearing as a determinate presence.  To insist that 
this can phenomenally occur – as Marion does – is to insinuate that the divine itself is 
possibly revealed in revelation itself.  It is to say that revelation brings the other unto 
the complete presence of the knower, that is, vis-à-vis the horizon of being.  Such is 
ontotheology. 
 
Yet, if this can possibly happen, then God is no longer the tout autre glimpsed 
                                                                                                                                               
of the Impossible’, p. 208.  Also, see Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn”: The French 
Debate, ed. by D. Janicaud, trans. by B. G. Prusak (New York: Fordham Unviersity Press, 2002). 
405 Ibid, p. 75. Marion: “This counter-experience is, in fact, the correct and consistent kind of experience 
appropriate to every decisive evidence in our life-death, birth, love, poverty, illness, joy, pleasure, and 
so on. One may argue that the ability to posit this hypothesis presupposes a 'comprehension of what is 
impossible' and, hence, technically falls into the possible and knowable for experience.” 
406
 See Derrida, ‘Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ At the Limits of Reason Alone’, 
trans. by S. Weber, in Acts of Religion, pp. 42–101. 
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through a glass darkly but an event grasped through the revealing of a revelation – an 
event with which human discourse can happen.  This is what Derrida, in his critique of 
Marion, suggests the saturated phenomenon accomplishes:  Not content to leave the 
wholly Other as the Impossible of revelation, as pure absence, the saturated 
phenomenon pre-emptively includes the wholly Other as the Possible of revelation, as 
pure presence.  It is ontotheology in the guise of a phenomenology of the invisible. 
 
4.5. Enacting the Overcoming of Ontotheology 
 
Derrida and Marion find negative theology impossible for very different reasons.   
For Derrida, negative theology is a denial or negation of knowledge about God that 
translates into a hyper-theology affirming God as hyperousious.  When that happens, 
negative theology no longer remains apophatic.  Derrida’s deconstruction of the 
mystical theology of Pseudo-Dionysius and Eckhart also reveals the aporia of 
hyperessentialism inherent in what Derrida calls the Christian paradigm of the via 
negativa.  In this paradigm, negative theology no longer remains possible.  Despite 
Marion’s insistence that mystical theology a discourse on hyperessentialism and 
metaphysics of presence, Derrida thinks that theology is always a discourse in which 
God is, above all, an experience.  Theology is unable to escape ontology as far as 
Derrida is concerned.  Mystical theology is a discourse of presence, especially since it 
promises union with God, a teleological fulfilment of presence that is more ontological 
than apophatic.   
 
For Marion, negative theology mediates between affirmative theology and a 
hyperbolic and pragmatic discourse of knowing, namely, mystical theology.  This third 
way is the knowledge of God by unknowing or “denomination”, whereby discourse 
about God goes beyond affirmation and negation.  As such, negative theology gives 
way to mystical theology, which is also a “theology of absence”, a higher apophasis that 
overcomes both affirmation and negation.  Due to this overcoming of negativity, 
negative theology is no longer possible once mystical discourse establishes a pragmatic 
mode of encounter with the divine.  Negative theology always operates in the horizon 
of knowledge, of being, albeit as negation of being.  Mystical theology transcends this 
horizon, accessing a presence that exceeds knowing.  Marion calls this the saturated 
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phenomenon, which argues for the possibility of intuiting the presence of the divine 
despite being unable to conceptualize it.  In light of this phenomenon, negative 
theology becomes impossible, thus giving way to mystical theology. 
 
Using the saturated phenomenon, Marion also argues for the possibility of a 
phenomenology of revelation:  In the “saturated phenomenon” revelation becomes a 
valid phenomenological study.  Phenomenology must now take into account 
phenomena of intuition that exceeds intentions.  This is a phenomenology of a different 
kind of presence, where the “absence” of intention gives way to the fullness of intuition.  
In the saturated phenomenon, intuition precedes knowledge – being gives way to 
presence.  As such, Marion’s phenomenology welcomes all phenomena, a move that 
Derrida finds problematic.  As their discussion on “the Gift” demonstrates, Marion’s 
phenomenology makes room for revelation as an appearing whereby the divine itself 
gives itself.  Derrida questions if this is still phenomenology that welcomes the other 
as tout autre, absence.  If the divine gives itself in the appearing of revelation, it no 
longer remains other.   
 
Derrida, therefore, agrees with Marion that negative theology is impossible, 
although for different reasons.  More importantly, the discussion on negative theology 
accentuates Derrida’s disagreement with Marion’s on a more urgent issue, namely, the 
conflation of theological revelation and phenomenology.  For Derrida, divine 
revelation – where the divine itself gives itself in the revealing, is an impossibility. This 
is true to the extent that one is doing phenomenology, not theology.  But as far as 
Marion is concerned, theological revelation is a valid study for phenomenological 
description.  So, while Derrida insists that no discourse can safely overcome 
ontotheology, Marion thinks that this overcoming can be achieved by employing a 
phenomenology of the invisible – which Derrida conceives inscribing God into the 
horizon of what appears, namely, being.  Therefore, ontotheology repeats itself.  
Ultimately, the debate between Derrida and Marion can be characterized as a re-
enactment of the overcoming of ontotheology, and the inherent tension between 
philosophy and theology. 
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